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Abstract
This thesis work is in the area of modeling trust in multi-agent systems, systems
of software agents designed to act on behalf of users (buyers and sellers), in ap-
plications such as e-commerce. The focus is on developing an approach for buyers
to model the trustworthiness of sellers in order to make effective decisions about
which sellers to select for business. One challenge is the problem of unfair ratings,
which arises when modeling the trust of sellers relies on ratings provided by other
buyers (called advisors). Existing approaches for coping with this problem fail in
scenarios where the majority of advisors are dishonest, buyers do not have much
personal experience with sellers, advisors try to flood the trust modeling system
with unfair ratings, and sellers vary their behavior widely. We propose a novel
personalized approach for effectively modeling trustworthiness of advisors, allowing
a buyer to 1) model the private reputation of an advisor based on their ratings for
commonly rated sellers 2) model the public reputation of the advisor based on all
ratings for the sellers ever rated by that agent 3) flexibly weight the private and
public reputation into one combined measure of the trustworthiness of the advisor.
Our approach tracks ratings provided according to their time windows and limits
the ratings accepted, in order to cope with advisors flooding the system and to
deal with changes in agents’ behavior. Experimental evidence demonstrates that
our model outperforms other models in detecting dishonest advisors and is able to
assist buyers to gain the largest profit when doing business with sellers.
Equipped with this richer method for modeling trustworthiness of advisors, we
then embed this reasoning into a novel trust-based incentive mechanism to encour-
age agents to be honest. In this mechanism, buyers select the most trustworthy
advisors as their neighbors from which they can ask advice about sellers, forming
a social network. In contrast with other researchers, we also have sellers model
the reputation of buyers. Sellers will offer better rewards to satisfy buyers that
are well respected in the social network, in order to build their own reputation.
We provide precise formulae used by sellers when reasoning about immediate and
future profit to determine their bidding behavior and the rewards to buyers, and
emphasize the importance for buyers to adopt a strategy to limit the number of
sellers that are considered for each good to be purchased. We theoretically prove
that our mechanism promotes honesty from buyers in reporting seller ratings, and
honesty from sellers in delivering products as promised. We also provide a series
of experimental results in a simulated dynamic environment where agents may be
arriving and departing. This provides a stronger defense of the mechanism as one
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that is robust to important conditions in the marketplace. Our experiments clearly
show the gains in profit enjoyed by both honest sellers and honest buyers when our
mechanism is introduced and our proposed strategies are followed.
In general, our research will serve to promote honesty amongst buyers and sellers
in e-marketplaces. Our particular proposal of allowing sellers to model buyers opens
a new direction in trust modeling research. The novel direction of designing an
incentive mechanism based on trust modeling and using this mechanism to further
help trust modeling by diminishing the problem of unfair ratings will hope to bridge
researchers in the areas of trust modeling and mechanism design.
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Research in the field of artificial intelligence has recently been focused on designing
intelligent agents - software programs that serve to carry out problem solving on be-
half of human users and organizations to offload the processing required [81]. These
agents learn the behavior of the other agents in the environment, in order to make
effective decisions for their owners. Multi-agent systems arise when these agents
co-exist [81]. While the goals of the users and organizations may be articulated
clearly to propose certain specific actions for the agents, the agents often exist in
an uncertain and dynamic environment. Furthermore, the individual agents may
be self-interested. They interact with each other to achieve their own goals and
may therefore engage in deception.
Trust thus plays an important role in multi-agent systems. While trust has
many possible meanings, as in [54], we define trust as a belief an agent has that
the other party will do what it says it will (being honest, reliable and capable of
keeping its promise). The modeling of trust then provides a form of social control
and allows agents to reason about the reliability, capability and honesty of others,
in order to decide which other agents to interact with.
The research presented in this thesis is in this area of modeling trust in multi-
agent systems. In particular, we focus our attention on developing a framework
for trust modeling that will be effective in the application domain of electronic
commerce. We are encouraged by the way the Internet and other computer net-
works are changing the conventional way of doing business. As organizations bring
their business on-line, buyers can make orders directly through network connections
from anywhere in the world. These changes provide many benefits, e.g. high busi-
ness efficiency, reduced operation costs, attracting new customers, accessing more
opportunities, and convenient shopping [40, 9]. They also offer opportunities for
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electronic commerce to become increasingly popular and to exist worldwide [48].
For example, electronic commerce in Canada has grown from $5.7 billion to over $28
billion from 2000 to 2004 [51]. As also pointed by Noce and Peters [51], electronic
commerce keeps growing as many organizations realize its potential benefits.
By implementing an electronic marketplace as a multi-agent system, software
agents act on behalf of their human users to perform the tasks of buying and selling.
Selling agents try to maximize their profit when selling products to buying agents.
Buying agents try to acquire good products in terms of, for example, high quality
and low prices. In multi-agent based electronic marketplaces that lack complete
contracts and legal verification, a buying agent may rely on self-enforcing contracts
where it can selectively choose business partners (selling agents) and this then
critically depends on an evaluation of their trustworthiness [47]. The modeling of
trust may also serve to encourage honest behavior. How to effectively model the
trustworthiness of agents in electronic marketplaces then becomes an important
topic of research.
1.1 Trust Modeling
There has been a growing number of researchers studying how to model the trust-
worthiness of selling agents in multi-agent based electronic marketplaces, in an effort
to enable buying agents to make effective decisions about which selling agents to
consider. A modeling of the trustworthiness of a selling agent can be based for ex-
ample on the buying agent’s past personal experience with the selling agent. One
of the earliest trust models developed by Marsh [44] in fact takes into account only
direct interactions between buying and selling agents. The trust-oriented learning
strategy proposed by Tran and Cohen [77] also relies on the direct experience of
buying agents. They have buying agents using reinforcement learning to determine
the trustworthiness of selling agents, after the true value of delivered goods is eval-
uated and compared to the buying agent’s expected value for the goods. Selling
agents can be classified as untrustworthy if their trust values fall below a certain
threshold and buying agents try to select the trustworthy selling agent with the
highest expected value for the goods.
However, for a new buying agent or a buying agent without much personal expe-
rience with the selling agent, the selling agent’s trustworthiness is often determined
by examining the ratings for the selling agent from other buying agents. This strat-
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Figure 1.1: Snapshot of a Seller Profile on eBay
egy is evident, for example, in the eBay system.1 Figure 1.1 shows a profile of a
seller on eBay. Trustworthiness of this seller is determined based on ratings from
other buyers who have bought her products. This seller has received in total nearly
99.5% positive ratings. This would give a potential new buyer a sense that the
seller is trustworthy. As a result, a number of artificial intelligence researchers have
explored the use of social networks of buying agents. The premise of this research
is that a buying agent will ask other buying agents (known as advisors) to provide
ratings of a selling agent, based on their own personal experience. These shared
ratings can then be used by the buying agent to reason about the selling agents in
the marketplace. Some approaches using social networks for trust modeling include
that of Yu and Singh [84] where the beliefs of multiple advisors about a selling agent
are combined to compute the trustworthiness of the selling agent using Dempster-
Shafer theory; the HISTOS system of [86] which collects ratings of a selling agent
only from other buying agents that a buying agent trusts to evaluate the trustwor-
thiness of the selling agent; the REGRET model of Sabater et al. [64] which offers a
multi-dimensional view of trust that includes a social dimension, where the ratings
of a selling agent provided by other members in a buying agent’s group are also
considered for evaluating the trustworthiness of the selling agent; and two distinct
models that employ probabilistic reasoning to model the likely performance of the
selling agent in new scenarios, BRS [29] and TRAVOS [76]. A good survey of some
of these systems is presented in [65].
It is worth noting that with any framework designed to enable buying agents
to share ratings of selling agents, it then becomes important to specify the range
of values provided and to clarify what the ratings represent. The ratings that are
provided by an advisor to a buying agent represent the advisor’s level of satisfaction
1http://www.ebay.com
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with the selling agent. While certain trust modeling researchers examine ratings in
the range [0, 1] (e.g [77]), several others restrict themselves to binary ratings (either
1 or 0, to reflect satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a selling agent) (e.g. [29], [76]).
This is the convention that we adopt in this thesis.
The unfair rating problem may arise in trust models where buying agents elicit
opinions about selling agents from other buying agents in the marketplace [14].
Dallarocas points out two distinct problems to address - “ballot stuffing”, when an
advisor provides an unfairly high rating of a seller (for example, in order to promote
a selling agent) and “bad mouthing”, when the advisor rates the seller unfairly low
(for example, in an effect to drive a seller out of the marketplace).
A variety of approaches have been proposed to address the problem of unfair
ratings [57, 14, 82, 10, 76]. For example, Regan et al. [57] extend the work of Tran
and Cohen [77] and allow buyers to share models of sellers.2 The trustworthiness
of advisors is then modeled using a reinforcement learning approach in order to
determine whose advice will be considered. This modeling, however, only depends
on buyers’ personal experience with advisors’ advice. The Beta Reputation System
(BRS) of Whitby et al. [82] estimates the reputation of a selling agent by employing
a probability density function representing a probability distribution of a continuous
variable. The BRS system propagates ratings provided by multiple advisors. It
filters out those ratings that are not in the majority with other ratings. More
specifically, feedback provided by each advisor consists of ratings supporting both
the good reputation and the bad reputation of a seller, and is represented by a
beta distribution. If the cumulated reputation of the seller falls between the lower
and upper boundaries of feedback, this feedback will be considered as fair feedback.
However, the BRS system is only effective when the significant majority of ratings
are fair. TRAVOS, developed by Teacy et al. [76] proposes that possibly unreliable
ratings of sellers should be discounted when the buying agent tries to reason about
the trustworthiness of the sellers. However, this model does not work well when
sellers vary their behavior widely.
In this thesis, we develop a model to effectively address the problem of unfair
ratings. We call this model a personalized approach as it takes into account buyers’
private knowledge about advisors and offers more flexibility for buyers to weight the
value of both the private and public knowledge about advisors. More specifically,
our approach allows buyers to first represent private reputation values of advisors,3
2For the remainder of the thesis, we will use the term buyer to refer to a buying agent and
seller to refer to a selling agent.
3We use the terms private and public reputation to reflect the advisor’s trustworthiness as
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based on what is known about the advisors’ ratings for sellers with which the buy-
ers have already had some experience. Next, buyers construct a public model of
trustworthiness of advisors based on common, centrally held knowledge of sellers
and the ratings provided by advisors, including the ratings of sellers totally un-
known to the buyer. Then both private and public models can be combined, in
order to obtain a value for the trustworthiness of each advisor. As will be demon-
strated, our method is able to cope with large numbers of unfair ratings, and is
still effective even when buyers do not have much experience with advisors’ advice.
Once the trustworthiness of advisors has been modeled, it is possible for a buyer to
reason about the sellers in the marketplace making more effective use of the ratings
provided by advisors. In order to do so, we propose a personalized approach as
well to allow buyers to model the trustworthiness of selling agents by combining
the weighted private and public reputation values of the sellers, where the private
reputation is now a reflection of the buyers’ own ratings and the public reputation
is a reflection of the ratings provided by advisors.
We carry out experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of the personalized
approach for modeling advisors in terms of adjusting the advisors’ trustworthiness
based on the percentages of unfair ratings they provided. Our approach is shown
to be scalable in terms of different populations of involved sellers. We also demon-
strate the value of our method for modeling advisors in order to effectively model
the trustworthiness of sellers. We then carry out comparative experiments in a
simulated dynamic electronic marketplace environment where buying and selling
agents are possibly deceptive and they may freely leave and join the marketplace.
Experimental results show that our personalized approach in general performs bet-
ter than the TRAVOS model and the BRS system. Results also show that our
approach performs much better than TRAVOS especially when buyers do not have
much experience with sellers. Our personalized model can therefore be seen as a
valuable approach to use when introducing social networks in order to model the
trustworthiness of sellers in electronic marketplaces.
Our personalized approach is also demonstrated to be valuable for contexts other
than the electronic marketplace, including the context of modeling the trustworthi-
ness of information providers on the Semantic Web and the context of experience-
based service selection in a distributed Semantic Web environment. Its central idea
of combining buyers’ private and public knowledge for trust modeling can also be
employed in the design of a credibility model for the context of evaluating credibility
assessed by the buyer using an accumulation of either private or public knowledge.
5
of messages in environments of participatory media.
While methods for trust modeling can begin to address the problem of unfair
ratings, promoting honesty in the marketplace would be even more effective. This
leads to the second central concern of this thesis, developing an incentive mechanism
where buying agents reporting honestly leads to a better outcome for these agents.
As will be discussed, our approach will be to embed our methods for trust modeling
into this incentive mechanism, leveraging the social network of agents to deliver the
required rewards.
1.2 Incentive Mechanism Design
An incentive mechanism is a system with designed rules ensuring that the actions of
agents honestly reporting their information will produce a better outcome for these
agents [71]. A classical example is the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) Mechanism
where agents are better off to report truthfully the information of their valuation
about requested products [71]. Different incentive mechanisms have been devel-
oped by researchers to encourage honesty in the reporting from buying agents in
electronic marketplaces, in order to diminish concerns about untruthful4 ratings.
For example, side payment mechanisms [31, 49] offer side payment to buyers that
truthfully rate results of business with sellers. Credibility mechanisms [53, 32] mea-
sure agents’ credibility. The credibility of two participants (a buyer and a seller,
for example) in their business will be decreased if their ratings about the business
result are different. Buying agents will provide truthful ratings in order to keep up
their credibility. Trust revelation mechanisms [5, 13] create incentives for agents to
truthfully report their own trustworthiness or the trust they have of others.
We, however, begin with a novel insight that advisors may be motivated to
provide truthful ratings when asked by other buying agents, if advisors that are
honest are rewarded by sellers. We develop a novel trust-based incentive mechanism
where buyers first model other buyers using our personalized approach and select
the most trustworthy ones as their neighbors from which they can ask advice about
sellers. We use the term “neighbor” to refer to a buying agent that is accepted as an
advisor of the buyer, and becomes part of that buyer’s social network. In addition,
however, sellers model the global reputation of buyers based on the social network.
4The term untruthful reflects dishonest reporting by the agent. In these contexts, a seller
makes a certain promise for delivery of a good; a buyer reports honestly or dishonestly about
being satisfied (i.e. whether the promise was honored by the seller or not).
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Since buyers are modeling the trustworthiness of potential advisors, advisors that
always provide truthful ratings of sellers are likely to be neighbors of many other
buyers and are considered reputable in the social network. This is supported by
Gintis et al. [23]. They argue that agents reporting honestly provide benefit to
others and will further be preferred by others as allies. These agents will be able
to attract a larger audience to witness their feedback (also known as increasing
“broadcast efficiency”). Their findings are demonstrated in the context of a multi-
player game. In marketplaces operating with our mechanism, sellers will increase
quality and decrease prices of products to satisfy reputable buyers, in order to do
business with many other buyers in the market. In consequence, our mechanism is
able to create incentives for buyers to provide truthful ratings of sellers.
We envisage a marketplace where sellers indicate their bids and buyers select
a seller as a business partner. The bids submitted by sellers would indicate the
prices and non-price features (for example, delivery time and warranty) of the
sellers’ products. In order for our mechanism to be effective, we also need to
address how sellers should be bidding in order to be selected for business by buyers.
We provide precise formulae used by sellers when reasoning about immediate and
future profit to determine their bidding behavior and the rewards to buyers, and
emphasize the importance for buyers to adopt a strategy to limit the number of
sellers that are considered for each good to be purchased. We theoretically prove
that our mechanism promotes honesty from buyers in reporting seller ratings (due
to anticipated rewards), and honesty from sellers in delivering products as promised
(due to anticipated penalties, exacted from trust modeling). We also provide a series
of experimental results in a simulated dynamic environment where agents may be
arriving and departing. This provides a stronger defense of the mechanism as one
that is robust to important conditions in the marketplace. Our experiments clearly
show the gains in profit enjoyed by both honest sellers and honest buyers when our
mechanism is introduced and our proposed strategies are followed.
Thus, our mechanism is able to create a better environment for buyers and
sellers to do business with each other. In such an environment, honesty is promoted
amongst buyers and sellers, and both honest parties participating in business are
able to gain more profit. The ultimate aim is in fact to engender the trust of buying
and selling agents from their human owners. Our particular proposal of allowing
sellers to model buyers is promoting a novel direction in the area of trust modeling
for multi-agent systems. With our proposal of designing an incentive mechanism
based on trust modeling and also encouraging trust modeling researchers to consider
incentives to diminish the problem of untruthful ratings, we hope to bridge research
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in the areas of trust modeling and mechanism design.
1.3 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we first introduce different trust and reputation modeling ap-
proaches that also make use of advice from other agents in the application of e-
marketplaces. These include BRS [82] and TRAVOS [76], the two previous models
to which our personalized model is compared. We specifically analyze these ap-
proaches for handling unfair ratings provided by advisors, and point out certain
shortcomings, in order to show the need for a novel solution. We also introduce a
general categorization of a wide range of approaches for trust modeling, in order
to provide a valuable perspective on the key challenges to be faced. After that, we
describe a few specific existing incentive mechanisms for eliciting truthful ratings
from agents in e-marketplaces and point out some shortcomings of these methods,
which motivate the development of our trust-based incentive mechanism.
In Chapter 3, we first present a personalized approach that addresses unfair
ratings of selling agents provided by advisors, by modeling the trustworthiness of
these advisors. Once we have presented this framework for modeling advisors, we
discuss how buyers can use this advice to model the trustworthiness of sellers, re-
taining an approach that combines both private and public knowledge. We provide
examples that go through each step of our approach and carefully draw attention to
some of the valuable features of our model. We then present experimental results to
demonstrate the effective value of the personalized approach. We also focus on ex-
perimental comparison with competing trust and reputation modeling approaches
in different specific scenarios.
In Chapter 4, we present a novel trust-based incentive mechanism to elicit truth-
ful ratings of selling agents from buying agents and to promote seller honesty in
electronic marketplaces. We develop a precise specification for seller bidding behav-
ior and for offering rewards to buyers based on their reputation. We also emphasize
the importance for buyers to adopt a strategy to limit the number of sellers that are
considered for each good to be purchased. Most importantly, we theoretically prove
that both rational buyers and rational sellers are incentivized to behave honestly
in our mechanism. The proposed seller strategy and the buyer behavior in the con-
text of the seller strategy are also illustrated through a detailed example. We then
present a series of experimental results to provide additional detail on marketplace
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trends that demonstrate the value of our newly designed incentive mechanism, con-
ducted in a simulated environment where buyers and sellers may be deceptive and
they may be arriving and departing.
In Chapter 5, we discuss how the personalized approach can be used in different
contexts, including the context of sharing trust ratings on the Semantic Web and
that of filtering out deceptive experiences for experience-based service selection on
the Semantic Web. We then discuss how the idea of the personalized approach
can be applied in a credibility model for the context of participatory media. We
also argue that the trustworthy central server in our incentive mechanism plays an
important role and that this design choice is practical. Finally, we briefly discuss
the potential of our particular approach to cope with the challenge of colluding
agents and elaborate on some potential connection from our work to research in
economics and sociology.
In Chapter 6, we conclude our work by highlighting the contributions of the
personalized approach and the trust-based incentive mechanism. We also propose
future work to expand our proposed models and to develop more extensive evalua-




In the previous chapter, we briefly described our personalized approach that was
developed to address the problem of unfair ratings provided by advisors as part of a
buyer’s modeling of the trustworthiness of sellers. In this chapter, we first introduce
different trust modeling1 approaches that also make use of advice from advisors in
Section 2.1. These include the BRS system [82] and the TRAVOS model [76] that
our model will be compared against in Chapter 3. We specifically analyze the ap-
proaches of these researchers for handling unfair ratings provided by advisors. For
example, the BRS system filters out ratings provided by advisors that are not in
the majority amongst other ones, in a setting where probability density functions
are used to estimate the reputation of a selling agent, propagating ratings provided
by multiple advisors. The TRAVOS system uses the approach of discounting the
ratings provided by less trustworthy advisors. We point out the shortcomings of
these approaches in order to clarify the motivation of our research on this topic. We
then categorize a wide variety of approaches for trust modeling in terms of three
dimensions, an “endogenous-exogenous” dimension, a “public-private” dimension
and a “global-local” dimension. We also introduce a categorization of various fea-
tures that have been introduced to make trust models robust, and discuss the types
of systems in which they have been used. The categorization of the different ap-
proaches provides a valuable perspective on the key challenges faced in designing an
effective reputation system that makes use of advice from other agents, but takes
care to consider the trustworthiness of those ratings.
While these trust modeling methods can mitigate the effect of unreliable ratings,
introducing direct incentives for honesty may be even more effective. We then
1When discussing a model of another researcher, we use either the term reputation or trust,
depending on the terminology used by that researcher.
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describe existing incentive mechanisms for eliciting truthful ratings from agents in
Section 2.2. One type of mechanism is side payment mechanisms [15, 31, 49]. This
approach offers payment to buyers that truthfully rate results of business with
sellers. Another type of incentive mechanism is credibility mechanisms [53, 32]
where only honest agents have their credibility in the marketplace enhanced. The
third type of incentive mechanism is trust revelation mechanisms [5, 13] where
agents are incentivized to truthfully report their own trustworthiness or the trust
they have of others. We point out some shortcomings of these methods, which
motivate our development of a trust-based incentive mechanism.
2.1 Trust and Reputation Models
In this section, we survey different trust systems, focusing on the feature of coping
with the problem of unfair ratings provided by advisors. We provide a summary of
these approaches, and then proceed to offer a categorization.
2.1.1 Different Approaches
In this section, we provide a brief summary of some existing trust and reputation
modeling approaches for coping with the unfair rating problem. Advantages and
disadvantages of these approaches are also pointed out.
Beta Reputation System
The beta reputation system (BRS) proposed by Jøsang and Ismail [29] estimates
reputation of selling agents using a probabilistic model. This model is based on
the beta probability density function, which can be used to represent probability
distributions of binary events. The beta distributions are a family of statistical
distribution functions that are characterized by two parameters α and β. The beta
probability density function is defined as follows:
beta(p|α, β) = Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
pα−1(1− p)β−1 (2.1)
where Γ is the gamma function, p ∈ [0, 1] is a probability variable, and α, β > 0.
This function shows the relative likelihood of the values for the parameter p, given
the fixed parameters α and β.
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This model is able to estimate the reputation of a seller by propagating ratings
provided by multiple advisors. Ratings are binary in this model (1 or 0, to repre-
sent that the advisor considers the seller to be satisfactory or dissatisfactory in a
transaction). Individual ratings received are combined by simply accumulating the
number of ratings (m) supporting the conclusion that the seller has good reputation
and the number of ratings (n) supporting the conclusion that the seller has bad
reputation. To ensure α, β > 0, the values for α and β are then set as follows:
α = m + 1, β = n + 1 (2.2)
The prior distribution of the parameter p is assumed to be the uniform beta prob-
ability density function with α = 1 and β = 1. The posteriori distribution of p is
the beta probability density function after observing α − 1 ratings of 1 and β − 1
ratings of 0. An example of the beta probability density function when m = 7 and
n = 1 is shown in Figure 2.1. This curve expresses the relative likelihood of the
probability p that the seller will have good reputation in the future. When m > n,
it is more likely that the probability value p > 0.5. For example, from the curve in
Figure 2.1, we can see that it is more likely that p = 0.6 than that p = 0.2.
Figure 2.1: PDF when m = 7 and n = 1 [82]
The reputation of the seller s can then be represented by the probability expec-
tation value of the beta distribution, which is the most likely frequency value, used
to predict whether the seller will act honestly in the future. The formalization of
this is given as follows:




According to this calculation, the reputation of the seller s in Figure 2.1 is 0.8.
To handle unfair ratings provided by advisors, Whitby et al. [82] extend BRS
to filter out those ratings that are not in the majority amongst other ones. More
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specifically, feedback provided by each advisor is represented by a beta distribu-
tion. If the cumulated reputation of the seller falls between the lower and upper
boundaries of the feedback, this feedback will be considered as fair. Figure 2.1
shows a demonstration of this process when the lower and upper boundaries are
0.01 and 0.99 respectively. When the cumulated reputation of the seller is within
the black area (Tr(s) > 0.98 or Tr(s) < 0.45 in this case), the advisor’s ratings
will be considered as unfairly high or unfairly low ratings.
However, this approach is only effective when a significant majority of the ratings
are fair. Suppose there are 4 advisors, a1, a2, a3 and a4. Each advisor has provided
one rating for a dishonest seller. The rating provided by advisor a1 is 0, which
is fair. The other three advisors’ ratings are all 1, which is unfair. In this case,
the cumulated reputation of the seller is calculated as 3+1
4+2
= 0.67 (Equation 2.3).
By setting the lower and upper boundaries to 0.01 and 0.99 as suggested by the
authors of [82], the cumulated reputation of the seller falls between the lower and
upper boundaries of the ratings of advisors a2, a3 and a4. The unfair ratings of
advisors a2, a3 and a4 will then be incorrectly considered as fair ratings.
TRAVOS
Teacy et al. [76] propose the TRAVOS model, which is a trust and reputation
model for agent-based virtual organizations. This approach is also based on the
beta probability density function. It copes with inaccurate reputation advice by
accomplishing two tasks. The first task is to estimate the accuracy of the current
reputation advice (ratings of 1 or 0) provided by the advisor about the seller,
based on the buyer’s personal experience with the advisor’s previous advice. More
specifically, the TRAVOS model divides the interval of [0, 1] into Nbin number of
equal bins. It then finds out all the previous advice provided by the advisor that is
similar to the advice being currently given by the advisor. The two pieces of advice
are similar if they are within the same bin. The accuracy of the current advice
will be the expected value of the beta probability density function representing the
amount of the successful and unsuccessful interactions between the buyer and the
seller when the buyer follows the previous advice.
Let us consider an example of estimating the trustworthiness of an advisor.
Suppose the interval of [0, 1] is divided into two bins, [0, 0.5] and [0.5, 1]. The
current advice provided by the advisor about a seller consists of 7 ratings of 1 and
1 rating of 0. This indicates that the trustworthiness of the seller is 0.8 (using the
calculations in the previous section). The current advice is then within the bin of
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[0.5, 1]. Thus, the previous advice of the advisor that is also between 0.5 and 1 will
be considered similar to the current advice. Suppose that by following these similar
advice, the buyer has had 3 successful interactions and 0 unsuccessful interactions
with the seller. The trustworthiness of the advisor is then calculated as 3+1
3+2
= 0.8.
The second task is to adjust reputation advice according to its accuracy. The
aim of this task is to reduce the effect of inaccurate advice. This task is necessary
because it can deal with the situation where an advisor unfairly rates a seller a large
number of times. Experimental results show that TRAVOS has better performance
in estimating sellers’ trustworthiness than the BRS system [76]. However, this
model also has some weaknesses. It assumes that selling agents act consistently.
This assumption might not be true. A seller may change its behavior from being
trustworthy to being untrustworthy. Suppose an advisor has done business with
the seller before and their interaction is successful. The fair advice provided by the
advisor then indicates that the seller is trustworthy. However, this advice will be
incorrectly considered as unfair when a buyer takes this advice and does business
with the seller after the seller changes its behavior. The second problem is that
this model relies only on the buyer’s personal experience with the advisor’s advice.
This will be problematic when the buyer does not have much experience with selling
agents, for example if the buyer is new to the system. In this case, it is difficult for
the buyer to determine whether the advisor is trustworthy.
The BRS system and the TRAVOS model are the main ones that our personal-
ized model will be compared to in Chapter 3 because all the three approaches use
the beta probability density function. In the rest of this section, we also introduce
other related models. The categorization of these approaches will provide a valu-
able perspective on the key challenges faced in designing an effective approach to
cope with the problem of unfair ratings.
Reinforcement Learning Model
Tran and Cohen [77] have buying agents use reinforcement learning to determine
with which selling agents to do business, in order to maximize the buyers’ expected
profit. They also have selling agents use the same learning method to maximize
the sellers’ profit by adjusting product prices and altering product quality offered
to different buyers. To avoid doing business with possibly dishonest sellers, buyers
in the market determine the trustworthiness of the sellers using an incremental
updating approach motivated by that proposed in [83], after the true value of
delivered products is evaluated and compared to the buying agent’s expected value
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for the products. This approach updates the trustworthiness of sellers based on
their previous trust values after examination of goods. The formulae proposed
adhere to the principle that trust is difficult to build up but easy to lose. Selling
agents can be classified as untrustworthy if their reputation values fall below a
certain threshold and buyers try to select only the selling agents with the highest
expected value for the goods from the set of selling agents not yet labelled as
untrustworthy. This approach of modeling trustworthiness of sellers relies only on
buyers’ personal experience with sellers. However, a (new) buyer may not have
much personal experience with some sellers.
Regan et al. [57] extend this work of Tran and Cohen to allow buyers to share
models of sellers. Advisors are then modeled in order to determine whose advice
will be considered, using a similar approach of modeling trustworthiness of sellers
based on whether buyers are satisfied with the advisors’ advice. This modeling only
depends on buyers’ personal experience with advisors’ advice. Reputation advice
from selected (trustworthy) advisors, however, is treated equally in this model when
estimating an aggregated trust value for each seller.
Bayesian Network Model
Wang and Vassileva [80] propose a Bayesian network-based trust model in a peer-
to-peer file sharing system. In this system, file providers’ capabilities are evaluated
according to different aspects, including download speed, file quality, and file type.
A näıve Bayesian network is constructed to represent conditional dependencies be-
tween the trustworthiness of file providers and the aspects. Each user holds a näıve
Bayesian network for each file provider. If a user has no personal experience with
a file provider, he may ask other users (advisors) for recommendations. A rec-
ommendation provided by an advisor will be considered by the user according to
the trust value he has of the advisor. The trust value is updated by a reinforce-
ment learning formula. More specifically, it will be increased/decreased after each
comparison between the näıve Bayesian networks held by the user and the advisor
for the file provider. The Bayesian network-based trust model takes into account
preference similarity between users and advisors. However, this approach assumes
that the aspects of file providers’ capabilities are conditionally independent. This
assumption may be unrealistic. For instance, users may prefer high quality video
and picture files, but do not care much about the quality of text files.
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Weighted Majority Algorithm
Yu and Singh [84] propose to use Dempster-Shafer theory as the basis for computing
the trustworthiness of an agent. More specifically, they define belief, disbelief and
uncertainty parameters b, d, u ∈ [0, 1] respectively, for the proposition that the
agent is trustworthy. These parameters sum up to 1. An orthogonal sum function
is also defined to combine beliefs of any two other agents (advisors) about the
trustworthiness of the agent that is currently being evaluated. This function yields
the same aggregated value regardless of the order in which the beliefs of multiple
advisors are combined.
To handle possibly unfair reporting from advisors, Yu and Singh propose an
algorithm that uses a version of the weighted majority algorithm (WMA) [85]. In
their algorithm, weights are assigned to the advisors. These weights are initialized
to be 1 and can be considered as the trustworthiness of the corresponding advisors.
The algorithm predicts the trustworthiness of sellers based on the weighted sum
of the ratings provided by those advisors. The weight of an advisor’s ratings is
determined by the trustworthiness of the advisor.
Yu and Singh propose to tune the weights of the advisors after an unsuccessful
prediction so that the weights assigned to the advisors are decreased. They assume
that the ratings of dishonest advisors may conflict with the observations of the
buyers receiving these ratings. By decreasing the weights of these advisors over
time, unfair ratings are filtered. Their approach determines the weights of the
advisors based only on the buyers’ personal experience with the advisors’ ratings.
If the buyers do not have much personal experience with the advisors’ ratings, the
weights of the advisors will not be decreased. These weights remain high and the
advisors’ ratings will then be heavily considered by the buyers. Another problem
is that once the weights of the advisors are decreased, the advisors will not be able
to gain trust back from the buyers by providing fair ratings to the buyers.
Cluster Filtering Approach
Dellarocas [14] simplifies the problem of unfair ratings by introducing the mecha-
nism of controlled anonymity to avoid unfairly low ratings and negative discrim-
ination. To reduce the effect of unfairly high ratings and positive discrimination,
Dellarocas first uses collaborative filtering techniques [1] to identify the nearest
neighbors of a buying agent by calculating the similarity of its ratings with the buy-
ing agents’ ratings for commonly rated selling agents. He then proposes the cluster
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filtering approach to filter out unfairly high ratings provided by those neighbors.
The idea of this approach is to apply a divisive clustering algorithm to separate the
neighbors’ ratings into two clusters, the lower rating cluster and the higher rating
cluster. Ratings in the lower rating cluster are considered as fair ratings. Ratings in
the higher rating cluster are considered as unfairly high ratings, and therefore are
excluded or discounted. To deal with the situation where ratings vary over time,
the cluster filtering approach considers only the ratings within the most recent time
window whose width is influenced by the frequency of fair ratings. The cluster fil-
tering approach copes with unfairly high ratings, and deals with changes of agents’
ratings. Dellarocas points out that the mechanism of controlled anonymity cannot
avoid unfairly high ratings and positive discrimination because of identity signals
between buying and selling agents; for instance, selling agents may use a particular
pattern in the amount of their services. Identity signaling may not be able to avoid
unfairly low ratings as well because buying agents may rate against all other selling
agents except their partners. In addition, controlled anonymity may only work in
a sufficiently large system. In many smaller systems, however, it cannot be used
due to the fact that agents may easily locate their conspirators’ identity signals, for
example using a username with a special character. Therefore, this approach may
not be able to handle unfairly low ratings.
GM-GC
Chen and Singh [10] develop a general method, GM-GC, to automatically compute
reputations for raters based on all the ratings given to each object. More specifically,
the GM-GC approach computes a rater’s reputation through three steps. The first
step is to compute quality and confidence values of each of the rater’s ratings for
each object in a category. The quality value, called local match (LM) is calculated
based on the frequency distribution of all ratings given to the same object. The
confidence level, called local confidence (LC) is determined by a piecewise function.
LC is the same for all ratings for the same object. The second step is to compute the
cumulated quality and confidence values of all ratings for each category of objects,
which are called global match (GM) and global confidence (GC) respectively. GM
and GC are computed by combining LM and LC for each object in the category.
Finally, the GM-GC approach computes the rater’s reputation based on the rater’s
GM and GC for each category. The GM-GC approach is different from filtering
approaches. It explicitly computes reputations for raters to cope with unfair ratings.
Ratings from less reputable raters will carry less weight and have less impact on
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accumulated reputations of provider agents. However, for a system with complex
categorization of objects, the computation of GM-GC will be quite time consuming.
RRSMAN
Buchegger and Boudec [7] propose a robust reputation system for mobile Ad-hoc
networks (RRSMAN). RRSMAN is a fully distributed reputation system that can
cope with false disseminated information. In RRSMAN, every node in the network
maintains a reputation rating and a trust rating about every other node that it
cares about. The trust rating for a node represents how likely the node will provide
true advice. The reputation rating for a node represents how correctly the node
participates with the node holding the rating. A modified Bayesian approach [63]
is developed to update both the reputation rating and the trust rating that node i
holds for node j based on evidence collected in the past. This approach does not
treat evidence equally, and collected evidence is weighted according to the order in
which it is collected.
To detect and avoid false reports, RRSMAN updates the reputation rating held
by node i for node j according to the advice provided by node k only if node k is
trustworthy or the advice is compatible with the reputation rating held by node
i. The advice is considered as compatible if its difference with the reputation rat-
ing held by node i is less than a deviation threshold, which is a positive constant.
Three problems exist in the RRSMAN approach. Evidence collected by a node is
weighted only according to its order of being observed. Therefore, the weights of
two pieces of evidence collected one month ago and one year ago have very little
difference as long as they have been collected one after the other. Another prob-
lem is that this approach determines the preference similarity between two nodes
based on only their current reputation ratings to one other node, which is certainly
insufficient. The third problem concerns the method for integrating advice. The
RRSMAN approach updates the reputation rating of a node by considering other
nodes’ advice. Pieces of advice provided by other nodes are considered equally as
long as these nodes are trustworthy or each piece of advice is compatible. Some
trustworthy nodes may be more trustworthy and others may be less trustworthy.
Their advice about a node should have different impact when updating the reputa-
tion rating of the node. Similarly, advice with different compatibility values should
also be considered differently.
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2.1.2 Characteristics of Approaches
We have summarized different approaches proposed to handle unfair ratings, in-
cluding BRS, TRAVOS, the reinforcement learning model, the Bayesian network
approach, WMA, the cluster filtering approach, GM-GC, and RRSMAN. In this
section, we characterize these approaches by presenting a categorization and also
provide an analysis of their capabilities.
Categories
The approaches presented in this chapter can be categorized in terms of three
dimensions, an “endogenous-exogenous” dimension, a “public-private” dimension,
and a “global-local” dimension.
Endogenous versus Exogenous: Jøsang et al. [30] divide the approaches for
handling unfair ratings into two categories, endogenous and exogenous. Methods
in the category of “endogenous” assume that unfair ratings can be recognized by
their statistical properties. Therefore, the approaches in this category are based
on analyzing and comparing the rating values themselves. For example, BRS falls
into this category. It relies on the majority ratings of a seller to judge whether
a rating is fair/unfair. The cluster filtering approach also falls into this category
and considers ratings in the higher rating cluster as unfair ratings. Methods in
the category of “exogenous” assume that advisors with low trustworthiness are
likely to give unfair ratings and ones with high trustworthiness are likely to give
fair ratings. Therefore, they use the trustworthiness of advisors to decide which
ratings are unfair. The TRAVOS model, the Bayesian network-based approach, the
reinforcement learning model, WMA, and RRSMAN all fall into this category. They
all update the trustworthiness of an advisor based on the consistency determined
from the buyer’s experience with the advisor.
Public versus Private: An approach for handling unfair ratings is “private”
if the buying agent estimates the trustworthiness of an advisor based on only its
personal experience with previous ratings provided by the advisor. The current
rating provided by the advisor is likely to be fair if the advisor’s past ratings are also
fair. For example, the TRAVOS model [76] estimates the accuracy of the advisor’s
current rating based on the amount of fair and unfair previous ratings provided by
it. These private approaches also belong to the “exogenous” category. An approach
for handling unfair ratings is “public” if the buyer estimates trustworthiness of the
advisor based on all the ratings it has supplied for any of the sellers in the system.
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A rating is likely to be reliable if it is the same as most of the other ratings for
the same sellers. For example, the BRS approach [82] filters out unfair ratings that
are not in the majority amongst others. These pubic approaches also belong to the
“endogenous” category.2
Global versus Local: An approach is “local” if it filters out unfair ratings
based on only the ratings for the seller currently being evaluated as a possible
partner (referred to as the current seller). For example, the BRS approach judges
whether a rating of a seller is an unfair rating based on whether it is consistent with
the majority of other ratings of the same seller. An approach for handling unfair
ratings is considered as “global” if it estimates the trustworthiness of an advisor
based on ratings for all the sellers that the advisor has ever rated. For example,
the Baysian network-based and the WMA approaches are “global” approaches.
Table 2.1: Categorization of Approaches
Categories Public/Endogenous Private/Exogenous
Global GM-GC TRAVOS, RRSMAN, WMA
Bayesian Network
Reinforcement Learning
Local BRS, Cluster Filtering
The categorization of approaches for handling unfair ratings is summarized in
Table 2.1. Note that there is no approach falling in the category of “private and lo-
cal”. This is simply because there is a conflict in this category. A buying agent asks
advice about a selling agent from an advisor only when it lacks personal experience
with the seller. An approach belonging to the “private and local” category will
evaluate the trustworthiness of the advisor based only on the seller’s ratings and
the advisor’s ratings for the seller currently being evaluated as a possible partner
(referred to as the current seller). The buyer’s limited experience with the current
seller is certainly not sufficient for determining the trustworthiness of the advisor.
Our personalized approach falls into both the categories of “public/endogenous”
and “private/exogenous” because it uses a combination of private and public rep-
utation components. Details of this approach can be found in Chapter 3.
2Although the “endogenous-exogenous” and “public-private” dimensions are similar, they cat-
egorize approaches based on different aspects. The “endogenous-exogenous” axis considers the
difference of the approaches in coping with unfair ratings. The “public-private” dimension con-
cerns what information will be used to determine the fairness of a rating.
20
Capabilities
To compare the different approaches, we also analyze the capabilities they have.
We list the following four capabilities that an effective approach should have.
• Majority: An effective approach should be able to cope with unfair ratings
even when the majority of the ratings of a seller is unfair. Endogenous/public
approaches assume that unfair ratings can be recognized by their statistical
properties, and therefore may suffer in this situation. For example, the per-
formance of BRS largely decreases when the majority of ratings are unfair,
which will be demonstrated in Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4. Approaches that be-
long to the category of “private” rely on buyer’s personal experience with
advisors’ advice and will not be affected by this situation;
• Flooding: An approach should also be able to deal with the situation where
advisors may provide a large number of ratings within a short period of time.
The approach of BRS is affected by this situation and the reason for this will
be further explained in Section 3.4.4. The Bayesian network-based model is
also affected because one advisor may be able to quickly build up its reputa-
tion by providing a large number of fair ratings within a short period. One
possible way to cope with this is to consider only a limited number of ratings
from each advisor within the same period of time, as used by the Cluster
Filtering approach and that of Zacharia et al. [87]. In the WMA approach,
fair ratings do not increase advisors’ trustworthiness, and therefore WMA is
not affected by this situation;
• Lack (of Experience): An approach should still be effective even when buyers
do not have much experience with sellers. Private approaches (e.g., TRAVOS,
Bayesian, and WMA) suffer from this type of situation. BRS, GM-GC and
the Cluster Filtering approach are able to deal with this situation because
they can rely on the public knowledge of the ratings provided for sellers;
• Varying: An approach should be able to deal with changes of selling agents’
behavior. Because of changes of selling agents’ behavior, buying agents may
provide different ratings for the same seller. Even though two ratings provided
within different periods of time are different, it does not necessarily mean
that one of them must be unfair. TRAVOS assumes that selling agents act
consistently and it suffers from this problem. Different ways are proposed to
deal with this situation. BRS [82] uses a forgetting factor λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) to
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dampen ratings according to the time when they are provided. Older ratings
are dampened more heavily than more recent ones.
Table 2.2: Capabilities of Approaches

















Table 2.2 lists capabilities of the approaches summarized in the previous sec-
tion. In this table, the mark “
√
” indicates that an approach has the capability. For
example, the BRS approach is capable of dealing with changes of sellers’ behavior
and is still effective when buyers do not have much experience. The mark “≈ √”
indicates that an approach has the feature, but in a limited manner. For instance,
the RRSMAN approach deals with changes of agents’ behavior by dampening ad-
visor agents’ ratings but only according to their order of being provided. As will
be discussed in Chapter 3, our personalized model has all these capabilities. These
capabilities of our approach will be further demonstrated through experiments.
2.1.3 Impact of System Architectures
Trust and reputation system architectures have an impact on the selection of ap-
proaches for handling unfair ratings. There are basically two types of trust and
reputation systems, in terms of their different architectures, centralized reputation
systems and distributed reputation systems [30].
In centralized reputation systems, central servers collect ratings for each selling
agent from buying agents after transactions between them have taken place. These
systems typically provide the same cumulative rating of a seller to any buyer. The
approaches for coping with unfair ratings in these systems, such as BRS, do not
consider buyers’ personal experience with advisors’ advice. These approaches are
based on all ratings of sellers and belong to the “public/endogenous” category.
Results from those approaches do not differ for different buyers.
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In distributed reputation systems, there is no central location for submitting
ratings or obtaining advisors’ ratings. A buyer should simply request advice about
a seller from advisors. Even though some distributed reputation systems have
distributed stores for collecting ratings, it is still costly to obtain all ratings for
the seller. Therefore, approaches used in these systems cannot consider all agents’
ratings for the sellers. The approaches used in distributed reputation systems, for
example TRAVOS, Bayesian and WMA, handle unfair ratings by estimating the
trustworthiness of an advisor based on each individual buyer’s personal experience
with the advisor’s advice. These approaches belong to the “private/exogenous”
category.
Our personalized approach in Chapter 3 is used as part of an enhanced cen-
tralized reputation system. This system collects ratings for each selling agent from
buying agents. It also creates a profile for each buying agent to record ratings for
each selling agent it has experienced. Thus, our approach can have the advantages
of both approaches used in centralized reputation systems and approaches used in
distributed reputation systems.
2.2 Incentive Mechanism Design
Researchers have also been developing incentive mechanisms to elicit truthful rat-
ings from buyers (advisors). Game theory plays a major role in the design of these
mechanisms. This is the mathematical study of interaction among independent,
self-interested agents in multi-agent systems [71]. A mechanism is a set of rules
that provide a mapping between the actions of the agents and the outcomes (pay-
ment) for these actions [71]. The design of an incentive mechanism aims to have
an equilibrium (a stationary point in the system) where the best outcomes are ob-
tained for the agents’ actions of providing truthful ratings of sellers, possibly given
the equilibrium strategies of other agents.
In this section, we survey three types of incentive mechanisms for electronic
marketplaces, including side payment mechanisms [15, 31, 49], credibility mech-
anisms [53, 32], and trust revelation mechanisms [5, 13]. We point out certain
shortcomings of these methods, some of which motivate our proposal of a novel
incentive mechanism.
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2.2.1 Side Payment Mechanism
We survey three side payment mechanisms. They are different, for example, in
terms of which party pays honest buyers and/or in ways of evaluating the truthful-
ness of buyers’ ratings.
Dellarocas [15] proposes “Goodwill Hunting” (GWH) as a feedback mechanism
for a trading environment based upon the argument that truthful feedback will
benefit the community as a whole. If buyers provide random feedback, sellers with
higher product qualities will be driven out of the market and buyers will lose profit.
This mechanism elicits truthful feedback from buyers by offering rebates of a buyer’s
periodic membership fee if the mean and variance between the buyer’s and seller’s
perception of quality of their transactions are consistent across the entire buyer
community. In this mechanism, buyers will receive less payment if their feedback of
sellers’ product qualities deviates from the community-wide reporting. To provide
incentives for buyer participation in this mechanism, buyers will not receive a rebate
if they do not provide feedback. Buyers may behave badly before they exit from
the market. To solve this problem, part of the membership fee will be refunded
only at the end of the period on the basis of the buyer’s behavior. However, the
GWH mechanism does not deal with buyers’ strategic behavior of misreporting and
only works when each buyer buys from a given seller only once.
In the incentive compatible mechanism proposed by Jurca and Faltings [31], a
set of broker agents called R-agents, can sell and buy ratings of sellers to and from
other ordinary agents. These ordinary agents first buy ratings from broker agents.
After they finish doing business with sellers, they can sell ratings of the sellers back
to the broker agents from which they bought ratings. To balance payoffs, ordinary
agents are only allowed to sell ratings of a seller if they have previously bought
reputation ratings of the seller. An agent will get paid only if a rating of a seller
it provides is the same as the next rating of the same seller provided by another
agent. In this mechanism, agents are interacting in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
environment [2] where the sum of agents’ payoff is maximized when both of them
choose to cooperate. A simple two-agent case in this environment proves that the
optimal strategy for an agent is to report truthfully because it will get paid with
probability of at least 0.5. The price that an agent will get paid for a truthful report
is determined based on the probability that an agent will trust another agent and
this other agent will not change its behavior. However, they assume that broker
agents already store some reputation information after bootstrapping the system.
This overly simplifies the process of reputation management and additionally does
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not take into account the case of new entrants into the system. Moreover, this
mechanism does not work if most of the agents provide untruthful feedback or if
they collude in giving untruthful feedback.
Miller et al. [49] introduce a mechanism which is similar to that proposed by
Jurca and Faltings [31]. In this mechanism, there is a center that maintains buyers’
ratings. The center rewards or penalizes each buyer on the basis of its ratings and
ensures that the mechanism at least breaks even in the long run. More specifically, a
buyer providing truthful ratings will be rewarded and get paid not by broker agents
but by the buyer after the next buyer. To balance transfers among agents, a proper
scoring rule [27] is used to determine the amount that each agent will be paid for
providing truthful feedback. Scoring rules used by the center (i.e. the Logarithmic
Scoring Rule) make truthful reporting a Nash equilibrium [71] where every agent is
better off providing truthful feedback given that every agent else chooses the same
strategy. Furthermore, proper scalings of scoring rules and collection of bonds or
entry fees in advance ensure budget balance and incentives of the mechanism. This
mechanism assumes that sellers have fixed quality, which limits its usefulness. As
with the mechanism proposed by Jurca and Faltings [31], the truthful equilibrium
is not the only equilibrium in this mechanism. There may be non-truthful equilibria
where every agent is better off providing untruthful feedback given that other agents
choose the same strategy. Therefore, this mechanism also can not deal with the
situation where strategic buyers collude in giving untruthful feedback.
In summary, side payment mechanisms offer side payment to buyers that truth-
fully rate results of business with sellers. Providing truthful feedback of sellers is a
Nash Equilibrium in these mechanisms. However, the mechanisms do not work well
if the majority of buyers elect to provide untruthful ratings because each of these
dishonest buyers will receive a reward. This means that honest buyers that will
not be giving similar ratings as many other buyers, will not be rewarded and will
be discouraged from being honest in the future. Second, in addition to the desir-
able truth-telling equilibria, these mechanisms induce additional equilibria where
agents do not report the truth. Equilibrium selection, thus, becomes an important
consideration in practical implementations. Third, these mechanisms require a cen-
ter to control the monetary payments, so that balancing the budget of involving
parties is a concern. The center has to make sure that the mechanism pays out
and receives the same amount. Moreover, these mechanisms assume that buyers
act independently, and therefore have difficulty with the situation where buyers
collude in giving untruthful ratings.
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2.2.2 Credibility Mechanism
Instead of giving instant payment to agents that provide truthful ratings, credibility
mechanisms measure agents’ credibility or non-credibility according to their past
ratings. It is believed that agents are more likely to conduct business with credible
other ones.
One credibility mechanism is introduced by Papaioannou and Stamoulis [53] for
eliciting truthful ratings in peer-to-peer systems. Besides reputation information,
each peer also stores a non-credibility value and a binary punishment state variable.
After each transaction between two peers, they submit a rating indicating whether
the transaction is successful or not. If both of them agree with the result of the
transaction, their non-credibility values will be decreased by the system. Otherwise,
their non-credibility values will be increased and both of them will be punished.
They will be forced not to conduct any transactions for a period that is exponential
in their non-credibility values. The punishment of not transacting with other peers
causes the punished peer to lose value offered by others. This provides incentives
for peers to truthfully report the result of their business with others.
A slightly different credibility mechanism called “CONFESS” is proposed by
Jurca and Faltings [32] for the online hotel booking industry. This mechanism is
used to cope with opportunistic behavior where a hotel may establish an excellent
reputation first and then start cheating from time to time. It is based on the
observation that hotels are less likely to cheat on clients that have a good reputation
for reporting the truth, as the resulting negative report will attract future loss
that outweighs the momentary gain obtained from cheating. More specifically, this
mechanism asks the hotel for a listing fee for every room booked by a client and
also asks some fee from each client who books a room. The hotel first reports
its behavior to the system whether it delivered the promised quality of service for
the room booked by the client. If it claims to have cooperated, the client is then
asked by the system to submit a rating. If the client also reports that the hotel
has cooperated, it is sure that the hotel has cooperated. Their credibility will be
increased and the fees they paid will be returned. Otherwise, both of them will be
punished by decreasing their credibility as untruthful reporters because in this case
at least one of them is cheating, and their fees will be confiscated. It is proved in this
mechanism that it is possible for clients to build up reputation by always reporting
the true behavior of hotels and the clients’ building up reputation for truthfully
reporting will affect the behavior of hotels. As rational hotels (maximizing their
expected utility) will deliver their promised services to reputable clients, reputable
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clients gain higher future profit. This provides incentives for clients to truthfully
report the behavior of hotels. One weakness of this mechanism is that it is difficult
to guarantee budget balance among different involved parties. The center in this
mechanism may end up earning a lot of extra profit, and the trustworthiness of the
center becomes very crucial. The center may be incentivized to manipulate hotels
and clients in order to gain more profit.
In credibility mechanisms, the credibility of two participants (a buyer and a
seller, for example) in their business will be decreased if their ratings about the
business result are different. Buyers will provide truthful ratings in order to keep
up their credibility, and to gain higher future profit. However, in these mechanisms,
honest agents will be untruthfully punished if they meet with a dishonest agent
because they will not agree when they rate the results of their transactions with
the agent. These honest agents will not gain credibility even if they provide good
services. In addition, credibility mechanisms cannot deal with the situation where
buyers and sellers collude to increase each other’s credibility. A pair of colluding
buyer and seller may always report that the seller has cooperated in their business.
2.2.3 Trust Revelation Mechanism
Trust revelation mechanisms are designed to provide incentives for agents to truth-
fully report either the trustworthiness of themselves or trust values they place on
other agents. These mechanisms are different from the ones of side payment and
credibility. In side payment and credibility mechanisms, agents are asked to pro-
vide ratings of others or themselves that are binary (e.g. 1 or 0). Trust revelation
mechanisms accept reported trust values that are continuous in the range of, for
example, [0, 1].
Brynov and Sandholm [5] design a trust revelation mechanism that provides
incentives for sellers to truthfully reveal their trustworthiness at the beginning of
their business with buyers. This mechanism involves one trustworthy buyer and one
possibly untrustworthy seller and operates as follows. At the beginning of business,
the seller declares its trustworthiness. After that, the buyer chooses a quantity
value in the business, for example, the quantity of the commodity that the buyer
will purchase from the seller in this business transaction. This quantity value is
dependent on the seller’s declared trustworthiness. If the quantity value is set
properly, the seller will have the incentive to truthfully reveal its trustworthiness.
This incentive mechanism works only when the cost for the seller to produce the
commodity has certain properties (i.e. twice differentiable and convex). It also has
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limited applicability, in that buyers have less control over the quantity of goods they
want to purchase. In this case, the number of goods the buyers will purchase cannot
depend on the buyers’ actual needs but has to be dependent on the trustworthiness
of the seller.
Dash et al. [13] also propose a trust revelation mechanism that explicitly handles
issues of trust through mechanism design. This mechanism is different from that
of [5]. It is intended to provide incentives for agents to reveal the trust they place
on other agents. The proposed mechanism is used in a task allocation scenario
where agents need to make decisions about which other agents they should allocate
their tasks to. The task allocation in this work relies on the standard Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction. In a VCG auction for task allocation, agents declare
to the center a set of tasks to be allocated to others. Each other agent then
reports its cost and valuation for completing these tasks. The center computes the
optimal allocation of tasks and transfer of money where agents truthfully report
their valuations and costs, by ensuring that an agent’s reporting of its valuation
and cost affects only the allocation but not the payment it receives or gives. The
trust revelation mechanism designed in [13] generalizes the VCG mechanism. In
this mechanism, agents take into account the trustworthiness of other agents when
determining their allocations. Each agent reports as well the trust that it places on
other agents and its trust calculation function used to calculate the trustworthiness
of another agent from all other agents’ reporting about the trustworthiness of the
agent currently being modeled. The center will compute the trust of each agent
according to this function and reported trust values of the agent from all other
agents. The center then decides the optimal allocation and payment by using the
intuition behind VCG mechanisms that an agent’s reporting of others’ trust affects
only the allocation but not its payment to make sure that there are no incentives
for agents to lie about their reporting of others’ trustworthiness. This approach
assumes that all of an agent’s preferences concern its own allocation. But, buyers
may provide inaccurate trust information to decrease or increase the chances of
another agent receiving a good allocation. Thus, coping with collusion is an issue.
2.3 Concluding Remarks
Different trust and reputation models that handle the problem of unfair ratings
described in this chapter all have some shortcomings. In Section 2.1.2, we categorize
these trust models in terms of three dimensions, a “public-private” dimension,
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an “endogenous-exogenous” dimension, and a “global-local” dimension. We also
discuss the impact of reputation system architectures on the selection of methods
for handling unfair ratings. Approaches used in centralized reputation systems
belong to the “public/exogenous” category and cannot consider buying agents’
personal experience with advisor agents’ advice (ratings), whereas approaches used
in distributed reputation systems belong to the “private/exogenous” category and
cannot consider all ratings for selling agents.
In addition, we list the capabilities that an effective approach should have.
Approaches for handling unfair ratings should be able to cope with unfair ratings
even when the majority of the ratings of a seller is unfair. They should be able
to deal with the situation where advisors may provide a large number of ratings
within a short period of time. They should still be effective even when buyers
do not have much experience with sellers. And, they should be able to deal with
changes of agents’ behavior over time. None of the described models have all these
capabilities. Thus, an effective approach is needed to cope with the problem of
unfair ratings in a comprehensive manner.
The above analysis provides a deep understanding of differences amongst these
models, and inspires our proposal of an effective method for coping with unfair
rating problem by modeling the trustworthiness of advisors. This method has all
the four desired capabilities. The analysis also inspires empirical studies in our
work. The proposed approach and empirical studies will be presented in detail in
Chapter 3
We also study three different kinds of incentive mechanisms that are designed
to provide incentives for agents to provide truthful reporting of trustworthiness,
including side payment mechanisms, credibility mechanisms and trust revelation
mechanisms. Side payment mechanisms offer payment to buyers that provide truth-
ful ratings. Providing truthful ratings in these mechanisms is a Nash equilibrium.
Credibility mechanisms measure agents’ credibility. Agents in these mechanisms
have incentives to provide truthful ratings, in order to increase their credibility or
decrease their non-credibility. In doing so, they are able to gain higher profit. Trust
revelation mechanisms have agents truthfully report their own trustworthiness or
the trust they have of others that are represented as continuous values. In the
trust revelation mechanism of [5], selling agents are incentivized to truthfully re-
port their own trustworthiness to obtain more business with buyers and gain more
profit. And, in the trust revelation mechanism of [13], agents do not have incentives
to lie about the trust they place on others.
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These incentive mechanisms generally suffer from collusion of strategic agents.
Side payment mechanisms cannot deal with situation where buyers collude in give
untruthful ratings. In credibility mechanisms, buying and selling agents may col-
lude in increasing each other’s credibility. The trust revelation mechanism of [13]
assumes that an agent’s preferences concern its own allocation. The trust revelation
mechanism of [5] assumes that a buyer’s demand in the quantity of the goods is
tied to the trustworthiness of the seller. These shortcomings begin to motivate our
development of a trust-based incentive mechanism.
As will be described in Chapter 4, our mechanism focuses on the use of a
social network of buyers where buyers select the most trustworthy other buyers as
their neighbors from which they can ask advice about sellers, to make an informed
decision about which sellers to do business with. This use of neighborhoods suggests
an avenue for excluding colluding buyers and detecting and avoiding dishonest,
colluding sellers. The topic of collusion is further discussed in Section 5.6. The
idea used in our mechanism that a trustworthy seller will be rewarded by more
opportunities of doing business with buyers lifts the assumption in [5] that the
demand for goods from buyers has to be linked to the trustworthiness of sellers.
As will be explained in Section 6.1, our mechanism in fact has wider applicability




In this chapter we first present a personalized approach that addresses unfair ratings
of selling agents provided by advisors by modeling trustworthiness of advisors, but
with flexibility for buying agents to weight the value of their private and public
knowledge of these advisors. Once we have presented this framework for modeling
advisors, we discuss how buyers can use this advice to model the trustworthiness
of sellers, retaining an approach that combines both private and public knowledge.
The essential component of the buyer’s decision making about sellers is the ef-
fectiveness of its modeling of advisors. In Section 3.2, we provide examples that
go through each step of our approach and carefully draw attention to some of the
valuable features of our model. We then carry out experiments in Section 3.3 to
demonstrate the effective value of the personalized approach in terms of adjusting
advisors’ trustworthiness based on the percentages of unfair ratings they provided.
Section 3.3 also includes some experimental results demonstrating what happens
when there are large numbers of advisors providing large numbers of unfair rat-
ings and showing the ability of our approach to operate effectively in environments
with growing numbers of sellers. We also show how buyers can effectively model
trustworthiness of sellers, making use of advisors’ models created through the per-
sonalized approach.
In Section 3.4, we also focus on experimental comparison with competing trust
and reputation modeling approaches, including BRS [82] and TRAVOS [76]. We
simulate a dynamic electronic marketplace environment where buyers and sellers
may be deceptive and they may be arriving and departing. Inspired by the analysis
of different features that an effective approach should have in Section 2.1.2, we
specifically examine different scenarios, including ones where the majority of buyers
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are dishonest, buyers lack personal experience with sellers, sellers may vary their
behavior, and buyers may provide a large number of ratings.
3.1 A Personalized Approach
In this section, we describe our personalized approach for modeling the trustworthi-
ness of advisors. The approach is used as part of a centralized reputation system.
We assume that all buyers can play the role of advisors to other buyers. We assume
as well that advisors provide ratings only when a transaction occurs and these are
stored with the central server.1 We also assume a marketplace where sellers are
offering similar kinds of goods. In Chapter 6, we discuss possible extensions to
more heterogenous marketplaces.
Our personalized approach allows a buyer to estimate the reputation (referred
to as private reputation) of an advisor based on their ratings for commonly rated
sellers. We call this type of reputation private reputation because it is based on the
buyer’s own experience with the advisor’s advice, and is not shared with the public.
The private reputation value of the advisor may vary for different buyers. When
the buyer has limited private knowledge of the advisor, the public reputation of the
advisor will also be considered. We call this type of reputation public reputation
because it is based on the public’s opinions about the advisor’s advice, and it is
shared by all of the public. The public reputation value of the advisor is the same
for every buyer; it is estimated based on all ratings for the sellers ever rated by the
advisor. Finally, the trustworthiness of the advisor will be modeled by combining
the weighted private and public reputations. These weights are determined based
on the estimated reliability of the private reputation.
Similarly, the personalized approach for modeling the trustworthiness of a sell-
ing agent first models private reputation of the seller based on the buyer’s own
ratings for the seller. If the buying agent does not want to rely fully on its per-
sonal experience with the seller, it will consider ratings provided by advisors. It
then can derive a public reputation of the seller from these ratings. Once more, a
weighted combination of private and public reputations is used to determine the
trustworthiness of the seller.
1This may be kept in check by the centralized system where all buyers agree to have their
interactions with sellers known, for instance.
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3.1.1 Modeling Trustworthiness of Advisor
Our personalized approach allows a buying agent b to evaluate the private rep-
utation of an advisor a by comparing their ratings for commonly rated sellers
{s1, s2, ..., sm}. For one of the commonly rated sellers si (1 ≤ i ≤ m), advisor
a has the rating vector Ra,si and buyer b has the rating vector Rb,si . A rating for si
from b and a is binary, in which 1 means that si is trustworthy and 0 means that si
is untrustworthy. For the remainder of this chapter, we assume ratings for sellers
are binary. Possible ways of extending our approach to accept ratings in different
ranges are proposed as future work and are presented in Section 6.2.
The ratings in Ra,si and Rb,si are ordered according to the time when they are
provided. The ratings are then partitioned into different elemental time windows.
The length of an elemental time window may be fixed (e.g. three days) or adapted
by the frequency of the ratings to the seller si, similar to the way proposed in [14].
A window should also be sufficiently small so that there is no need to worry about
the changes of sellers’ behavior within the time window. We define a pair of ratings
(ra,si , rb,si), such that ra,si is one of the ratings of Ra,si , rb,si is one of the ratings of
Rb,si , and ra,si corresponds to rb,si . The two ratings, ra,si and rb,si , are correspondent
only if the rating rb,si is the most recent rating in its time window, and the rating
ra,si is the closest and prior to the rating rb,si . We consider ratings provided by buyer
b after those by advisor a, in order to incorporate into buyer b’s ratings anything
learned from advisor a, before taking an action. According to the solution proposed
by Zacharia et al. [87], by keeping only the most recent ratings, we can avoid the
issue of advisors “flooding” the system. No matter how many ratings are provided
by one advisor in a time window, we only keep the most recent one.
We define the rating pair (ra,si , rb,si) as a positive rating pair if ra,si is the same
value as rb,si . Otherwise, the pair is a negative rating pair. We assume that rb,si is
provided within the time window Tb and ra,si is within the time window Ta. We also
assume that each time window is identified by an integer value, where 1 is the most
recent time window with a rating, 2 is the time window just prior, and so on until
the oldest time window. So, Ta is always greater than or equal to Tb because ra,si is
prior to the rating rb,si . As also pointed out by Jøsang and Ismail [29], old ratings
may not always be relevant for sellers’ actual trustworthiness because sellers may
change their behavior over time. Older ratings should be given less weight than
more recent ones. In our case, if ra,si and rb,si are within the same time window,
it is more relevant to compare them and the rating pair will be given more weight;
otherwise, the rating pair will be given less weight.
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We then examine rating pairs for si. We define Nsi as the sum of the weights
of all rating pairs for si. The sum of weights Nall of all rating pairs for sellers rated





We also define Np as the sum of the weights of all positive rating pairs for all
commonly rated sellers.
If the two ratings in a rating pair are within the same time window, the weight
of the rating pair is 1. In a simple case where each of all rating pairs has two ratings
that are within the same time window, we only need to count the number of rating
pairs for si to calculate Nsi and the total number of rating pairs for all commonly
rated sellers to calculate Nall. Np is the number of all positive rating ratings for all
commonly rated sellers in this case.
For the more general case where a rating pair (ra,si , rb,si) may have two ratings
that are within different time windows, we calculate the weight of the rating pair,
as follows:
z = λTa−Tb (3.2)
where λ is a forgetting factor (a concept used by BRS [29]) and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Note
that when λ = 1 there is no forgetting (i.e. older ratings supplied by advisors will
be accepted and compared to the buyer’s rating in the closest time window). Note
as well that when λ > 0, the higher the value of λ, the greater the weight placed
on the ratings provided by the advisor. When λ = 0, we are in the simple case
described above; ratings that are not in the same window will not be considered.
We provide an example in Section 3.2.1 to demonstrate how the forgetting factor
is beneficial for buyers.
The private reputation of the advisor a is estimated as the probability that
advisor a will provide fair ratings to the buyer b. Because there is only incomplete
information about the advisor, the best way of estimating the probability is to use
the expected value of the probability. The expected value of a continuous random
variable is dependent on a probability density function, which is used to model the
probability that a variable will have a certain value. Because of its flexibility and
the fact that it is the conjugate prior for distributions of binary events [63], the beta
family of probability density functions is commonly used to represent probability
distributions of binary events (see, e.g. the generalized trust models BRS [29] and
TRAVOS [76]). Therefore, the private reputation of advisor a can be calculated as
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follows:
α = Np + 1, β = Nall −Np + 1




where Pr(a) is the probability that advisor a will provide fair ratings to buyer b,
and E(Pr(a)) is the expected value of the probability, which is the most likely
probability value that the advisor will be honest in the future. An advisor’s rating
is considered to be a fair rating if it is the same as the buyer’s rating.2 The buyer
may decide not to trust the advisor if they have a different view of sellers. An
example of this calculation will be presented later in Section 3.2.1.
When there are not enough rating pairs, the buyer b will also consider advisor
a’s public reputation.3 The public reputation of advisor a is estimated based on
her ratings and other ratings for the sellers rated by advisor a. Each time advisor
a provides a rating ra,s for any seller s, the rating will be judged centrally as a
consistent or inconsistent rating. We define a rating for a seller as a consistent
rating if it is consistent with the majority of the ratings of the seller up to the
moment when the rating is provided.4 We consider only the ratings within a time
window prior to the moment when the rating ra,s is provided, and we only consider
the most recent rating from each advisor. In so doing, as sellers change their
behavior and become more or less trustworthy to each advisor, the majority of
ratings will be able to change.
Suppose that the advisor a provides N ′all ratings in total. If there are Nc con-
sistent ratings, the number of inconsistent ratings provided by advisor a will be
N ′all − Nc. In a similar way as estimating the private reputation, the public repu-
tation of the advisor a is estimated as the probability that advisor a will provide
consistent ratings. It can be calculated as follows:
α′ = Nc + 1, β′ = N ′all −Nc + 1
2As explained, the advisor’s rating is examined either in the same or the closest time window,
and is submitted prior to the buyer’s experience. The buyer’s experience is used to judge the
fairness of the rating.
3This is determined by Equations 3.5 and 3.6 for calculating the weight of private reputation,
which will be explained later in this section. When the weight is less than 1, there are not enough
rating pairs and public reputation will also be considered.
4Determining consistency with the majority of ratings can be achieved in a variety of ways, for
instance averaging all the ratings and seeing if that is close to the advisor’s rating, which is the
method used in our experiments in Section 3.3. The development of more comprehensive methods






which also indicates that the greater the percentage of consistent ratings advisor a
provides, the more reputable she will be considered. An example of this calculation
will be shown in Section 3.2.1.
To estimate the trustworthiness of advisor a, we combine the private reputation
and public reputation values together. The private reputation and public reputation
values are assigned different weights. The weights are determined by the reliability
of the estimated private reputation value.
We first determine the minimum number of rating pairs needed for buyer b to
be confident about the private reputation value he has of advisor a. The Chernoff
Bound theorem [50] provides a bound for the probability that the estimation error
of private reputation exceeds a threshold, given the number of rating pairs. Ac-
cordingly, the minimum number of pairs can be determined by an acceptable level
of error and a confidence measurement as follows:






where ε ∈ (0, 1) is the maximal level of error that will be accepted by b and γ ∈ (0, 1)
is the level of confidence buyer b would like to attain. An example is presented in
Table 3.4 of Section 3.2.1 to show how varying the value of ε can affect the value
of Nmin. If the total weight of all rating pairs Nall is larger than or equal to Nmin,
buyer b will be confident about the private reputation value estimated based on
his ratings and the advisor a’s ratings for all commonly rated sellers. Otherwise,
there are not enough rating pairs, the buyer will not be confident about the private
reputation value, and it will then also consider public reputation. The reliability





if Nall < Nmin;
1 otherwise.
(3.6)
The trust value of advisor a will be calculated by combining the weighted private
reputation and public reputation values as follows:
Tr(a) = wRpri(a) + (1− w)Rpub(a) (3.7)
The buyer will consider the public reputation value less when the private reputation
value is more reliable. A demonstration of this can be seen from an example in
Table 3.8 of Section 3.2.1. Note that when w = 1, the buyer relies only on private
reputation.5
5This can be used as well if the majority rating is suspect. The buyer can rely on its own
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Algorithm 1: Buyer b Modeling Trustworthiness of an Advisor a
//Buyer estimates private reputation of advisor
{s1, s2, ..., sm}: sellers commonly rated by buyer b and advisor a;
Set Nall = 0: sum of weights of all rating pairs for b and a;
Set Np = 0: sum of weights of all positive rating pairs for b and a;
foreach si in {s1, s2, ..., sm} do
//comparing ratings for commonly rated sellers
Rb,si : buyer b’s ratings for seller si;
Ra,si : advisor a’s ratings for seller si;
foreach rating rb,si in Rb,si do
if a rating ra,si of advisor a in Ra,si corresponds to rb,si then
//checking time windows
Nall = Nall + z; //z is calculated using Equation 3.2
if ra,si = rb,si then
Np = Np + z;
Private reputation is then calculated using Equation 3.3;
Calculate weight w using Equations 3.5 and 3.6;
Set public reputation = 0;
if weight w < 1 then
//private knowledge is limited, buyer also estimates public reputation
Set N ′all = 0: number of all ratings provided by advisor a;
Set Nc = 0: number of ratings by advisor a consistent with majority;
{s1, s2, ..., sn}: sellers ever rated by advisor a;
foreach sj in {s1, s2, ..., sn} do
Ra,sj : advisor a’s ratings for seller sj;
foreach rating ra,sj in Ra,sj do
N ′all = N
′
all + 1;
//Comparing ra,sj with other ratings of seller sj
if ra,sj is consistent then
Nc = Nc + 1;
Public reputation is then calculated using Equation 3.4;
Trustworthiness = weighted combination of private and public reputation;
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Algorithm 1 is a pseudo code summary of the personalized approach for mod-
eling the trustworthiness of an advisor.
3.1.2 Modeling Trustworthiness of Seller
Once we have the models of advisors, we need an effective method for the buying
agent to model the trustworthiness of a selling agent, by combining the buyer’s per-
sonal experience with the seller and reputation ratings provided by the advisors.
The model of BRS [29] introduced in Section 2.1.1 uses the beta probability density
function to aggregate the ratings of the seller provided by the buyer and multiple
advisor agents. This model, however, does not allow the buyer to weight its value
in its own ratings any more or less heavily than the advisors’ ratings of the seller.
We argue that buyers may rely more on their personal experience with sellers. The
Bayesian network-based trust model [80] updates a Bayesian network of the seller’s
trustworthiness based on the buyer’s direct interactions with the seller and recom-
mendations provided by advisors that have previously interacted with the seller.
This model also does not weight any differently the buyer’s personal experience
from others’ recommendations. The TRAVOS model [76] provides a method for
estimating the trustworthiness of the seller based on the buyer’s personal experi-
ence with the seller and a method for estimating the reputation of the seller by
aggregating advisors’ advice. They do not provide a function for combining both
of these elements. This model also assumes that sellers act consistently; therefore,
it cannot deal with changes of agents’ behavior.
Our personalized approach can also be adopted to effectively model the trust-
worthiness of selling agents. It allows the buying agent to model the private rep-
utation of a seller based on the buyer’s own ratings for the seller. If the buyer
does not want to rely fully on its personal experience with the seller, it will ask for
advisors’ ratings of the seller. It then can derive a public reputation of the seller
from these ratings. The trustworthiness of the seller will be modeled by combining
the weighted private and public reputation values. We formalize our approach for
modeling the trustworthiness of sellers as follows. Note that our formalization of a
seller’s private and public reputation is similar to the formulas used for estimating
an advisor’s private and public reputation in Equations 3.3 and 3.4. However, we
present the formulas in this section in a more compact manner for the purpose of
simplicity.
private knowledge and allow for a difference of opinion. Once a buyer has had personal experience,
it will know better whether the majority opinion is acceptable.
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Suppose that buyer b has the rating vector Rb,s, which contains all the ratings
provided by b for the seller s. The rating of 1 will be considered as a positive
rating, and 0 will be considered as a negative rating. Similarly, the ratings in Rb,s
are ordered from the most recent to the oldest according to the time when they are
submitted. The ratings are then partitioned into different elemental time windows
{T1, T2, ..., Tn}. In this case, T1 is the most recent (current) time window. We then
count the number of positive ratings N bpos,i and the number of negative ratings N
b
neg,i
in each time window Ti. The private reputation of the seller s can be estimated













where λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) is a forgetting factor used in the previous section to deal
with possible changes of the seller agent’s behavior over time because old ratings
will be given less weight than more recent ones. Note that when λ = 1 there is
no forgetting, and when λ = 0 only the ratings that are within the current time
window T1 will be considered.
If the buying agent b does not have enough personal experience with the seller
s, it will also consider ratings provided by other buyers (advisors). Suppose that
advisors {a1, a2, ..., ak} have provided ratings for the seller s. We also partition
these ratings into different elemental time windows. Suppose that the advisor aj
has provided N
aj
pos,i positive ratings and N
aj
neg,i negative ratings within the time
window Ti. These ratings will be discounted based on the trustworthiness of the
advisor, so that the ratings from less trustworthy advisors will carry less weight
than ratings from more trustworthy ones.
Jøsang [28] provides a mapping from beliefs defined by the Dempster-Shafer






























where bf , df and uf represent belief, disbelief and uncertainty parameters, respec-
tively. In our case, bf represents the probability that the proposition that the seller
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is trustworthy is true, and d represents the probability of the proposition is false.
Note that bf + df + uf = 1 and bf , df , uf ∈ [0, 1]. As also pointed out in [29]
and [85], beliefs and disbeliefs can be directly discounted by the trustworthiness of




From Equations 3.9 and 3.10, we then can derive a discounting function for the















(1− Tr(aj))(Najpos,i + Najneg,i) + 2
(3.12)
where Tr(aj) is the trustworthiness of the advisor aj, which can be calculated by
using the personalized approach as presented in the earlier section. An example is
provided in Section 3.2.2 to show how ratings of advisors are discounted.
In the same way as estimating the private reputation, the public reputation of























The ratings provided by the advisors will be also discounted by the forgetting factor
λ.
Similar to the way of estimating the trustworthiness of advisors, the trustwor-
thiness of the selling agent s is estimated by combining the weighted private and
public reputation values as follows:
Tr(s) = w′Rpri(s) + (1− w′)Rpub(s) (3.14)






if N ball < Nmin;
1 otherwise.
(3.15)
where Nmin represents the minimum number of ratings needed for the buyer b to
be confident about the private reputation value it has of the seller s. Nmin can be
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Algorithm 2: Buyer b Modeling Trustworthiness of a Seller s
//Buyer estimates private reputation of seller based on buyer’s own ratings
Set N bpos = N
b
neg = 0: amount of discounted positive/negative ratings of b;
{T1, T2, ..., Tn}: time windows;
foreach Ti in {T1, T2, ..., Tn} do
Set N bpos,i = N
b
neg,i = 0: number of b’s positive/negative ratings in Ti;
Rb,s: buyer b’s ratings for seller s;
foreach rating rb,s in Rb,s and rb,s within Ti do
if rb,s = 1 then




N bneg,i = N
b
neg,i + 1;











Private reputation is then calculated using Equation 3.8;
Calculate weight w′ using Equations 3.5 and 3.15;
Set public reputation = 0;
if weight w′ < 1 then
//private knowledge is limited, buyer estimates public reputation of s
//based on advisors’ ratings for the seller
{a1, a2, ..., ak}: advisors that have provided ratings for seller s
Set Napos = 0: amount of all discounted positive ratings of advisors;
Set Naneg = 0: amount of all discounted negative ratings of advisors;
foreach advisor aj in {a1, a2, ..., ak} do
Set N
aj
pos = 0: amount of discounted positive ratings of aj;
Set N
aj
neg = 0: amount of discounted negative ratings of aj;
{T1, T2, ..., Tn}: time windows;





neg,i: number of aj’s positive/negative ratings in Ti;





pos,i based on N
aj
pos,i using Equation 3.11;
Set Dbneg,i based on N
aj























Public reputation is then calculated using Equation 3.13;
Trustworthiness = weighted combination of private and public reputation;
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calculated by using Equation 3.5. N ball is the total number of ratings provided by
buyer b for the seller.
A pseudo code summary of the personalized approach for modeling the trust-
worthiness of a seller is shown in Algorithm 2.
3.2 Examples
To illustrate how our approach models trustworthiness of advisors and sellers, this
section provides examples that go through each step of the approach. Examples are
also provided to demonstrate how trust values different buying agents have of the
same advisors may vary, and to show the effectiveness of our approach even when
the majority of ratings are unfair. We provide a further example to show that
the forgetting factor in our model is beneficial when ratings provided by buyers
and advisors are sparse. We also provide a simple example to show how to model
trustworthiness of sellers after we have advisor models.
3.2.1 Modeling Trustworthiness of Advisors
In an electronic marketplace, a buyer b needs to make a decision on whether to
interact with a seller s0, which depends on how much b trusts s0. To model the
trustworthiness of the seller s0, when the buyer has had no or only limited experi-
ence with the seller, the buyer b seeks advice from three advisors ax, ay and az that
have had experience with s0. The advice about s0 from ax, ay and az are ratings
representing the trustworthiness of s0. Before aggregating the ratings provided by
ax, ay and az, the buyer b needs to evaluate the reliability of those ratings, which
depends on the trustworthiness of the advisors ax, ay and az. Our personalized
approach effectively models the trustworthiness of advisors based on how reliable
the previous ratings provided by them are.
Consider the case where the advisors ax, ay and az each has rated only the five
sellers (s1, s2, s3, s4, and s5). Table 3.1 lists the ratings provided by aj (j ∈ {x, y, z})
for the five sellers. The symbol “T” represents a sequence of time windows, in which
T1 is the most recent time window. To simplify the demonstration, we assume that
each advisor provides at most one rating within each time window. We also assume
that those are the only ratings provided by them.6
6Our personalized approach keeps only the most recent rating in each time window.
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Table 3.1: Ratings of Sellers Provided by Advisors
aj ax ay az
T T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
s1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
s3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s4 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
s5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
As can be seen from Table 3.2, the buyer b has also provided some ratings for
the five sellers. The buyer b might have not provided any rating for some sellers
within some time window. For example, b has provided only one rating for the
seller s5, which is in the time window T1. We assume that the ratings provided by b
are after those provided by ax, ay and az if they are within the same time window.
Table 3.2: Ratings Provided by the Buyer b
T T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
s1 1 1 1 1 1
s2 1 1 1 1 -
s3 1 1 1 - -
s4 1 1 - - -
s5 1 - - - -
We compare the ratings provided by advisors ax, ay and az in Table 3.1 and
the ratings provided by buyer b in Table 3.2. The buyer b has the same number of
rating pairs with each advisor (Nall = 15). However, buyer b has different numbers
of positive rating pairs Np(aj) (j ∈ {x, y, z}) with ax, ay and az, which are listed
in Table 3.3. Accordingly, as can be seen from Table 3.3, the private reputation
values of ax, ay and az are different, in which the private reputation value of ax is
the highest and that of az is the lowest. Note that the private reputation values
of advisors are calculated by setting λ of Equation 3.2 to be 0, meaning that we
compare only the ratings provided by buyer b and advisors that are within the same
time windows. The result indicates that the advisor ax is most likely to provide fair
ratings and have similar preferences with the buyer b, whereas az will most likely
provide unfair ratings and have different preferences than buyer b.
According to Table 3.1, the total number of ratings provided by each advisor
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Table 3.3: Private and Public Reputation Values of Advisors
aj ax ay az
Np(aj) 15 8 0
α 16 9 1
β 1 8 16
Rpri(aj) 0.94 0.53 0.06
Nc(aj) 25 12 0
α′ 26 13 1
β′ 1 14 26
Rpub(aj) 0.96 0.48 0.04
is the same (N ′all = 25). We also count the number of consistent ratings each
advisor provides, Nc(aj). A rating here is considered as a consistent rating when it
is consistent with the majority of ratings for the seller within a same time window.
Consider the case where all of the five sellers are trustworthy and the majority of
ratings are fair. In this situation, ratings consistent with the majority are fair. A
rating of 1 provided by an advisor will be considered as a rating consistent with the
majority rating, whereas a rating of 0 will be considered as an inconsistent rating.
From the advisors’ ratings listed in Table 3.1, we can see that ratings provided by
the advisor ax are all consistent with the majority rating, the advisor az always
provides inconsistent ratings, and some of the ratings provided by the advisor ay
are consistent. Table 3.3 lists the number of consistent ratings provided by each
advisor and the corresponding public reputation value of her. From Table 3.3, it
is clear that the advisor ax is most likely to provide consistent and therefore fair
ratings, and the advisor az most likely will provide inconsistent ratings.
Table 3.4: Trustworthiness of Advisors
ε 0.1 0.15 0.2
Nmin 115 51 29
w 0.13 0.29 0.52
Tr(ax) 0.957 0.954 0.950
Tr(ay) 0.487 0.495 0.506
Tr(az) 0.043 0.046 0.05
To combine private reputation and public reputation, the weight w should be
determined. The value of w depends on the values of ε and γ, and the total number
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of rating pairs, which is the same for every advisor in our example. Suppose we
have a fixed value, 0.8 for γ, which means that the confidence value should be no
less than 0.8 in order for the buyer to be confident with the private reputation
values of advisors. In this case, the more errors the buyer can accept, the more
confident it is with the private reputation values of advisors, which also means that
the more weight the buyer will put on the private reputation values. Table 3.4
lists different acceptable levels of errors, their correspondent weights of private
reputation values, and different results of trust values. It clearly indicates that ax
is the most trustworthy, and ay is more trustworthy than az. As a result, the buyer
b will place more trust in the advice provided by ax. Buyer b will consider the
advice provided by ax more heavily when aggregating the advice provided by ax, ay
and az for modeling the trustworthiness of the seller s0. Our framework serves the
purpose of representing the trustworthiness of advisors, so that this may be taken
into account, when determining how heavily to rely on their advice.
Table 3.5: Ratings Provided by the Buyer b′
T T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
s1 1 1 - - 1
s2 1 - - 1 -
s3 1 1 - - -
s4 1 1 - - -
s5 1 - - - -
Table 3.6: Trust Values b′ Has of Advisors
aj ax ay az
Rpri(aj) 0.92 0.58 0.08
Rpub(aj) 0.96 0.48 0.04
Tr(aj) 0.947 0.514 0.054
To demonstrate how the trust values different buyers have of the same advisors
may vary, we consider another buyer b′, which also needs to make a decision on
whether to trust the information provided by a seller s′0 (s
′
0 may differ from s0).
The ratings provided by b′ for the five sellers are listed in Table 3.5. By going
through the same process as above, we can calculate the trust values the buyer b′
has of advisors ax, ay and az, when ε = 0.2 and γ = 0.8. The results are presented
in Table 3.6. Comparing Table 3.6 with Tables 3.3 and 3.4, we can see that the
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private reputations the buyer b′ has of advisors are different from those the buyer
b has. Although the public reputations of advisors that the buyers have are the
same, the trust values that the buyers have of advisors are still different.
Table 3.7: Public Reputations of Advisors When Majority of Ratings are Unfair
aj ax ay az
Nc(aj) 0 13 25
α′ 1 14 26
β′ 26 13 1
Rpub(aj) 0.04 0.52 0.96
Table 3.8: Trustworthiness of Advisors When Majority of Ratings are Unfair
ε 0.1 0.2 0.25
Nmin 115 29 19
w 0.13 0.52 0.79
Tr(ax) 0.157 0.508 0.751
Tr(ay) 0.521 0.525 0.528
Tr(az) 0.843 0.492 0.249
To show the robustness of our model, we now consider a case where the majority
of ratings provided by advisors are unfair. Adjusting our earlier example, a rating
of 1 provided by an advisor for any seller will now be considered as an inconsistent
rating with low reputability, whereas a rating of 0 will be considered as a consistent
rating. As a result, the public reputations that the buyer b has of the advisors ax,
ay and az will be different, which can be seen from Table 3.7. We model the trust
values the buyer b has of the advisors ax, ay and az, when buyer b’s acceptable
levels of errors of private reputation values are different. Results are presented in
Table 3.8. From this table, we can see that our approach can still correctly represent
the trustworthiness of advisors by making adjustments to rely more heavily on the
private reputations.
We set the forgetting factor λ to be 0 in the above examples, meaning that we
compare only the ratings provided by buyers and advisors that are within the same
time windows. However, when ratings provided by them are sparse, buyers may set
λ to be other values, in order to gain more private knowledge about advisors and
rely on it more heavily when modeling trustworthiness of advisors. We use a simple
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Table 3.9: Ratings of s′1 and s
′




T T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
a - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1
b 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -
example here to demonstrate how the forgetting factor in our approach is beneficial
for buyers. In this example, a buyer b and an advisor a both have provided some
ratings for the sellers s′1 and s
′
2, as listed in Table 3.9. We can see that the buyer b
and the advisor a do not have ratings in the same time windows.
Table 3.10: Private Reputation of a and Its Weights for Different λ Values
λ 0 0.5 1
Nall 0 3 6
Rpri(a) 0.5 0.8 0.875
w 0 0.16 0.32
In this example, when modeling the trustworthiness of advisor a, we have Nmin
equal to 19, by setting ε to be 0.25 and γ to be 0.8. We also assume that each
subsequent time window is one unit apart from the previous one, so that Ta−Tb =
1. By setting different values for λ, we then calculate the corresponding private
reputation of the advisor and the value w in the calculation of the trustworthiness of
the advisor that represents how much the buyer will rely on the private reputation.
These values are listed in Table 3.10. From this table, we can see that there are
no ratings to be compared with if we set λ to be 0. By setting λ to be higher, the
buyer can have more sense about the advisor, and therefore rely more on its private
knowledge of the advisor.
3.2.2 Modeling Trustworthiness of Seller S0
In this example, we demonstrate how the buying agent b models trustworthiness of
the selling agent s0 by using our personalized approach. We assume that the buyer
b has not done any business with the seller s0. Therefore, the private reputation of
s0 can be calculated according to Equation 3.8 as follows:
Rpri(s0) =
0 + 1
(0 + 0) + 2
= 0.5
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Table 3.11: Ratings of s0 provided by ax and ay
Ti T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
ax 0 0 0 1 1
ay 1 1 1 1 1
Table 3.12: Amount of Ratings of s0 provided by ax and ay
Ti T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Naxpos,i 0 0 0 1 1
Naxneg,i 1 1 1 0 0
N
ay
pos,i 1 1 1 1 1
N
ay
neg,i 0 0 0 0 0
The buyer b then asks advice from advisors ax, ay and az. Results from the
earlier examples show that the trust values that b has of advisors ax, ay and az in
Table 3.4 are 0.95, 0.506 and 0.05, respectively, when we set ε to be 0.2. Because
advisor az has a very low trust value, we assume that the buyer b will consider
advice from only the advisors ax and ay.
7
The ratings of the seller s0 provided by the advisors ax and ay are listed in
Table 3.11. We assume that the seller s0 is dishonest and fails to deliver goods
almost half the time. We first count the amount of positive and negative ratings
provided by the advisors ax and ay within each time window, as listed in Table 3.12.
We then discount the amount of ratings provided by them, using Equations 3.11
and 3.12. The discounted amount of ratings is listed in Table 3.13.
In this example, we set λ to be 0.9, which means that the buyer b does not have
much forgetting. According to Equation 3.13, the public reputation of the seller




0.927 ∗ 0.9i−1 +
5∑
i=1
0.406 ∗ 0.9i−1 + 1
5∑
i=1
0.927 ∗ 0.9i−1 +
5∑
i=1
0.406 ∗ 0.9i−1 + 2
= 0.529
7What is required is then an approach for limiting the number of advisors that are consulted.
For simplicity in this example, we assume some kind of threshold is used and trustworthiness of
advisors must be greater than 0.05 at least. By doing so, we can cope with the situation where
a buyer may falsely improve its trustworthiness by creating multiple fake identities [86]. This is
discussed further in Section 6.2.
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Table 3.13: Discounted Amount of Ratings of s0 provided by ax and ay
Ti T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Daxpos,i 0 0 0 0.927 0.927
Daxneg,i 0.927 0.927 0.927 0 0
D
ay
pos,i 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406
D
ay
neg,i 0 0 0 0 0
Because the buyer b has not done business with the seller before, the weight w′ of
the private reputation of the seller is 0. The trustworthiness of the seller s0 can
then be calculated by using Equation 3.14 as follows:
Tr(s0) = 0 ∗ 0.5 + (1− 0) ∗ 0.529 = 0.529
We calculate the public reputation of the seller by taking into account the
trustworthiness of advisors. From the result of Tr(s0), we can see that the buyer
relies on the advice provided by ax more heavily, and ay’s advice has less impact
on the result. We compare this with the way of not considering the trustworthiness




1 ∗ 0.9i−1 +
5∑
i=1
1 ∗ 0.9i−1 + 1
5∑
i=1
1 ∗ 0.9i−1 +
5∑
i=1
1 ∗ 0.9i−1 + 2
= 0.636
The trustworthiness of the seller s0 can then be calculated by as follows:
Tr′(s0) = 0 ∗ 0.5 + (1− 0) ∗ 0.636 = 0.636
From the results of Tr(s0) and Tr
′(s0), we can see that the trust value of the seller,
calculated through our formula, is closer to the actual trustworthiness of the seller.
It suggests that our formulation results in better estimation for the trustworthiness
of the seller.
3.3 Validating Effectiveness of Our Approach
Our approach models the trustworthiness of advisors according to the reliability of
the ratings provided by them. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach,
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we carry out experiments involving advisors that provide different percentages of
unfair ratings. The expectation is that trustworthy advisors will be less likely to
provide unfair ratings, and trustworthy advisors will be more likely to provide fair
ratings. We also examine how large numbers of dishonest advisors (i.e. advisors
that provide unfair ratings) will affect the estimation of advisors’ trustworthiness.
Results indicate that our approach is still effective by making adjustments to rely
more heavily on private reputations of advisors, in this case. We conduct further
experiments to test the scalability of our approach. Results show that trustwor-
thiness of advisors remains nearly the same for different populations of sellers. We
also demonstrate how buyers can effectively model trustworthiness of sellers using
the personalized approach, making use of advisors’ models.
The first experiment involves 100 sellers, 3 buyers, and one advisor. The 3
buyers, B1, B2 and B3, rate 10, 40 and 70 randomly selected sellers, respectively.
The advisor rates 40 randomly selected sellers in total.8 We examine how the trust
values the buyers have of the advisor change when different percentages (from 0%
to 100%) of its ratings are unfair.9 As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the trust values the
buyers have of the advisor decrease when a larger percentage of the advisor’s ratings
are unfair. From this figure, we can also see that our approach is still effective when
the buyer B1 does not have much experience with sellers, in the sense that B1 can



























Pecentage of Unfair Ratings
B1 Rated 10% Sellers
B2 Rated 40% Sellers
B3 Rated 70% Sellers
Figure 3.1: Trustworthiness of Advisor
The second experiment involves 100 sellers, 80 advisors, and one buyer. The
buyer and each advisor rate 80 of the randomly selected sellers. We model the trust
8Note that we simplify the experiments by limiting each buyer or advisor to provide at most
one rating for each seller.
9To simulate unfair ratings, we assume all sellers in the experiment are honest.
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value the buyer has of one of the advisors, A. The trustworthiness of the advisor will
be modeled as the combination of its private and public reputations (referred to as
the CR approach) and as only its public reputation (referred to as the PR approach),
respectively. The advisor A will provide different percentages (from 10% to 100%)
of unfair ratings. Figure 3.2 illustrates the trustworthiness of A when 24 (30% of
all) advisors are dishonest. Those dishonest advisors provide the same percentage of
unfair ratings as the advisor A does. Results indicate that the trustworthiness of A
modeled by using the CR and PR approaches decreases when a larger percentage of
ratings provided by A are unfair. Therefore, these two approaches are not affected
when only a small number of advisors are dishonest. Figure 3.3 represents the
trustworthiness of A when 48 (60% of all) advisors are dishonest. In this figure,
the trustworthiness of A modeled by using the CR approach still decreases when
a larger percentage of ratings provided by A are unfair, which indicates that our
approach is still effective when the majority of advisors provide large numbers of
unfair ratings. In contrast, the trustworthiness modeled by using the PR approach
increases when more than 60% of ratings provided by the dishonest advisors are
unfair, which indicates that the PR approach is only effective when the majority
of ratings are fair. The statistical significance of the results is also confirmed in the
figure by the fact that the intervals (corresponding to ± 1 standard deviation) do



























Pecentage of Unfair Ratings
The PR Approach
The CR Approach
Figure 3.2: Trustworthiness of A When Majority of Advisors are Honest
The effectiveness of our approach is demonstrated by the above experiments
with the fixed population of (100) sellers. It is useful to examine whether our ap-
proach will still be useful when there are a large number of sellers. The number
of sellers affects the number of commonly rated sellers, and may then affect the




























Pecentage of Unfair Ratings
The PR Approach
The CR Approach
Figure 3.3: Comparison of the CR and PR Approaches
where there are many sellers, there may be a smaller percentage of those sellers
that have been commonly rated by buyers and advisors. In this case, buyers may
have less private knowledge about advisors. We use a simulation to demonstrate
that our approach can still effectively model trustworthiness of advisors. In this
simulation, we have different populations of sellers spanning from 100 to 500 in
increments of 50. A buyer models trustworthiness of an advisor. 50% of the ratings
provided by the advisor are unfair in this experiment. The results are shown in
Figure 3.4. The x-axis represents the populations of sellers, and the y-axis repre-
sents the trustworthiness of the advisor. The solid line is the average trust value
of the advisor. As can be seen from Figure 3.4, the trustworthiness of the advisor
remains nearly the same when the population of sellers changes, which indicates























Figure 3.4: Scalability of Our Approach
After demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach in modeling trustworthi-
ness of advisors, we carry out a further experiment to examine how buyers can make
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use of our method for modeling advisors in order to effectively model the trustwor-
thiness of sellers. This experiment also involves 100 sellers, 80 advisors, and one
buyer. Similarly, the buyer and each advisor rate 80 of the randomly selected sell-
ers. Every 10% of the sellers acts dishonestly with different probabilities (from 0
to 0.9). The buyer models the trustworthiness of sellers based on the advisors’
ratings of sellers. In order to determine which advisors the buyer should ask advice
from, the buyer first models trustworthiness of advisors, and then selects a list of
trustworthy advisors from which it can ask advice about sellers. Once this list is
determined, the ratings of each of the advisors in the list need to be combined to
determine the trustworthiness of the sellers. For this experiment, we assume that



























Figure 3.5: Trustworthiness of Sellers When Majority of Advisors are Honest
Similar to the second experiment, the trustworthiness of each advisor will be
modeled based on either the CR approach or the PR approach. Figure 3.5 illus-
trates the trustworthiness of different sellers when 30% of advisors are dishonest.
Results indicate that the trustworthiness of sellers, when using the CR and PR ap-
proaches to model trustworthiness of advisors, decreases when they act dishonestly
with higher probabilities. Therefore, these two approaches are both effective when
only a small number of advisors are dishonest. Figure 3.6 represents the trustwor-
thiness of sellers when 60% of advisors are dishonest. In this figure, the value of the
10Note that other methods may be used to determine the list of trustworthy advisors to consult
(for example, using a threshold and retaining only advisors with trustworthiness beyond that
threshold). Also note that a larger list will increase computation, and may decrease the accuracy
for predicting seller agents’ trustworthiness from advice provided by advisors. A smaller list may
increase the accuracy, but will have higher chance that none of the advisors has rated some sellers.
The detailed study of how to determine the proper number of advisors to consult can be found
in [25]. The issue of choosing advisors to consult is further discussed in Section 6.2.
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trustworthiness of sellers, when using the CR approach to model trustworthiness
of advisors, still decreases when the sellers act dishonestly in higher probabilities,
which indicates that our approach is still effective when the majority of advisors
provide large numbers of unfair ratings. In contrast, the value of the trustworthi-
ness of sellers when using the PR approach to model trustworthiness of advisors,
increases when the sellers act dishonestly in higher probabilities. This indicates
that the PR approach is only effective when the majority of ratings are fair. This
figure also shows that the intervals do not overlap, which confirms the statistical
significance of our results. All in all, if taking our model and using it as a basis for
evaluating sellers, more accurate decisions about trustworthiness of sellers can be




























Figure 3.6: Comparison of the CR and PR Approaches
Note that we do not provide experiments to demonstrate how the trustworthi-
ness of sellers will change when the population of agents changes. As demonstrated
by the experiments, our personalized approach can effectively model the trust-
worthiness of advisors. By also using the personalized approach for modeling the
trustworthiness of sellers, buyers can always effectively adjust ratings provided by
advisors based on the trustworthiness of the advisors. Therefore, our approach
should also be able to scale well when modeling the trustworthiness of sellers.
3.4 Comparative Experiments
In this section, we focus on experimental comparison of our personalized approach
for modeling the trustworthiness of advisors with competing approaches. We sim-
ulate a dynamic electronic marketplace environment involving possibly deceptive
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buying and selling agents. These agents may be arriving and departing. We specif-
ically examine different scenarios, including ones where the majority of buyers are
dishonest, buyers lack personal experience with sellers, sellers may vary their be-
havior, and buyers may provide a large number of ratings.
We compare our approach with the two competing approaches: BRS and TRAVOS.
These three approaches are all based on the beta density function. They are also
representative of other approaches summarized in Section 2.1.1. As can be seen
from Table 2.1 in Chapter 2, they cover all the four categories of “global”, “local”,
“public/endogenous” and “private/exogenous”. They are also useful for demon-
strating the importance of the capabilities, which some of the approaches have and
others do not, according to Table 2.2 in Chapter 2.
3.4.1 Experimental Setting
We simulate a marketplace for our experiments. In this marketplace, we model
dishonest sellers as ones that provide a promise to deliver certain goods at certain
prices but fail to keep that promise to buyers. To avoid doing business with possibly
dishonest sellers, buyers in the market model the trustworthiness of the sellers. In
order to directly compare the performance of the competing approaches for coping
with unfair ratings, the trustworthiness of the sellers is simply modeled using Equa-
tion 3.13, which aggregates ratings from advisors. A seller is considered trustworthy
if its trust value is greater than a threshold θ. It will be considered untrustworthy
if the trust value is less than δ. Note that we set λ = 1 in Equation 3.13.
We implement the BRS approach to filter out unfair ratings for each seller.
The aggregation of ratings for modeling the trustworthiness of sellers in this case
is computed by assuming Tr(aj) is always 1 in Equations 3.11 and 3.12 because
the trustworthiness of advisors is not modeled by BRS. We also implement the
TRAVOS model and the personalized approach for coping with unfair ratings by
modeling the trustworthiness of advisors.
The marketplace operates for a period of 60 days. It involves 90 buyers. These
buyers are grouped into three groups. They have different numbers of requests.
Each group of buyers has a different number (20, 40 and 60) of requests. In our
experiments, we assume that there is only one product in each request and each
buyer has a maximum of one request each day. For the purpose of simplicity, we
also assume that the products requested by buyers have the same valuation for
buyers. After they finish business with sellers, buyers rate sellers. Some dishonest
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buyers from each group will provide unfair ratings. We allow 2 buyers from each
group to leave the marketplace at the end of each day. Accordingly, we also allow
6 buyers to join the marketplace at the end of each day. Some of them may also
provide unfair ratings, to keep the percentage of dishonest buyers in each group the
same in each day. There are also 6 sellers in total in the marketplace. Each 2 sellers
acts dishonestly in different percentages (0%, 25% and 50%) of their business with
buyers.
We also set different parameters in the experiments. We set the lower and
upper boundaries for BRS to be 0.1 and 0.99 respectively, as recommended in [82].
The number of bins Nbin used by the TRAVOS model is chosen to produce the
best results in our experiments. The weight of private reputation used by the
personalized approach is also selected to produce the best performance. We set the
threshold θ to be 0.7 and δ to be 0.3. Therefore, a seller is considered trustworthy
if its trust value is greater than 0.7 and untrustworthy if it is below 0.3. In our
experiments, a buyer is considered to be honest if its trust value is greater than
0.5; otherwise, it is untrustworthy.
3.4.2 Performance Measurement
We measure the performance of an approach for coping with unfair ratings in two
ways. One is its ability to detect dishonest advisors. An effective approach should
be able to correctly detect dishonest advisors. This performance can be measured
by the false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR). A false positive
represents that an honest advisor is incorrectly detected as a dishonest advisor.
A false negative represents that an advisor is misclassified as honest but actually
is dishonest. The lower values of FPR and FNR imply better performance. We
also use Matthew’s correlation coefficient (MCC) [45] to measure the approaches’
performance in detecting dishonest advisors. MCC is a convenient measure because




(tp + fp)(tp + fn)(tn + fp)(tn + fn)
(3.16)
where fp = false positives, tp = true positives, fn = false negatives, tn = true nega-
tives. An MCC value is between -1 and +1. A coefficient of +1 represents a perfect
detection, 0 an average random detection and -1 the worst possible detection.
We also measure the performance of an approach based on how much buyers
can benefit if the approach is employed. We use two metrics to represent this
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benefit, the profit of buyers and the ratio of buyers’ successful business with sellers.
Eventually, the higher the ratio of successful business the buyers can have with
sellers, the larger the profit they will be able to gain.
In this section, we present experimental results comparing the three approaches,
BRS, TRAVOS and the personalized approach. We first provide the comparison
of their overall performance. We then analyze how these approaches perform in
different scenarios.
3.4.3 Overall Performance Comparison
In this experiment, we vary the percentage of dishonest buyers (from 20% to 80%)
in the marketplace environment. We then measure the average MCC values for
TRAVOS, BRS and the personalized approach for the period of 60 days. Results
are shown in Figure 3.7. From this figure, we can see that the personalized approach
produces the highest MCC values for different percentages of dishonest buyers.
TRAVOS performs better than BRS. The performance of these approaches will
generally decrease when more buyers are dishonest. Note that the performance of
BRS is close to random classification when 50% of buyers are dishonest and becomes
much worse when the majority of buyers are dishonest. This result confirms our














Figure 3.7: Overall Performance of Detecting Dishonest Buyers
We measure the ratio of buyers’ successful business with sellers. We call a
transaction between a buyer and a seller successful business if the seller is honest
and delivers what it promised. We measure the success ratio of buyers after 60





















Figure 3.8: Ratio of Successful Business
marketplace (90 in our experiments). In this experiment, we also measure the
average total profit of buyers after 60 days.
The profit of a buyer is based on the buyer’s valuation for the good and the
price of the good. If a buyer does business with a honest seller, the profit of the
buyer from this transaction will be calculated as the difference between the value
of the product and the price of the product set by the seller. If the buyer does
business with a dishonest seller, the profit of the buyer will be reduced by the price
of the product. 11
The results are shown in Figures 3.8 and 3.9. These two figures are very similar
and also confirm the results shown in Figure 3.7. Note that the performance of
the personalized approach decreases when 40% of the buyers are dishonest. This
is because the public reputation component of the personalized approach does not
perform well when a large number of buyers are dishonest. When 40% of buyers
are dishonest, the personalized approach still considers the public reputation part.
Its performance is then affected by the public part. When more than 50% of buyers
are dishonest, the personalized approach will rely only on the private component.
In summary, the personalized approach performs the best. The TRAVOS model
performs better than BRS, which is similar to the results in [76]. BRS performs
much worse when the majority of buyers are dishonest, which will be further ana-
lyzed in depth in the next section. We will also analyze how the three approaches
perform in different scenarios.
11For our simulation, we assume that all goods have the same valuation for all buyers and we



















Figure 3.9: Total Profit of Buyer
3.4.4 Analysis of Different Scenarios
In order to further compare the three approaches and analyze their capabilities, we
simulate different scenarios where the majority of buyers are dishonest, buyers do
not have much experience with sellers in the marketplace, sellers may vary their
behavior widely, and buyers may provide a large number of ratings in a short period
of time. Note that in this section we will only present the performance of the
approaches in detecting dishonest buyers because this performance is correlated
with the results of total profit and success ratio of buyers, as presented in the
previous section.
Dishonest Majority
BRS assumes that a significant majority of the buyers are honest. This is why the
performance of BRS decreases dramatically when half of the buyers are liars as
shown in Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9.
In order to better see the reasons behind this performance decrease, we show
the error of BRS in detecting dishonest buyers when 50% of buyers are dishonest
in a period of 120 days, in Figure 3.10. From this figure, we can see that the ratio
of false negatives approaches 0. However, the ratio of false positives continuously
increases and approaches 1. This means that BRS tends to label every buyer as
dishonest.
Figure 3.11 explains the statistical foundation of BRS’s behavior when 50% of
buyers are dishonest. For a honest seller, dishonest buyers provide unfairly low











































Figure 3.11: BRS for 50% of Dishonest Buyers
β increases. However, for the same seller, honest buyers provide high ratings that
make their Beta distributions reside near 1. Overall, the expected value of the
aggregated Beta distribution becomes 0.5 and it does not stay within the margins
defined by the lower and upper boundaries of the buyers’ Beta distributions. Hence,
both the dishonest and honest buyers are regarded as dishonest.
Lack of Personal Experience
The TRAVOS model relies only on buyers’ personal knowledge with advisors’ ad-
vice, whereas BRS and the personalized approach also considers public knowledge
of advisors’ advice. The public knowledge is useful especially when buyers do not
have much experience with sellers, and as a consequence do not have much personal
knowledge with advisors’ advice. In this experiment, we demonstrate the perfor-
mance of these three approaches in detecting dishonest buyers when 30% of buyers
are dishonest. We plot the MCC values of their performance over 60 days, as shown
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in Figure 3.12. We can see that both BRS and the personalized approach perform
much better than the TRAVOS model in the beginning 10 days. This confirms our
argument that buyers should rely on public knowledge about advisors when they
do not have much experience with sellers. We also can see from Figure 3.12 that
the performance of BRS will decrease after 30 days and become worse than that of

















Figure 3.12: Detecting Dishonest Buyers
In the second experiment, we directly compare the performance of the personal-
ized approach with that of TRAVOS in the scenario where buyers do not have much
experience with sellers. In the experimental setting, 30% of buyers are dishonest.
Half of all buyers have more requests for products and another half have fewer
requests. Buyers having more requests will have more experience with sellers. We
























Figure 3.13: Personalized vs. TRAVOS When Buyers Lack Personal Experience
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Results are shown in Figure 3.13. In both cases when buyers have more or less
experience with sellers, the personalized approach outperforms TRAVOS. From
the figure, we can see that the difference is larger when buyers do not have much
experience with sellers. The performance difference will decrease day after day
because buyers will have more and more experience with sellers. This suggests
that an approach of modeling the trustworthiness of advisors for coping with unfair
ratings should rely on public knowledge of advisors’ advice as well when buyers do
not have much experience with sellers.
Seller Varying Behavior
The personalized approach introduces the concept of a time window when evalu-
ating the trustworthiness of advisors. For example, it only compares a buyer’s and
an advisor’s ratings if these two ratings are within the same time window when
computing the private reputation of the advisor, by setting λ in Equation 3.2 to
be 0. This is to deal with the problem when sellers vary their behavior widely.
However, as we point out in Section 2.1.1, the TRAVOS model is not able to deal
with this problem. In this section, we present experimental results to confirm this
argument.
We first carry out an experiment to compare the personalized approach with
the TRAVOS model in the situation where sellers may change their behavior. In
this experiment, the sellers that vary their behavior will be dishonest in 25% or
50% of the period of 60 days. We also have three types of sellers. The first type
of sellers act dishonestly in a uniform manner. The second type of sellers is honest
first and then becomes dishonest. The third type of sellers acts dishonestly first and
then honestly later on. We run simulations separately 500 times for each type of
seller and average the results. We then calculate the mean and standard deviation
of the two approaches’ performance in detecting dishonest buyers. Note that λ in
Equation 3.2 is set to 0, because the seller behavior is varying so much.
From the results shown in Figure 3.14, we can see that the mean performance
of the personalized approach consistently increases after each day. The standard
deviation of its performance stays nearly at 0, which implies that the performance
of the personalized approach is not affected by sellers’ varying behavior. However,
the mean performance of the TRAVOS model decreases heavily after 45 days and
the standard deviation of its performance is considerably large for the beginning
15 days and the ending 15 days. Therefore, TRAVOS does not perform well when




















Figure 3.14: Personalized vs. TRAVOS When Sellers Vary Behavior
We also carry out another experiment to analyze in depth how the TRAVOS
model will be affected by different types of seller varying behavior. In this experi-
ment, we have sellers vary their behavior in different frequencies. All sellers in this
experiment will act honestly first and then dishonestly later on. These different
types of sellers vary their behavior for 1, 3 and 5 times respectively within the
period of 60 days, as shown in Figure 3.15. This figure shows an example how a
seller that is dishonest in 50% of the period of 60 days will vary its behavior. A
seller’s honesty of 1 on the vertical axis means that the seller acts honestly in the
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Figure 3.15: Seller Varying Behavior
The performance of TRAVOS for different frequencies of seller changing behav-
ior is presented in Figure 3.16. When sellers change their behavior very frequently,
the performance of TRAVOS will also change more often. The change of its perfor-
mance is less than that when sellers vary behavior less frequently. When the sellers
change their behavior only once from being honest to be dishonest, the performance





































Figure 3.17: Performance of TRAVOS When Sellers Act Honestly First
We also show the results of the performance of TRAVOS when all sellers act
dishonestly first and then honestly later on. Similarly, sellers vary their behavior
in different frequencies. The results are shown in Figure 3.17. Comparing this
figure with Figure 3.16, we can see that the performance of TRAVOS is affected
less than that in the situation where sellers act honestly first and then dishonestly.
Especially when sellers vary their behavior at a low frequency, the performance
of TRAVOS does not have much change compared to that in Figure 3.16. In the
simulation framework, sellers acting dishonestly at the beginning will have very low
trust values and be prevented from doing business with buyers. The changes of their
behavior will no longer affect the performance of detecting dishonest buyers. This
also implies that a more effective varying behavior for a seller is to be honest first to
build up its trustworthiness, and to then act dishonestly to exploit the marketplace




Buyers’ flooding is the situation where buyers (advisors) may provide a large num-
ber of ratings for a seller in a short period of time. To deal with situation, for
example, the personalized approach uses the concept of a time window and con-
siders only a limited number of ratings from one buyer for the seller within the
same time window. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, the BRS approach will be heav-
ily affected by buyers’ flooding. In the case where buyers provide a large number
of unfair ratings, BRS will suffer from the dishonest majority problem as demon-
strated in previous sections. In this section, we carry out experiments to show that
BRS is affected even when buyers provide a large number of fair ratings within a
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Figure 3.19: BRS Unable to Cope with Flooding
In this experiment, we involve two types of buyers. The first type of buyers has
many more requests and therefore will provide a lot of ratings to sellers. The second
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type of buyers provide fewer ratings. In both cases, 20% of buyers are dishonest.
We run simulations for the two cases separately and measure the false positive rate
of BRS in detecting dishonest buyers. Results are shown in Figure 3.18. We can
see that after 20 or 40 days, BRS will start incorrectly classifying honest buyers
as dishonest. The false positive rate is higher when buyers provide more ratings.
Therefore, BRS is even affected by the situation where buyers may provide a large
number of fair ratings.
We further analyze the statistical foundation of this phenomenon, as shown in
Figure 3.19. The vertical line on the figure represents the expected value (trust-
worthiness) of a seller when there are 500 positive ratings and 0 negative ratings
provided by buyers for the seller. This figure also shows the beta distributions
for buyers that provide 1, 2, 3, and 4 positive ratings respectively, and 0 negative
ratings for the seller. The “×” symbols on the distributions represent the cut-off
points of upper bounds of these distributions. We can see from the figure that the
seller’s expected value only falls within the upper bounds of the distribution with
4 positive ratings. Therefore, the honest buyers that have only provided 1, 2 or
3 positive ratings will be incorrectly classified as dishonest buyers. This therefore
increases the false positive rate of BRS.
Summary of Results
We have carried out experiments to compare the overall performance of the three
representative approaches, TRAVOS, BRS and the personalized approach. We
measure their accuracy in detecting dishonest buyers, the ratio of buyers’ successful
business with sellers when these approach are employed, and the total profit of
buyers. Results show that the personalized approach performs the best, TRAVOS
performs better than BRS, and BRS performs much worse when the majority of
buyers are dishonest.
We also analyze how these three approaches perform in different scenarios. Re-
sults show that the personalized approach performs much better than TRAVOS
especially when buyers do not have much experience with sellers. In this case,
BRS also performs better than TRAVOS when the majority of buyers are honest.
TRAVOS suffers from the situation where sellers may vary their behavior, and is
heavily affected especially when sellers first build up their trust by being honest
and then act dishonestly. BRS is shown to be ineffective when buyers provide a
large number of ratings for a seller.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we propose a personalized approach for effectively handling unfair
ratings in centralized reputation systems. It allows a buying agent to estimate
the private reputation of an advisor agent based on their ratings for commonly
rated selling agents. When the buying agent is not confident with the private
reputation value, it can also use the public reputation of the advisor. The public
reputation of the advisor is evaluated based on all ratings for the selling agents
rated by the advisor agent. Similarly, we adopt a personalized approach to model
the trustworthiness of selling agents by combining the weighted private and public
reputation values of the sellers.
Compared with other trust and reputation modeling approaches summarized in
Section 2.1.1, our personalized approach for modeling the trustworthiness of advi-
sors has all of the desirable features that we outlined in Section 2.1.2. It is able to
cope with unfair ratings even when the majority of the ratings of a seller is unfair.
It is able to deal with the situation where advisors may provide a large number of
ratings within a short period of time. It is effective even when buyers do not have
much experience with sellers and is also able to deal with changes of agents’ behav-
ior over time. These capabilities of our approach are further demonstrated through
experiments. In the categorization of these models presented in Table 2.1, only
our personalized approach falls into both the categories of “public/endogenous”
and “private/exogenous” because it has the combination of the private and pub-
lic reputation components. It also has the advantages of both approaches used
in centralized reputation systems and approaches used in distributed reputation
systems.
Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the personalized approach
in terms of adjusting agents’ trustworthiness based on the percentages of unfair
ratings they provided. Trustworthiness of advisor agents will be decreased more/less
if advisor agents provide more/fewer unfair ratings. Our approach can effectively
model the trustworthiness of advisors even when buying agents do not have much
experience with selling agents. Furthermore, our approach is still effective when the
majority of advisor agents provide large numbers of unfair ratings, by adjusting to
rely more heavily on private reputations of advisor agents. In addition we show that
our approach is scalable in terms of different populations of involved sellers. We also
demonstrate the value of our method for modeling advisors in order to effectively
model the trustworthiness of sellers. Our personalized model can therefore be seen
as a valuable approach to use when introducing social networks in order to model
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the trustworthiness of sellers in electronic marketplaces.
We then focus on experimental comparison with the representative approaches,
including BRS and TRAVOS. Instead of using the ART Testbed [19] that is pro-
posed to provide unified performance benchmarks for comparing trust and repu-
tation modeling approaches, we propose a framework that simulates a dynamic
electronic marketplace environment involving possibly deceptive buying and selling
agents.
The current ART Testbed specification is in an artwork appraisal domain where
appraisers want to buy artwork about which they may have limited knowledge.
They may then seek information about artwork from other appraisers (opinion
providers). Opinion providers may choose to lie about the true value of the art-
work. The appraisers will model the trustworthiness of opinion providers based on
their own knowledge about the opinion providers or reputation opinion of other ap-
praisers (reputation providers). These reputation providers may choose to lie about
opinion providers’ true trust values. An approach for coping with untruthful rep-
utation opinions from opinion providers may then be integrated and evaluated by
the ART Testbed. However, integrating TRAVOS, BRS and the personalized ap-
proach into the testbed is challenging. These approaches are developed for a rather
simpler e-marketplace environment. They allow only binary ratings to represent
simple and objective results of transactions between sellers and buyers (advisors).
Advisors modeled by these approaches do not make profit from providing advice
or pay cost to generate advice. Overly simplifying the ART Testbed may lose its
advantages, and adapting these approaches to the complicated testbed may change
their original design. Furthermore, the winning approach IAM [75] for the 2006
ART Testbed competition does not even consider reputation opinions from other
appraisers. This decision raises the concern about the importance of an approach
for coping with untruthful reputation opinions in this testbed, and whether the
results of comparing the approaches based on this testbed will be significant.
The approaches of BRS, TRAVOS and our personalized approach are compared
for the first time in terms of their capabilities for detecting dishonest buyers. Total
profit of buyers is also the most direct and important measure used in the compar-
ison between these approaches. We further specifically examine different scenarios,
including ones where the majority of buyers are dishonest, buyers lack personal
experience with sellers, sellers may vary their behavior, and buyers may provide a
lot of ratings. Such an empirical study is useful for highlighting the importance of





In the previous chapter, we presented a personalized approach that effectively
models the trustworthiness of agents in terms of private and public reputation.
Equipped with this method, in this chapter, we propose a novel trust-based incen-
tive mechanism to elicit truthful ratings of selling agents from buying agents and
to promote seller honesty in electronic marketplaces. In our mechanism, buyers are
encouraged to be truthful in order to gain more profitable transactions. This idea
is supported by Gintis et al. [23]. They argue that altruism in one context signals
“quality” that is rewarded by increased opportunities in other contexts. Specifi-
cally, if the system is such that the provision of truthful reputation feedback makes
agents more likely to choose to undertake transactions with the reporting agent,
then the reporting agent would benefit for its feedback through a greater number
of profitable transactions.
Our personalized approach presented in Chapter 3 provides the promising first
step for this work. It allows buyers to effectively model the trustworthiness of other
buyers. We then use this approach to create a social network of buyers. Each buyer
in the society retains a neighborhood of the most trustworthy buyers, as advisors.
In our mechanism, we also allow sellers to explicitly model the reputability of
buyers, based on the neighborhoods to which they belong in the society. A buyer
is reputable in the social network if it is the neighbor of many other reputable
buyers. Buyers that always provide truthful ratings of sellers are likely to become
reputable. This is also supported by Gintis et al. [23] through the model of a
multi-player game. They argue that agents reporting honestly provide benefit to
others and will further be preferred by others as allies. These agents will be able
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to attract a larger audience to witness their feedback (also known as increasing
“broadcast efficiency”). Sellers in our system will increase quality and decrease
prices of products to satisfy reputable buyers. This therefore creates an incentive
for buyers to provide truthful ratings of sellers. Since buyers are sharing ratings
of sellers, sellers are also encouraged to be trustworthy and honest (delivering the
goods, as promised, to the buyers).
We assume a marketplace where buyers declare their interest in a good, sellers
submit bids and buyers ultimately select a seller with which to do business. We
develop a precise formulation for sellers to reason about the important element
of expected future profit, starting from formulae for reasoning about immediate
profit.1 This is based on reasoning about the likelihood of making a sale to a
buyer, making use of information held centrally about the reputation of the buyer.
As a result, we are able to provide a precise specification for seller bidding behavior
and for offering rewards to buyers based on their reputation. We also emphasize
the importance for buyers to adopt a strategy to limit the number of sellers that are
considered for each good to be purchased. Most importantly, we theoretically prove
that both rational buyers and rational sellers are incentivized to behave honestly
in our mechanism, in so doing providing definitive validation of the effectiveness of
our proposal. The proposed seller strategy and the buyer behavior in the context
of the seller strategy are also illustrated through a detailed example in Section 4.3.
We then present a series of experimental results to provide additional detail
on marketplace trends that demonstrate the value of our newly designed incentive
mechanism, conducted in a simulated environment where buyers and sellers may
be deceptive and they may be arriving and departing. This provides a stronger
endorsement of the mechanism as one that is robust to important conditions in
the marketplace. In addition, we validate the benefit of our specific proposal for
the seller bidding strategy and for the buyer strategy of limiting the sellers being
considered, clearly showing the gains in profit enjoyed by both sellers and buyers
when our mechanism is introduced and our proposed strategies are followed.
4.1 System Overview
The electronic marketplace environment we are modeling is populated with self-
interested buying and selling agents. Our incentive mechanism is generally applica-
1As in Chapter 3, we assume as well a marketplace where sellers are selling similar kinds of
goods.
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ble to any marketplace where sellers may alter quality and price of their products
to satisfy buyers. For the remainder of this chapter, we discuss the scenario where
the buyers and sellers are brought together by a procurement (reverse) auction,
where the auctioneer is a buyer and bidders are sellers. There is a central server
that runs the auction. This server holds ratings of sellers submitted by buyers that
will be shared with other buyers. It also forms a social network of buyers based
on our personalized approach introduced in the previous chapter. The information
about buyers’ reputation is then also kept on the central server and will be released









Choose as winner, pay
Deliver product (or not)
Register a rating
Acquire ratings of seller
Acquire buyer’s reputation
Sellers allowed to bid
Figure 4.1: Buying and Selling Processes
Figure 4.1 illustrates the buying and selling processes, and the communications
between buyers, sellers and the central server. In our system, a buyer that wants
to purchase a product sends a request to the central server. This request indicates
not only the product that the buyer is interested in but also the buyer’s evaluation
criteria for the product (discussed in more detail in the following section). Sellers
interested in selling the product to the buyer will register to participate in the
auction.
The buyer will first limit the sellers it will consider for the auction, by modeling
their trustworthiness. This is achieved by having each buyer maintain a neighbor-
hood of trusted other buyers, which will be asked to provide ratings of the sellers
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Algorithm 3: Buying Algorithm
Send a request for a product to the central server;
//containing evaluation criteria for the product
Receive from the central server a list of sellers S interested in selling;
Set the list of sellers allowed to bid S ′ = Ø
foreach s in S do
Acquire ratings of s provided by neighbors from the central server;
Model trustworthiness of s; //using Algorithm 2 presented in Chapter 3
if s is trustworthy then
Add s in S ′;
Receive bids from each seller in S ′;
Choose the winner sw that offers largest profit, pay to sw;
if sw delivers promise then
Submit a rating 1 to the central server;
else
Submit 0;
under consideration. The buyer will then convey to the central server which sellers
it is willing to consider, and the pool of possible sellers is thus reduced.
Sellers that are allowed to participate in the auction will submit their bids and
the buyer will select the winner of the auction as the seller whose product (described
in its bid) gives the buyer the largest profit, based on the buyer’s evaluation criteria.
In order to formulate their bids, we introduce the important element that sellers
model the reputation of buyers and make more attractive offers to more reputable
buyers. A buyer’s reputation is based on the number of other buyers considering this
buyer as their neighbor (as well as the trust these other buyers place on this buyer,
and the reputation of these other buyers). As such, we are critically leveraging
the social network of the buyers as part of the framework. As will be shown later
in this section, this eventually provides important incentives for honest reporting
about sellers from buyers. The reputation of each buyer is maintained by the central
server and released to the sellers.
Once a buyer has selected the winning seller, it pays that seller the amount
indicated in the bid. The winning seller is supposed to deliver the product to the
buyer. However, it may decide to alter the quality of the product or to not deliver
the product at all. The buyer will report the result of conducting business with the
seller to the central server, registering a rating for the seller. It is precisely these
ratings of the seller that can then be shared with those buyers that consider this
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buyer as their neighbor.
In summary: the central server runs the auction and maintains information
that is shared with sellers and buyers; buyers announce their intention to purchase
products, consult with neighbors, choose a winning seller and report a final rating
for the seller; sellers bid to win the sale to the buyer, consider buyer reputation
in formulating their bids and then decide what product to deliver to the buyer (if
at all). A pseudo code summary of the buying and selling algorithms is shown in
Algorithms 3 and 4, respectively.
Algorithm 4: Selling Algorithm
Receive buyer b’s request from the central server;
if interested then
Register to participate in b’s auction;
if allowed to bid then
Acquire reputation of b from the central server;
//Calculate buyer reputation based on social network of buyers
//The central server maintains neighbor lists
Formulate a bid, and submit;
if decide to be honest then
Deliver the product described in the bid;
4.2 Strategic Behavior Analysis
In this section, we propose and analyze the strategies that buyers and sellers in
our mechanism should use. We also theoretically prove that these strategies will
promote buyer and seller honesty.
4.2.1 Seller Strategy to Promote Buyer Honesty
We first present a seller’s optimal strategy when sellers only take into account
their instant profit from winning a buyer’s auction. Next, we derive an equilibrium
bidding strategy for sellers when they also take into account their expected future
gain, in a simplified scenario where all sellers have the same productivity. We then
lift the simplifying assumption and show that with this bidding structure, sellers are
better off providing rewards to more reputable buyers and that buyers are better
off participating in the social network and providing honest ratings of sellers.
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Seller Strategy
We discuss our mechanism in the context of the Request For Quote (RFQ) sys-
tem [70, 79]. We consider a scenario where a buyer b wants to buy a product p. The
buyer specifies its evaluation criteria for a set of non-price features {f1, f2, ..., fn},
as well as a set of weights {w1, w2, ..., wn} that correspond to each non-price feature.
Each weight represents how much its corresponding non-price feature is worth. A
higher weight for a non-price feature implies that the buyer cares more about the
feature. The buyer also provides information in its evaluation criteria about the
conversion from descriptive non-price feature values to numeric values (for example,
a 3-year warranty is converted to the numeric value of 10 on a scale of 1 to 10).2 We
define the function τ() to denote such a conversion. Sellers {s1, s2, ..., sm} (m ≥ 1)
allowed to join the auction are able to know the buyer’s values of their products,





We now begin to express precisely the profit to be gained by the buyer and the
seller, to then discuss the kind of gains that sellers can reason about and the kinds
of bids they should offer to buyers.
A seller si (1 ≤ i ≤ m) sets the price and values for the non-price features of
the product p (i.e. its promise), depending on how much instant profit it can earn
from selling p to the buyer b. The instant profit is the profit earned by the seller
from the current transaction if it wins the auction. We define the seller’s instant
profit as follows:
Usi = Psi − Csi (4.2)
where Psi is the price of the product set by the seller si and Csi is the cost for the
seller to produce the product p with certain values for the non-price features in its
bid.
The profit gained by the buyer if it chooses to do business with the seller si can
be formalized as follows:
Ub = Vb − Psi (4.3)
The buyer’s profit is also called the seller’s “surplus offer”, denoted as Osi .
2In the current work, we focus on non-price features that are still objective - e.g. delivery time.
Handling subjective features is left for future work. Further discussion of this issue can be found
in Section 6.2.
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The seller’s “realized surplus” [70] is typically calculated as the sum of the
buyer’s and the seller’s profit, as follows:
Ssi = Vb − Csi (4.4)
Note that the seller’s realized surplus is higher when its cost for producing the
product is lower. We also define the cumulative distribution function for Ssi (over
all sellers) as F () and the support of F () is [SL, SH ]. We assume SL ≥ 0 to ensure
that the value of a seller’s product always exceeds its cost.
The seller whose surplus offer is the highest will win the auction. The RFQ
auction then becomes a first-price sealed auction where a bidder’s bids are not seen
by others and the bidder with the highest bid (surplus offer) wins the auction.
As argued by Shachat and Swarthout [70], a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium
surplus offer function can be derived as follows:






where m is the number of bidders. Recall that Osi is the same as Ub. From
Equations 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5, the equilibrium bidding function for the seller can then
be derived as follows:






The seller in our mechanism also reasons about the expected future gain from
winning the current auction. It takes into account the reputation of buyer b. In our
mechanism, each buyer in the marketplace has a fixed number of neighbors that the
buyer trusts and from which it can ask advice about sellers.3 This forms a social
network of buyers where there is a directed link (edge) from a buyer to its neighbors
(which will be described in greater detail in Section 4.2.2). The edges are assigned
weights ∈ (0, 1] representing how much a buyer trusts its neighbors modeled using
our personalized approach presented in the previous chapter. A simple example of
buyer social network is shown in Figure 4.2. As shown in the figure, buyer b1 is b3’s
neighbor and the trust value b3 has of b1 is 0.7.
A buyer is reputable in the social network if it is the neighbor of many other
reputable buyers. For example, buyer b4 in Figure 4.2 is more reputable because
it is highly trusted by buyer b2 and the reputable buyer b1. Cooperating with
reputable buyers will allow the seller to build its own reputation and to be known










Figure 4.2: A Simple Example of Buyer Social Network
as a trustworthy seller by many buyers in the marketplace. It will then be able to
obtain more opportunities for doing business with buyers and to gain more profit in
the future. We next provide formulae for the seller’s reasoning about its expected
future gain and prove that the expected future gain the seller si can earn after
doing good business with b increases with the reputation of buyer b.
We define the global reputation of buyer b (denoted as Rb) on the social network
to be the network effect of the buyer, which represents how much this buyer influ-
ences other buyers’ decisions on the entire network. According to [59], reputation
should be calculated as the effect that this buyer has on other buyers it influences,
multiplied by these other buyers’ effect on the network. This is a recursive and




where R is a vector containing each buyer’s reputation and is initially set to 1 for
every buyer.4 An example of this calculation can be found in Section 4.3. L is an
asymmetric matrix of the normalized weights of edges between all two-buyer pairs.
The weight between two buyers is 0 if there is no link between them. Therefore,
R can be computed as the dominant eigenvector of L, which is similar to the
EigenTrust computation [35].5
If the seller cooperates with the buyer, the new satisfied encounter between
the buyer and the seller will then increase the seller’s trustworthiness. The seller’s
probability of being allowed to join the buyer’s auctions in the future will be in-
4R can be recorded by the central server and shared with sellers. The source code of the
implementation in Java for this computation is presented in Appendix B.
5Note that this calculation may be computationally intensive. A simpler way of calculating
buyers’ reputation can be found in Appendix A, along with an example and experimental support
for this simpler calculation.
76
creased by some amount, 4Pb, where 4Pb > 0. Since this increment in probability
is fairly small and relatively stable, we can assume that the probability of the seller
being involved in auctions of other neighboring buyers increases linearly with how
much these other buyers trust the current buyer b. Richardson and Domingos [59]
indicate that the increase in probability of a seller being involved in every buyer’s
auctions across the network is 4PbRb.
If the seller is involved in a buyer’s auction, the average probability of winning
the auction is 1
m
, given that the number of bidders in the buyer’s auction is m. The




is the average probability of winning the auction multiplied by the average instant
profit gained from winning the auction.6 We use Esi(Rb) to denote the amount of

















4Pb > 0 (4.9)
The expected future gain the seller si can earn increases with the reputation of the
buyer b.
Let us first consider a simplified scenario where sellers {s1, s2, ..., sm} have the
same productivity. They have the same cost for producing the products that are
valued equally by the buyer. In other words, we make the following assumption
that the distribution of Ssi , F () is a uniform distribution. Let us also assume that
the seller’s lowest realized surplus SL for a transaction is 0. Equation 4.6 then can
be simplified as follows:






























m−1 = Csi +
Ssi
m
6The average instant profit is Ssim , as shown in Equation 4.10.
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Since the seller’s realized surplus is equal to the sum of the buyer and the seller’s
profit and the seller has expected future gain from winning the current auction, the
seller’s realized surplus Ssi can then be changed as follows:
S ′si = Ub + Usi + λ
′Esi(Rb) (4.11)
= Vb − Csi + λ′Esi(Rb)
= Ssi + λ
′Esi(Rb)
where λ′ ∈ [0, 1] is a discounting factor.7 The lowest S ′si becomes λ′Esi(Rb) instead
of zero and the upper bound of S ′si becomes SH + λ
′Esi(Rb). Accordingly, the
symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium surplus offer function formalized in Equation 4.5
should be changed as follows:8







From Equations 4.3, 4.4 and 4.12, we then can derive the modified equilibrium
bidding function for the seller as follows:
































































+ (m− 1)λ′Esi ]
7We suggest the inclusion of a discounting factor to allow sellers to learn over time the likelihood
of receiving their expected future gain. The proofs that follow do not depend on its inclusion.
8We replace Esi(Rb) by Esi for a more concise formulation.
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Comparing Equation 4.10 with Equation 4.13, we can see that the seller should









+ (m− 1)λ′Esi ] (4.14)
The reward can be the decreased price of the product. According to Equation 4.3, if
the bidding price is fixed, the reward can also be the increased values of the product
offered to the buyer. According to Equation 4.9, the seller’s expected future gain
Esi(Rb) is a monotonically increasing function of Rb, the reputation of buyer b. We
can then prove that the reward Dsi(Rb) offered to the buyer is also a monotonically




























































































≥ 0 > 0
> 0
We have now proved the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Sellers are better off providing better rewards to reputable buyers
in the case where all sellers have the same productivity.
The above analysis depends on the simplified assumption that sellers have the
same productivity. We can generalize this result by removing this assumption.
In this case, sellers may have different costs for producing the product with the
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same value of Vb. We first modify the seller’s original equilibrium bidding function
formalized in Equation 4.6 based on Equation 4.4, shown as follows:






We then prove that the seller’s original equilibrium bidding function is a monoton-














































Based on Equation 4.9, we can see that the seller’s modified realized surplus S ′si











Therefore, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 The seller’s equilibrium bidding function is a monotonically de-
creasing function of Rb, which indicates that the seller will give more reward Dsi(Rb)
to the buyers that are considered more reputable in the marketplace.
Buyer Honesty
Here we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The seller strategy creates incentives for buyers to truthfully report
the results of their business with sellers in order to become more reputable in the
marketplace.
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From Equation 4.3, we first formalize the total profit gained by the buyer b from l







(Vb,k − P ∗sk) (4.19)
Based on Proposition 2 that a seller’s equilibrium bidding function P ∗sk is a monoton-
ically decreasing function of Rb, we then can prove that the buyer’s total profit Tb




























is negative (and considering Vb,k as independent of Rb). Therefore, in
order to gain more total profit, it is better off for the buyer to maintain high
reputation. This can be achieved by participating in the social network and honestly
reporting the results of its business with sellers.
4.2.2 Buyer Strategy to Promote Seller Honesty
In this section, we present an effective strategy for buyers to choose their business
partners. Buyers using this strategy are able to gain more profit, which is further
validated by experimental results presented in Section 4.4. We also discuss how
this strategy creates incentives for sellers to deliver what they promised in their
bids.
Buyer Strategy
To avoid doing business with possibly dishonest sellers, the buyer b in our mecha-
nism first models the trustworthiness of sellers. We propose that our personalized
approach be used for this purpose; this is the approach used in the experiments
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presented in Section 4.4.9 A seller is considered trustworthy if its trust value is
greater than a threshold θ. It will be considered untrustworthy if the trust value
is less than δ. The buyer in our mechanism will allow only a number of the most
trustworthy sellers to join the auction. If there are no trustworthy sellers, the sellers
with trust values between θ and δ may also be allowed to join the auction.
Once a buyer engages in commerce with a seller, the buyer submits its rating
of the seller to the central server. This information may be viewed by the seller, in
order to determine the reputability of the buyer. The rating provided by the buyer
is a binary value and is a reflection of whether the buyer believes that the seller
delivered fairly on its stated promise for the good.
However, buyers may provide untruthful ratings of sellers. Our mechanism
allows the central server to maintain a fixed number10 of neighbors for each buyer:
a list of the most trustworthy other buyers to this buyer, used to provide advice
about sellers, in order to form a social network of buyers.11 The trustworthiness
of these other buyers (advisors) then needs to be modeled. In the experiments
presented in Section 4.4, our personalized approach described in Chapter 3 is used
for this purpose. This approach allows a buyer to first model private reputation of
an advisor based on their ratings for commonly rated sellers. When the buyer has
limited private knowledge of the advisor, the public reputation of the advisor will
also be considered, based on all ratings for the sellers ever rated by the advisor held
in the central server. Finally, the trustworthiness of the advisor will be modeled by
combining the private and public reputation values.
Figure 4.3 shows an example of a candidate list and a neighbor list for a par-
ticular buyer. Assume that these are both ordered from most trustworthy to least
trustworthy. For a new buyer, the central server randomly assigns to it some other
buyers with high public reputation as candidates for its neighbors. The candidate
list is larger than the neighbor list.12 The computation of buyers’ public reputation
is presented in Chapter 3. The neighbor list will be updated periodically. Each
time, the most trustworthy candidates will be selected as neighbors (shown as ar-
rows from the candidate list to the neighbor list in Figure 4.3). The candidate list is
9Different existing approaches for modeling sellers’ trustworthiness can be used here, for ex-
ample the TRAVOS model proposed by Teacy et al. [76]. It also proposes to take into account
the buyer’s personal experience with the sellers as well as ratings of the sellers provided by other
buyers.
10Deciding the appropriate number of neighbors to use is left for future work. See Section 6.2.1.
11Note for a new buyer, the central server randomly assigns to it some other buyers as its
neighbors.
12The suggestion of keeping track of a longer candidate list is also used in [83].
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c1 c2 c3 ... ck ...Candidate List:









Figure 4.3: Candidate List and Neighbor List
also updated periodically. Each time, a small portion of buyers is chosen randomly
as candidates from all buyers with high public reputation values (shown as arrows
from the buyer list to the candidate list in Figure 4.3).
Seller Honesty
Our idea of allowing the buyer to limit the number of selected bidders in its auc-
tions is supported by Kim’s results demonstrated in [37]. Kim proves that public
tendering could lead to quality reduction by bidders; in contrast, selective tender-
ing depending on bidders’ trustworthiness may avoid such difficulties. Calzolari
and Spagnolo [8] also analyze repeated procurement processes. They show that
by limiting the number of competitors and carefully choosing the trustworthy ones
to join their auctions, buyers offer sellers sufficient future gain so that sellers will
prefer to provide acceptable levels of quality of products in the current auction to
build their reputation, in order to gain more profit in the future. Bar-Isaac also
uses an example in [3] to show that low competition may sustain an equilibrium in
which sellers produce high quality products.
In [37, 8] the authors prove that by using a buyer strategy as described above
(modeling the trustworthiness of sellers and limiting the number of sellers that are
considered), dishonest sellers will not be able to gain more total profit than that
gained by honest sellers. Suppose that a dishonest winning seller s decides not to
deliver its promise in its bid submitted to the buyer b in the current auction. Also
suppose that the seller’s equilibrium bidding price is Ps and Cs is the cost for s to
produce the delivered product (possibly zero). By assuming that a dishonest seller
will lose the chance to do business with the buyer in the future, the total profit
gained by the seller s can then be formalized based on Equation 4.2, as follows:
Ts = Us = Ps − Cs (4.21)
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The studies of [37, 8] do not consider the case where buyers form a social net-
work. The seller therefore does not take into account the future profit gained by
doing business with other buyers influenced by the feedback about the seller pro-
vided by the buyer b. In our case, the seller bids to sell the product to the buyer
by also taking into account the future gain obtained by doing business with other
buyers that consider b as their neighbor. The seller’s expected gain in our case is
then greater than or equal to that in their case. Greater expected future gain leads
to a larger realized surplus (see Equation 4.11). Based on the argument supported
by Equation 4.17 that the seller’s equilibrium bidding function is a monotonically
decreasing function of its realized surplus, the seller’s equilibrium bidding price P ′s
should then be less than or equal to Ps. The profit that the seller s is able to earn
will be less than or equal to the profit that it can earn in the case where sellers do
not take into account the expected future gain obtained from other buyers in the
marketplace:




s − Cs ≤ Ps − Cs = Ts (4.22)
Honest sellers in both cases (taking future gain into account, or not) instead are
able to gain the same amount of profit. The sellers in our mechanism decrease their
instant profit, which will be complemented by their expected future gain. Based on
the above analysis, honest sellers in our mechanism therefore will be able to gain
more total profit than that gained by dishonest sellers. Rational sellers desire profit
and therefore will be honest. In conclusion, we have now proved the following:
Proposition 4 The buyer strategy is able to promote seller honesty.
4.3 Examples
In this section, we use some examples to demonstrate how our mechanism works.
We first provide an example to demonstrate how a buyer selects the winning seller to
do business with, based on not only the sellers’ bids but also their trustworthiness.
We then provide another example to illustrate how a seller models reputation of
buyers and specifies its bids for buyers’ requests according to their reputation values.
4.3.1 Buyer Choosing Winning Seller
In this example, a buyer b wants to buy a product p. It sends the request to the
central server. In its request, the buyer specifies the two non-price features (delivery
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time and warranty) of the product p; the weight for each non-price feature and
the information about the conversion from descriptive non-price feature values to
numeric values are presented in Table 4.1. For example, the delivery time of 1 week
will be converted to the numeric value of 3.
Table 4.1: Buyer b’s Evaluation Criteria for p
Non-price Features Delivery Time Warranty
Weights 0.4 0.6
Descriptive values 1 week 3 days 1 day 1 year 2 years 3 years
Numerical values 3 5 10 3 5 10
The central server forwards b’s request to the sellers in the marketplace. Five
sellers {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5} are interested in selling their products to the buyer. To
prevent doing business with possibly dishonest sellers, buyer b models the trust-
worthiness of the sellers using our personalized approach and selects trustworthy
ones to join its auction. We also suppose that b previously has not done business
with any one of the sellers. Therefore b has no ratings for these sellers. The private
reputation of the sellers can be calculated according to Equation 3.8 as follows:
Rpri(s1|s2|s3|s4|s5) = 0 + 1
(0 + 0) + 2
= 0.5
The buyer b then considers ratings of the sellers provided by its neighbors. We
assume that b has only one neighbor, which is the buyer (advisor) a. Assume that
the trust value that the buyer b has of a is 0.95. The ratings of the sellers provided
by the advisor a are listed in Table 4.2. The symbol “T” represents a sequence
of time windows, in which T1 is the most recent time window. To simplify the
demonstration, we assume that a provides at most one rating within each time
window. Note that the advisor a does not have ratings for s2 because a has not
done business with s2.
Table 4.2: Ratings of Sellers Provided by Advisor a
T T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
s1 0 0 0 1 1
s2 - - - - -
s3 1 1 1 1 1
s4 1 1 1 1 0
s5 1 1 1 1 0
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The amount of positive or negative ratings provided by advisor a within each
time window will be discounted using Equations 3.11 and 3.12. The discounted
amount of positive and negative ratings of sellers is listed in Table 4.3. For example,
the discounted amount of positive ratings of seller s1 in time window T4 is calculated
to be 0.93.
Table 4.3: Discounted Amount of Ratings of Sellers Provided by Advisor a
T T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Dapos,i(s1) 0 0 0 0.93 0.93
Daneg,i(s1) 0.93 0.93 0.93 0 0
Dapos,i(s2) 0 0 0 0 0
Daneg,i(s2) 0 0 0 0 0
Dapos,i(s3) 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Daneg,i(s3) 0 0 0 0 0
Dapos,i(s4) 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0
Daneg,i(s4) 0 0 0 0 0.93
Dapos,i(s5) 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0
Daneg,i(s5) 0 0 0 0 0.93
In this example, we set the forgetting factor λ in Equation 3.13 to be 0.9, which
means that the buyer b does not have much forgetting. According to Equation 3.13,




0.93 ∗ 0.9i−1 + 1
5∑
i=1
0.93 ∗ 0.9i−1 + 2
= 0.39
Rpub(s2) = 0.5, Rpub(s3) = 0.83, Rpub(s4) = 0.72, Rpub(s5) = 0.72
Because the buyer b has not done business with any of the sellers before, the
weights of the private reputation of the sellers are all 0. The trustworthiness of the
sellers can be calculated by using Equation 3.14 as follows:
Tr(s1) = 0 ∗ 0.5 + (1− 0) ∗ 0.39 = 0.39
Tr(s2) = 0.5, T r(s3) = 0.83, T r(s4) = 0.72, T r(s5) = 0.72
We set the threshold γ for sellers to be considered as trustworthy to be 0.7. In this
case, only the sellers s3, s4 and s5 will be considered as trustworthy sellers by buyer
b.
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Only the trustworthy sellers s3, s4 and s5 are allowed to submit their bids to
the buyer. Suppose that all three sellers want to produce the same product for the
buyer, which has 3-year warranty and will be delivered in 1 day. The buyer’s value
for their products will be calculated using Equation 4.1 as follows:
Vb = 10× 0.4 + 10× 0.6 = 10
The sellers s3, s4 and s5 have different costs for producing the product p. The
realized surplus of each seller Ss calculated using Equation 4.4, the sellers’ equilib-
rium bidding price P ∗s calculated using Equation 4.13 and their surplus offer for the
buyer O∗s calculated using Equation 4.12 are listed in Table 4.4. In this example,
we simplify the calculation by assuming that the sellers’ expected future gain from
winning the buyer’s current auction is 1; we also set the discounting factor λ′ to
0.9. A detailed example is in Section 4.3.2 to show how a seller reasons about its
expected future gain from winning the current auction.
Table 4.4: Sellers Bidding for b’s Request





s3 5 5 6.06 3.94
s4 6 4 6.72 3.28
s5 8 2 8.04 1.96
The buyer b will choose the seller that has the largest surplus offer Os as the
winner of the auction. In this case, s3 will be the winner. The buyer pays 6.06 to
seller s3. Later on, seller s3 delivers the product. Suppose that the seller delivers
the product with 3 year warranty in one day; we say that the seller is trustworthy
in this transaction. Buyer b will submit a rating of 1 to the central server. From
this example, we can see that only the trustworthy seller s3 gains the instant profit,
which can be calculated according to Equation 4.2 as follows:
Us3 = Ps3 − Cs3 = 6.06− 5 = 1.06
4.3.2 Seller Bidding for Buyers’ Requests
In this example, we illustrate how reputation of buyers is modeled by the central
server and how a seller s specifies its bids for buyers’ requests according to their
reputation values. Suppose that there are 6 buyers, {b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6}. They
request the same product p with the same evaluation criteria presented in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.5: Neighbors of Buyers
Buyer Neighbors
b1 b2 b5 b6
b2 b4 b5 b6
b3 b4 b5 b6
b4 b3 b5 b6
b5 b3 b4 b6
b6 b3 b4 b5
Assume that each buyer is allowed to have only 3 neighbors in this example. The
neighbors of each buyer are listed in Table 4.5. We also assume that the trust value
each buyer has of each its neighbor is 0.8. We calculate each buyer’s reputation
using Equation 4.7 as follows:
Rb1 = 0.8, Rb2 = 1.31, Rb3 = 10.95
Rb4 = 11.46, Rb5 = 11.74, Rb6 = 11.74
Seller s needs to decide how to bid for each buyer’s request. It considers the
reputation of each buyer. According to the reputation of each buyer, seller s spec-
ifies its bid for each buyer’s request. It produces different instantiations of the
product p for different buyers. Table 4.6 lists the buyers’ values for the products,
calculated using Equation 4.1 based on Table 4.1. The seller s has different costs
for producing these products, which are also listed in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: Products Produced for Different Buyers
Buyers Non-price Features Value Cost
Delivery Time Warranty
b1, b2 7 days 1 year 3 1
b3, b4 3 days 2 years 5 3
b5, b6 1 day 3 years 10 8
From Table 4.6, we can see that the seller’s realized surplus before considering
its expected future profit is 2 for every buyer. Suppose that there are 3 sellers in
each auction (m = 3). Also assume that the increase in probability ∆P of the seller
being involved in a buyer’s action in the future if the seller satisfies the buyer is
0.2. We can calculate the seller’s expected future profit from winning buyer b1’s
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∗ 0.2 ∗ 0.8 = 0.04
Table 4.7 lists the seller’s amount of expected future gain Es(Rb) from selling
the products to each of the six buyers with different reputation values. We assume
the discounting factor λ′ to be 1. We also calculate the modified realized surplus S ′s
using Equation 4.11, and the reward Ds offered to different buyers and the seller’s
equilibrium bidding prices P ∗s according to Equation 4.13, as presented in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Seller’s Prices for Different Buyers
Buyer b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
Es(Rb) 0.04 0.06 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.52
S ′s 2.04 2.06 2.49 2.51 2.52 2.52
Ds 0.027 0.04 0.333 0.347 0.354 0.354
P ∗s 1.640 1.627 3.334 3.319 8.313 8.313
We can see from Table 4.7 that seller s offers the best rewards to the more
reputable buyers b5 and b6. Buyers b1 and b2 with reputation values that are close
to 0 gain very little reward. According to Tables 4.6 and 4.7, we can calculate the
profit gained by the buyers using Equation 4.3, as follows:
Ub1 = 1.360, Ub2 = 1.373, Ub3 = 1.666
Ub4 = 1.681, Ub5 = 1.687, Ub6 = 1.687
We can see that the more reputable buyers b5 and b6 are able to gain the largest
profit and the less reputable buyers b1 and b2 can only gain the smallest profit.
Therefore, it is better off for buyers to be honest and build higher reputations, in
order to gain more profit.
4.4 Experimental Results
This section presents experimental results to confirm the value of our proposed
incentive mechanism, showing that: honesty is more profitable, for both buyers
and sellers; sellers are more profitable when modeling the reputation of buyers
according to their neighborhoods; buyers are more profitable when they participate,
by providing ratings to others; buyers derive better profit when they use the ratings
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of sellers provided by neighbors and measure the trustworthiness of other buyers,
in order to form these neighborhoods.
We simulate a marketplace operating with our mechanism for a period of 30
days. The marketplace involves 90 buyers. These buyers are grouped into three
groups. They have different numbers of requests. Every 10 of the buyers in each
group has a different number (10, 20 and 30) of requests. In our experiments,
we assume that there is only one product in each request and each buyer has a
maximum of one request each day. For the purpose of simplicity, we also assume
that the products requested by buyers have the same non-price features. After they
finish business with sellers, buyers rate sellers. Some buyers will provide untruthful
ratings. Each group of buyers provides different percentages (0%, 20% and 40%)
of untruthful ratings. We allow 2 buyers from each group to leave the marketplace
at the end of each day. Accordingly, we also allow 6 buyers to join the marketplace
at the end of each day. These buyers will also provide a different percentage (0%,
20% and 40%) of untruthful ratings, to keep the number of buyers in each group
the same. Initially, we randomly assign 5 buyers to each buyer as its neighbors.
There are also 9 sellers in total in the marketplace. Each 3 sellers acts dishon-
estly in different percentages (0%, 25% and 75%) of their business with buyers. We
assume that all sellers have the same cost for producing the products because all



























Figure 4.4: Reputation of Different Buyers
Here, we provide some general results to show that our mechanism promotes
buyer and seller honesty. We first measure the reputation of buyers that provide
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different percentages of untruthful ratings. In our experiments, a buyer’s reputation
is computed using Equation 4.7. The results13 are shown in Figure 4.4. From this
figure, we can see that the buyers providing the smaller percentages of untruthful
ratings will have the larger reputation values. Due to the randomness of the ini-
tial setting for our experiments, buyers’ reputation values change stochastically at
the beginning. After approximately 10 days when our marketplace converges, the


























Figure 4.5: Profit Gained by Different Buyers
After each day, we measure total profit gained by buyers that provide different
percentages of untruthful ratings. The profit gained by a buyer from buying a
product is formalized in Equation 4.3. From Figure 4.5, we can see that buyers
providing fewer untruthful ratings will gain more total profit. Note that the profit
difference of different types of buyers is fairly small. This is because buyers have at
most 30 requests in total. In summary, it is better off for buyers to provide truthful
ratings of sellers.
We compare the average trust values of different sellers. The average trust value
of a seller is calculated as the sum of the trust value each buyer has of the seller
divided by the total number of buyers in the marketplace (90 in our experiments).
As shown in Figure 4.6, results indicate that sellers being dishonest more often will
have smaller average trust values. From this figure, we can see that the average
trust values of the sellers being dishonest in 75% of their business are nearly 0.5.14
This is because they do not have much chance to do business with buyers and will
not have many ratings. A seller without any ratings will have a default trust value
of 0.5.
13All experimental results in Section 4.4 are averaged over 500 rounds of the simulation.























































Figure 4.7: Total Profit Gained by Different Sellers
We also compare total profit gained by different sellers. Results are shown in
Figure 4.7. From this figure, we can see that sellers being honest more often will
gain more profit. Therefore, it is better off for sellers to be honest. We can also
see that the profit difference between the honest sellers and the sellers lying 25%
is much larger than that between the sellers lying 25% and the sellers lying 75%.
The reason is that we set the threshold for sellers to be considered trustworthy to
be very high. The sellers lying 25% will not be considered as trustworthy sellers,
therefore will have few occasions to be selected as business partners by buyers.
4.4.2 Seller Strategy
The purpose of this experiment is to examine the average trustworthiness of and
the total profit gained by sellers using different strategies. We have two groups
of sellers. One group of sellers will model reputation of buyers and offer better
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rewards to reputable buyers. Another group of sellers will not model reputation of
buyers and ask for the same price from different buyers. Sellers in each group will
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Seller Not Modeling Buyers
Figure 4.9: Total Profit Gained by Different Sellers
We measure the average trust values of sellers from each group. Results shown
in Figure 4.8 indicate that sellers modeling reputation of buyers will have higher
average trust values. We also measure the total profit gained by different buyers.
Results in Figure 4.9 indicate that sellers are better off to model reputation of
buyers and adjust prices of products according to buyers’ reputation, in order to
gain more profit.
4.4.3 Buyer Strategy
Buyers in the marketplace may also have different strategies. They may not always
provide ratings for sellers. They may allow a lot of sellers to join their auctions.
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They may use different methods to model sellers, or may not model others at
all. In this section, we carry out experiments to compare reputation values and
total profit of buyers using different strategies. Results show that our mechanism
provides incentives for buyers to provide ratings of sellers, buyers should limit the
number of bidders, and the modeling methods we propose will provide buyers with
more profit.
Incentives for Providing Ratings
We examine how our mechanism provides incentives for buyers to provide ratings.
We compare reputation values and total profit of buyers providing different numbers
of ratings. In this experiment, all buyers are honest. They have the same number
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Figure 4.11: Profit Gained by Different Buyers
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We first measure the reputation of the buyers. Results are shown in Figure 4.10.
Buyers that have provided more ratings will have larger reputation values. We also
measure total profit of these buyers. Results shown in Figure 4.11 indicate that
buyers that have provided more ratings will be able to gain more total profit.
Therefore, it is better off for buyers to provide ratings of sellers.
Limiting Number of Bidders
We carry out experiments to show the importance of limiting seller bids. In these
experiments, we have 90 sellers. Each 30 sellers acts dishonestly in different per-
centages (0%, 25% and 75%) of their business with buyers. In the first experiment,
we allow 30 sellers to join each buyer’s auctions. Figure 4.12 shows the number of
business transactions done by different sellers. Sellers being honest more often are
still able to gain more opportunities to do business with buyers. We also compare
total profit gained by different sellers in this setting. However, from the results
shown in Figure 4.13, we can see that sellers being dishonest more often will gain
more total profit. In this case, sellers being honest gain very little profit from each


































Figure 4.12: Amount of Business Done by Sellers
In the second experiment, we limit the number of bidders allowed in each of the
buyer’s auctions to be 6. As shown in Figure 4.14, sellers being honest more often
will be able to gain more total profit. Therefore, limiting the number of bidders























































Figure 4.14: Total Profit Gained by Sellers
Buyer Modeling Sellers
In this experiment, one third of the buyers models the trustworthiness of sellers
based on their personal experience with the sellers and on advice about the sellers
provided by their neighbors. Another third of the buyers uses only personal expe-
rience to model the trustworthiness of sellers. These buyers allow only a number of
the most trustworthy sellers to join their auctions. The rest of the buyers do not
model sellers. They allow every seller to submit a bid.
We compare the total profit gained by these three types of buyers. Results
are shown in Figure 4.15. From this figure, we can see that buyers modeling the
trustworthiness of sellers and limiting their participation will be able to gain more
total profit. It is also clear that buyers modeling sellers by taking into account
as well the advice provided by other buyers will be able to gain more profit. In
summary, it is better off for buyers to selectively choose sellers to participate in
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Figure 4.15: Profit Gained by Different Buyers
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Figure 4.16: Profit Gained by Different Buyers
Buyer Modeling Other Buyers
We have two different settings for this experiment. In the first setting, the first
group of buyers does not provide any untruthful ratings, but the second and third
groups provide 20% and 40% of untruthful ratings respectively. In the second
setting, the first group of buyers still does not lie. The second and third groups
lie more. They provide 50% and 100% of untruthful ratings respectively. In both
of the settings, one half of the buyers in the first group model other buyers and
select the most trustworthy ones as their neighbors from which they can ask advice
about sellers. Another half of the buyers do not model the trustworthiness of other
buyers. They randomly select some other buyers as their neighbors.
We compare the total profit gained by these two types of buyers in the two
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settings. Results are shown in Figure 4.16. From this figure, we can see that buyers
modeling the trustworthiness of other buyers and selecting the most trustworthy
ones as their neighbors will be able to gain more total profit. It is also clear that
the buyers that do not model the trustworthiness of other buyers will gain much
less profit when the other buyers provide a lot of untruthful ratings. Therefore, it
is better off for buyers to model the trustworthiness of other buyers and select the
most trustworthy ones as their neighbors from which they ask advice about sellers.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we present a detailed incentive mechanism to encourage honesty,
intended for use in designing e-marketplaces. We provide theoretical proofs to show
that buyers have incentives to be honest in reporting about sellers, when sharing
ratings with the buyers in their neighborhoods, under our particular framework.
This occurs as a result of sellers offering better rewards to more reputable buyers,
as part of their reasoning about how to obtain profit. We are also able to show
that seller honesty is promoted, within our proposed framework, in order for sell-
ers to receive higher profit. We further validate our mechanism through a set of
experiments carried out using a simulated dynamic e-marketplace. As a result, our
research emphasizes the value of using trust modeling and the sharing of reputation




The model presented in Chapter 4 provides the basis for constructing an effective
electronic marketplace populated with buying and selling agents. It proposes the
use of a social network for the buying agents and the sharing of ratings of sellers.
It then proposes that the sellers leverage this social network to provide rewards
to buyers, in an effort to promote honesty and thus to earn greater profits. The
framework is intended to be used in an architecture where there is a central server.
Because of the use of a social network of buyers, there is a need for the buyers
to be modeling each other’s trustworthiness. As a result, the model presented
in Chapter 3 for trust modeling would form an important role within the overall
framework proposed in Chapter 4.
In this chapter, we examine our personalized approach for trust modeling from
Chapter 3 in greater detail. We outline how it may be used for the important
application of the Semantic Web, including the task of sharing trust ratings of in-
formation providers (Section 5.1) and the task of filtering out deceptive experiences
for experience-based Semantic Web service selection (Section 5.2). We also discuss
how the personalized approach can be applied in the context of a credibility model
for participatory media (Section 5.3). We then step back to reflect on the value
of trust modeling in electronic marketplaces, even when an incentive mechanism
such as the one proposed in Chapter 4 is in place (Section 5.4). Shifting our focus
to the incentive mechanism proposed in Chapter 4, we first comment in greater
detail on the value of the centralized architecture that is used with the framework
(Section 5.5). Then we return to the challenge of coping with collusion among
agents and discuss how our particular incentive mechanism may begin to address
this concern more effectively than the competing mechanisms introduced in Sec-
tion 2.2 (Section 5.6). We conclude with a commentary on how various studies in
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economics and sociology support our approach of a trust-based incentive mechanism
(Section 5.7). In Chapter 6, we revisit various design decisions made in Chapter 3
and in Chapter 4 and discuss how alternate formulations may be explored as part
of future work.
5.1 Sharing Semantic Web Trust Ratings
In the context of the Semantic Web, it may be beneficial for a user (consumer) to
receive ratings from other users (advisors) regarding the reliability of an informa-
tion source (provider). In this section, we discuss how our personalized approach
presented in Chapter 3 can be helpful for critiquing the ratings provided by the
advisors in this context [88, 89].
The vision of the Semantic Web is to construct a common semantic interpre-
tation for World Wide Web pages, in order to one day reliably run software to
interpret the information conveyed in any of its documents. In building the Seman-
tic Web, however, information may be supplied by a wide selection of sources, with
the result that a user seeking information will need to judge whether the content of
any given source is in fact trustworthy. It is therefore important to develop models
for trust in the context of the Semantic Web.
The challenge of trusting information providers in a Web-based environment
is discussed by Paolucci et al [52]. Paolucci et al. provide valuable insights into
the need for trust on the Web, in the context of Web services, where Web sites
dynamically exchange information using XML descriptions, but where it is difficult
to ensure that the meaning of the messages being sent is well understood, without
human intervention. The Semantic Web contributes by providing ontologies for
Web services to interpret meanings in exchanged messages. According to [52], with
the Semantic Web, the interaction between users and providers needs a process
of capability matching to link users with providers of Web services. Specifically,
providers advertise their capabilities, a user sends a request for the type of service
he requires, a registry matches the capabilities of providers and the capabilities ex-
pected by the user, and finally the user selects the most suitable provider. However,
in their advertisements, providers may lie about their capabilities in order to be
selected by the user. To avoid selection of an untruthful provider, there is a need to
properly model the trustworthiness of providers. In [22] this problem is reinforced
for the Semantic Web: whether to trust the content of a Web resource, depending
on the source. Richardson et al. [58] explain further that due to the great diversity
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of the Web, it is difficult to expect the content to be consistent and of high quality.
It then becomes important to decide how trustworthy each information source is.
Various approaches to date have been formulated about how best to form a
Web of Trust [22], in order to share information and selectively choose trustworthy
partners from whom information may be obtained. In these approaches, consumers
communicate with others to obtain advice about information providers. Maximi-
lien and Singh [46, 47] adopt an agent-based approach for modeling trust on the
Semantic Web. Their work focuses on representing multiple qualities of services
(QoS) for automatic runtime Web service selection. This trust model is based on
a shared conceptualization of QoS and takes into account providers’ quality ad-
vertisement, consumers’ quality preferences, quality relationships, and consumers’
quality tradeoffs. In order to select a Web service implementation, a consumer
dynamically associates a trust value with each service implementation and selects
the service implementation with the highest assigned level of trust. The trust value
of each service implementation partially depends on its reputation value, which is
determined by the set of quality values from other users who previously selected
that provider.
Kagal et al. [34] use a DAML+OIL trust ontology in a multi-agent system, which
is based on a distributed trust and delegation mechanism verifying that a user’s
credentials are acceptable. The trust ontology is built for specifying credentials and
checking whether the credentials conform to policies. A policy maps credentials
to a certain ability or right. The mechanism allows propagation of trust beliefs
exchanged between users and avoids repeated checking of users’ credentials.
The research of Gil and Ratnaker [22] provides a framework for users to express
their trust about a source and the statements the source contains, by annotating
each part of the source to indicate their views. The focus of the work is on how to
provide an effective interface for users to record their annotations. This TRELLIS
system ultimately averages the ratings provided over many users and many analyses,
to present a reflection of the trustworthiness of the source. A credibility-reliability
pair emerges for each source-statement pair, to derive an overall rating of a single
source, based on each of the associated statements provided by the source.
Modeling trust on the Semantic Web, as discussed so far in this section, includes
a reliance on the beliefs or ratings provided by third parties to be truthful. In fact,
it is important to address the problem of possibly unfair or unreliable ratings.
Our personalized approach works effectively in electronic commerce environments,
where buyers may make decisions about sellers by soliciting input on those sellers
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from other buyers in the marketplace. This framework is also sufficiently general
to operate in the context of the Semantic Web when a user seeks to evaluate the
trustworthiness of a provider. Our algorithms for buyers become those for con-
sumers and the sellers that we model become the providers of this environment. In
this context, our model is useful for the problem of determining the reliability of
a provider being evaluated by a consumer by virtue of trust ratings provided by
advisors.
5.2 Experience-based Service Selection under De-
ception
As presented in Chapter 3, our personalized approach effectively models the trust-
worthiness of advisors by combining buyers’ private and public knowledge of these
advisors. This approach has been demonstrated to be advantageous over compet-
ing approaches, such as BRS [82] and TRAVOS [76], in a dynamic e-marketplace
environment. In this section, we will briefly describe how such an approach can
be adapted to be used in a distributed setting where service consumers select an
appropriate service provider based on shared experiences provided by other con-
sumers (advisors) on the Semantic Web. We then integrate this approach with an
experience-based service selection approach that is consumer-oriented and context-
aware. We validate the adapted approach by comparing it with BRS and TRAVOS
in a simulated environment of service selection where service consumers may be
subjective, may request services in different contexts, and may lie about their ex-
periences with service providers to other consumers.
5.2.1 Experience-based Service Selection
Şensoy and Yolum [11] propose an approach for distributed service selection that
allows consumers to represent their experiences with service providers using Seman-
tic Web ontologies. The details of this experience-based service selection approach
can be found in [11].
Ontologies allow semantic data to be shared. Consumers’ experiences are ex-
pressed using fundamental concepts (such as demand, service and commitment)
in the base level ontology and the domain specific concepts and properties in the
domain level ontology. The base level ontology consists of the domain-independent
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infrastructure of the experience ontology. The main class in the base level ontology
is the Experience class. Instances of this class represent the experiences of service
consumers in the system. As in real life, an experience in the ontology contains
information about what a service consumer has requested from a service provider
and what the service consumer has received at the end. For example, in her expe-
rience, a consumer states that she ordered an IBM ThinkPad T60 notebook from a
seller named TechnoShop on 15 October 2007. She requested the merchandise to be
delivered to New York within 14 days. The provider received $700 for the product
and delivered the merchandise within 7 days without requesting any extra money
for shipping. However, the delivered product was not refundable and TechnoShop
did not provide any customer support.
To conceptualize the service demand and the received service of the consumer,
Demand and Service classes are included in the base level ontology. Both the de-
manded and the supplied service concepts are descriptions of a service for a specific
domain and hence share a number of properties. These shared properties are cap-
tured in the Description class in the base level ontology. The domain level ontology
contains extensions to this class. Domain-dependent properties of the Description
class can be used to describe service demands, supplied services, responsibilities
and fulfillments of sides during transactions. These properties are shown in domain
level ontology. An example of representing the experience in the early example
of purchasing an IBM ThinkPad T60 notebook using the ontologies is shown in
Figure 5.1.
<owlx:Individual owlx:name="ExperienceInstance">  
    <owlx:type owlx:name="Experience" />  
    <owlx:ObjectPropertyValue owlx:property="hasDemand">  
        <owlx:Individual owlx:name="demandInstance" />  
    </owlx:ObjectPropertyValue>  
    <owlx:ObjectPropertyValue owlx:property="hasService">  
        <owlx:Individual owlx:name="serviceInstance" />  
    </owlx:ObjectPropertyValue>  
</owlx:Individual>  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
<owlx:Individual owlx:name="demandInstance">  
    <owlx:type owlx:name="Demand" />  
    <owlx:ObjectPropertyValue owlx:property="hasOwner">  
        <owlx:Individual owlx:name="MuratSensoy" />  
    </owlx:ObjectPropertyValue>  
    <owlx:DataPropertyValue owlx:property="hasDate">  
        <owlx:DataValue owlx:datatype="&xsd; Date">2007-10-15</owlx:DataValue>  
    </owlx:DataPropertyValue>  
    <owlx:ObjectPropertyValue owlx:property="hasShoppingItem">  
        <owlx:Individual owlx:name="#IBM_ThinkPad_T60" />  
    </owlx:ObjectPropertyValue>  
    <owlx:ObjectPropertyValue owlx:property="toLocation">  
        <owlx:Individual owlx:name="NewYork" />  
    </owlx:ObjectPropertyValue>  
    <owlx:DataPropertyValue owlx:property="hasDeliveryDuration">  
        <owlx:DataValue owlx:datatype="&xsd; Integer">14</owlx:DataValue>  
    </owlx:DataPropertyValue>  
</owlx:Individual> 
<owlx:Individual owlx:name="serviceInstance">  
    <owlx:type owlx:name="Service" />  
    <owlx:ObjectPropertyValue owlx:property="hasOwner">  
        <owlx:Individual owlx:name="TechnoShop" />  
    </owlx:ObjectPropertyValue>  
    <owlx:ObjectPropertyValue owlx:property="hasShopping Item">  
        <owlx:Individual owlx:name="#IBM ThinKPad_T60 " />  
    </owlx:ObjectPropertyValue>  
    <owlx:DataPropertyValue owlx:property="hasDeliveryDuration">  
        <owlx:DataValue owlx:datatype="&xsd; Integer">7</owlx:DataValue>  
    </owlx:DataPropertyValue>  
    <owlx:DataPropertyValue owlx:property="receivedMerchandise">  
        <owlx:DataValue owlx:datatype="&xsd;boolean">true</owlx:DataValue>  
    </owlx:DataPropertyValue>  
    <owlx:DataPropertyValue owlx:property="isReFundable">  
        <owlx:DataValue owlx:datatype="&xsd;boolean">false</owlx:DataValue>  
    </owlx:DataPropertyValue>  
    <owlx:DataPropertyValue owlx:property="hasCustomerSupport">  
        <owlx:DataValue owlx:datatype="&xsd;boolean">false</owlx:DataValue>  
    </owlx:DataPropertyValue>  
    <owlx:DataPropertyValue owlx:property="hasShipingCost">  
        <owlx:DataValue owlx:datatype="&xsd;Integer">0</owlx:DataValue>  
    </owlx:DataPropertyValue>  
    <owlx:DataPropertyValue owlx:property="hasPrice">  
        <owlx:DataValue owlx:datatype="&xsd;Integer">700</owlx:DataValue>  
    </owlx:DataPropertyValue>  
</owlx:Individual> 
Figure 5.1: An Example of Representing Experience Using Ontologies
An experience represented using the ontologies is then able to capture the out-
103
come of an interaction between a consumer and a provider and can be thought
of as a record of what service the consumer has requested and received in return.
In this way, experience-based approaches allow the objective facts of the experi-
ences (other than subjective opinions) to be communicated to the other party. A
consumer that receives other consumers’ particular experiences can interpret what
they have experienced with the providers and evaluate the providers using her own
satisfaction criteria and context.
Using the collected experiences about service providers, a consumer can model
the service providers to estimate which of the providers produce a satisfactory ser-
vice for a specific service demand. For this purpose, the consumer uses a machine
learning technique, parametric classification [18], as follows. Demand and service
specifications within experiences are received in the form of ontologies, but then
they are converted into the internal representation of the service consumer. De-
mand and commitment information in each experience is represented as a vector.
Each field in this vector is extracted from the experience ontology. These fields cor-
respond to property values in the experience ontology such as service price. Then,
supplied service for this demand is classified as satisfied or dissatisfied with re-
spect to satisfaction criteria of the consumer using a taste function and ontological
reasoning. The taste function will be described later in Section 5.2.2. After that
the (vector, class) pairs are used as training set. For each class, covariance and
mean are extracted from the training set. Then, a discriminant function is defined
to compute the probability of satisfaction. The service consumer performs this
computation for every service provider and chooses the provider with the highest
satisfaction probability.
Consider that Bob wants to buy a notebook. For this purpose, first he collects
experiences about the notebook providers like the example of an experience of pur-
chasing an IBM ThinkPad T60 notebook presented earlier. He then estimates the
probability of satisfaction for each provider as described above. In this example,
Bob needs to compute the probability that TechnoShop produces a satisfactory
service. Initially, Bob uses his satisfaction criteria to evaluate the supplied services
within the collected experiences about TechnoShop. He labels each experience as
satisfied or dissatisfied. Bob estimates the probabilities that his current demand
is observed among the satisfied demands and dissatisfied demands. Then, Bob
estimates the probability that TechnoShop produces a satisfactory service given
his current service demand. Lastly, Bob calculates the discriminant function to
quantify the preferability of TechnoShop and uses this value to decide about Tech-
noShop.
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However, in many settings, a consumer may prefer to be dishonest about their
past dealings with providers. For example, consumers may provide untruthful ex-
periences to promote the providers. Consumers may also cooperate with other
providers to drive a provider out of the system. We adapt the personalized ap-
proach to filter out deceptive experiences during service selection. We then inte-
grate it with the experience-based service selection approach for consumer-oriented
and context-aware service selection in distributed and deceptive environments. The
integrated approach is called POYRAZ [12]1.
5.2.2 POYRAZ
The adapted approach allows a consumer to estimate the trustworthiness of an
advisor by combining the two different sources of information: private and public
credits of the advisor. The private credit of the advisor is calculated by the con-
sumer, based on the experiences the advisor supplies of providers with whom the
consumer has already had some interaction. In the same way as our personalized
approach presented in Chapter 3, the advisor’s experiences are compared with the
consumer’s own experiences using the consumer’s taste function. This function
takes as its argument an experience (a pair of service demanded, service received)
and returns as its output {0, 1}, where 0 means that the received service within a
transaction is not satisfactory for the consumer while 1 means that it is satisfactory.
If the returned output from the advisor’s experiences and that from the consumer’s
own experiences are the same, it is likely that the advisor is trustworthy.
Drawn from the idea of the public reputation component in our personalized
approach, when private credit cannot be calculated with confidence, a public credit
is also calculated, based on the advisor’s experiences with all providers in the en-
vironment. The advisor’s experiences are compared with the experiences given by
other advisors for the same providers. An experience of the advisor is considered
as a consistent experience if the difference between the advisor’s experience and
the average of other advisors’ experiences is less than a threshold. This threshold
represents the maximum acceptable deviation from the majority. If the advisors’
experiences are consistent with the majority of others’ experiences, the advisor is
likely to be trustworthy. Again, all experiences of all advisors are compared using
the consumer’s own taste function to reflect the consumer’s subjective preferences.
A weighted combination of the private and the public credits is derived, based
1This research was developed jointly with Murat Şensoy.
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on the estimated reliability of the private credit value. This combined value then
represents the trustworthiness of the advisor. After that, the experiences received
from the less trustworthy consumers are finally regarded as deceptive and filtered
out during service selection.
Note that during the above calculations, we only consider the experiences related
to the current demand of the consumer. This is because only those experiences are
used for the service selection, so the context of those experiences is the same as
the current one. In other words, trustworthiness of advisors is calculated in a
context-dependent way. This enables an advisor to be regarded as trustworthy in
one context while the advisor may be regarded as untrustworthy in another context.
Also note that the adapted approach works in a distributed way. For these purposes,
a P2P search mechanism is used [12], which enables a consumer to locate others
with similar service demands in a distributed setting. The P2P search mechanism
works as follows. A service consumer expresses what a similar demand is with
respect to its similarity criteria using Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL). A
simple rule for similarity is shown in Figure 5.2. In this rule, the consumer states
that a demand is a similar demand only if it concerns a book and requires a delivery
duration less than or equal to 14 days.
<ruleml:imp>
 <ruleml:_head>
     <swrlx:classAtom>
         <owlx:Class owlx:name="#SimilarDemand"/><ruleml:var> DEMAND  </ruleml:var> 
      </swrlx:classAtom>
 </ruleml:_head>
 <ruleml:_body>
      <swrlx:DataPropertyValue swrlx:property="#hasDeliveryDuration">
      <ruleml:var>DEMAND</ruleml:var><ruleml:var>DURATION </ruleml:var> 
      </swrlx:DataPropertyValue>
         <swrlx:individualPropertyAtom  swrlx:property="&ex;#hasShoppingItem">
         <ruleml:var>DEMAND</ruleml:var><owlx:Individual owlx:name="&ex;#book"/>
      </swrlx:individualPropertyAtom>
      <swrlx:predicateAtom swrlx:predicate="..#ifTrue">
         <owlx:DataValue owlx:datatype="..#string">$1 <= 14 </owlx:DataValue> 
         <ruleml:var>DURATION</ruleml:var> 
      </swrlx:predicateAtom>
 </ruleml:_body>
</ruleml:imp>
Figure 5.2: An Example of SWRL Rule for Similar Demands
In order to discover others with similar service demands and collect related ex-
periences from other consumers, the consumer distributes its definition of similar
demand through the network of consumers. When consumers receive this SWRL
rule, they evaluate their service demands with respect to the distributed similarity
metric. Then, they send their personal experiences to the consumer if those expe-
riences are related to similar service demands. Moreover, the consumers examine
their knowledge about their acquaintances and send the identities of their acquain-
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tances to the consumer if those acquaintances are known to have service demands
similar to the service demand of the consumer. Then, the consumer communicates
with those acquaintances further to collect related experiences. A pseudo code of
this process is summarized in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5: Algorithm for P2P Search Mechanism for a Consumer A
A expresses her similar demand using SWRL;
foreach consumer B whom A knows do
1. Sends the description of similar demand to B;
2. if B has personal experiences related to similar demand then
Receive B’s experiences
3. if B’s acquaintances have experiences related to similar demand then
Receive B’s acquaintances’ identities
Repeat steps 1, 2, and 3 for each acquaintance received from B;
We validate our adapted approach in a simulated environment of experience-
based service selection under deception. We integrate the approaches of coping with
deceptive experiences used by BRS and TRAVOS to the experience-based service
selection approach, denoted as Exp+BRS and Exp+TRAVOS, respectively. The
performance of POYRAZ, the experience-based service selection integrated with our
adapted approach, is then compared with that of Exp+BRS and Exp+TRAVOS
in our experiments.
5.2.3 Simulation Environment
The simulation environment is set up with 10 service providers and 200 service
consumers. Only one of the service providers can satisfy a given service demand. In
our simulations, service characteristics of a service provider are generated as follows.
First, a service space is defined so that all possible services are represented within
this service space. A service space has certain dimensions with different ranges.
For example, a dimension of “isRefundable” has the range of {0, 1}. Each service
provider has a multidimensional region called a service region in this service space.
This region is randomly generated. The service space and the service regions have
15 dimensions. A service region covers all of the services produced by the service
provider. If a consumer that is located in Waterloo orders two books titled Artificial
Intelligence from the service provider, the service that the provider delivers will be
constructed as follows: The properties that are specified (shopping item id, quantity
and location) will be fixed. For the remaining attributes, the service provider will
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choose random values making sure that the values stay in the range of its service
region. So, for this example, the degree of freedom for generating services will be
reduced to 12.
Given the service constraints, the simulation environment generates a demand
of a service consumer as follows. A demand space is constructed for the consumer
by removing the dimensions of the service space that do not belong to the properties
of the consumer’s demand. Then a random region in this demand space is chosen.
The center of this region represents the demanded service. In response to this
demand, the chosen provider supplies a service. If the provided service for this
demand stays within the margins of the demand region, the service consumer is
satisfied; otherwise she is dissatisfied. The simulation environment guarantees that
each demand can be satisfied by exactly one service provider.
Next, the simulator creates the similar demand criteria for the demand of the
service consumer. This is again done by creating a new region (called a similar
demand region). Essentially, this is the demand region after some dimensions have
been removed. The number of dimensions to be removed and these dimensions
are chosen randomly. Service demands staying within the margins of the similar
demand region are classified as similar demand by the consumer.
Simulations are run for 100 epochs, where an epoch refers to a discrete time slot
during which each consumer may request at most one service. When the simula-
tions start, agents do not have any prior experiences with service providers. At each
epoch, with a probability of 0.5, a consumer requests a service for its current ser-
vice demand. Then, it collects experiences related to similar service demands from
other consumers in order to use for service selection. In our simulations, we force
consumers to make service decisions based on the information from others rather
than their own previous experiences. In this way, we can compare our adapted
approach’s abilities of detecting deceptive experiences against other competing ap-
proaches.
5.2.4 Simulation Parameters and Evaluation Metrics
In our simulations, we try to mimic real-life scenarios. Therefore, we have para-
meterized our simulation environment considering some of the important factors
in real life. The factors are subjectivity, variations on context, and deception. We
briefly explain our parameters related to the factors below.
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Subjectivity
Consumers having similar demands may have different satisfaction criteria. This
means that for the same demand and the same supplied service, two consumers may
have different degrees of satisfaction (e.g., ratings) depending on their satisfaction
criteria. This is the subjectivity of the consumers. In the experiments, we define
subjectivity as a parameter (Rsub), which determines the ratio of consumers having
similar demands but conflicting satisfaction criteria. For example, if Rsub = 0.5, half
of the consumers having the same or similar demands have conflicting satisfaction
criteria (tastes).
In the experiments, only one provider satisfies a service demand of a consumer.
Now, consider two consumers with the same demand and assume that {P0 . . . P9}
are the providers in the environment. Therefore, if those two consumers have the
same taste, both of them give a good rating for the same provider Pi and they
give bad ratings for the other nine providers. However, if those two consumers
have conflicting satisfaction criteria, the first consumer gives a good rating to a
provider Pi, and the second consumer gives a good rating to another provider Pj,
where Pi 6= Pj. In this setting, the first consumer gives a bad rating to Pj and
the second consumer gives a bad rating to Pi. On the other hand, both of the
consumers give bad ratings to the other eight providers Pk, where k 6= i and k 6= j.
Therefore, ratings of the consumers are consistent for those providers, even though
their ratings are conflicting for Pi and Pj.
Variation on Context
As frequently seen in real world, each service consumer changes its service demand
after receiving a service. This is done with a predefined probability (PCD). After
changing its demand, the service consumer collects information for its new service
demand. This parameter is introduced to mimic variations on the context of service
demands in real life.
Liars
Another parameter in the simulations is the ratio of liars in the consumer society.
Liars modify their experiences before sharing, so that they mislead the other con-
sumers the most. This is achieved by disseminating bad experiences about the good
providers and good experiences about the bad providers. Behaviors of the liars are
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summarized as follows. If an experience of a liar contains a satisfactory service, the
liar modifies the experience before sharing with others so that the received service
within the experience looks like it has not satisfied the demand of the customer. For
example, if the liar demanded a notebook within 7 days from a provider in the past
and it is delivered on time, the liar states in its experience that the notebook was
not received or the notebook was delivered within 120 days. On the other hand,
if an experience contains an unsatisfactory service, the liar modifies the experience
before sharing so that the received service looks like it has satisfied the demand of
the customer. For example, if the liar demanded a notebook within 7 days from
a provider in the past, but delivery was made after 30 days, the liar states in its
experience that the notebook was delivered within 7 days.
Performance Metric
Our performance metric is success in service selection. We measure it as the per-
centage of the satisfactory service selections made by the consumers. Intuitively,
in deceptive environments, the success in service selection should be correlated
with the amount of filtered deceptive information during service selection. As the
amount of unfiltered deceptive information increases, the performance of service
selection approaches is expected to decrease.
5.2.5 Experimental Results
In our experiments, half of the consumers having similar service demands have
conflicting satisfaction criteria (Rsub = 0.5), and consumers change their service
demands with probability PCD = 0.2 after receiving a service. The experience-
based service selection approach of Şensoy and Yolum [11] does not detect and
filter deceptive experiences. It is highly vulnerable to deception. Figure 5.3 shows
the performance of the experience-based service selection approach when there are
liars in the environment. As the ratio of liars in the environment increases, the
percentage of successful service selections considerably decreases and becomes 30%
when 80% of the consumers are liars. This means that experience-based service
selection fails significantly when there are liars in the environment.
Figure 5.4 shows the performance of experience-based service selection when
different deceptive information filtering methods are used. POYRAZ has the best
performance in our experiment. This indicates that the approach (adapted from
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Figure 5.3: Performance of Service Selection for Different Ratios of Liars
TRAVOS. Performance of experience-based service selection decreases dramatically
when the information filtering method of BRS is used to filter deceptive experiences.
This is expected because this filtering method assumes that a significant majority of
consumers are honest. If this is not the case, error in determining liars dramatically





























Figure 5.4: Overall Performance Comparison for Different Approaches
The performance of Exp+TRAVOS does not go below 82%. This means that the
performance of the experience-based service selection is enhanced significantly when
the information filtering method from TRAVOS is integrated. On the other hand,
for each ratio of liars, POYRAZ outperforms Exp+TRAVOS and its performance
does not go below 87%. Hence, the the approach adapted from our personalized
approach is better than the other competing approaches.
Note that Figure 5.4 shows the average percentage of successful services selec-
tions during the simulations, and it does not show how the service selection perfor-
mance changes over time during simulations. In order to show how well POYRAZ
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performs with respect to Exp+BRS and Exp+TRAVOS more clearly, we demon-
strate average service selection performance over time for different ratios of liars in
Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6. For simplicity, only first 50 epochs of the simulations





































































Figure 5.5: Performance over Time When 0.1 ≤ Rliar ≤ 0.4
Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 show that when the ratio of liars is low (Rliar < 0.3),
Exp+BRS is much better than Exp+TRAVOS in the beginning of the simulations,
because it can determine deceptive experiences using the shared experiences instead
of personal observations, which do not exist in the beginning but accumulate over
time. On the other hand, Exp+TRAVOS uses only personal observations, so it
cannot determine liars until it gets a sufficient number of personal observations over
time. Once Exp+TRAVOS has enough personal observations, it can successfully
determine unreliable consumers and outperforms Exp+BRS. For a higher ratio of
liars (Rliar ≥ 0.3), the performance of Exp+BRS is very low.
The performance of POYRAZ is better than that of Exp+BRS and Exp+TRAVOS,
because it uses both the personal and the shared information while determining de-
ceptive experiences. When the personal observations are not enough, POYRAZ
combines its personal observations with the public information from others. There-
fore, it can achieve a good performance even in the beginning of the simulations.
While using public information, unlike Exp+BRS, POYRAZ does not assume that
a significant majority of consumers are honest, but it assumes that the ratio of
liars is not higher than the ratio of honest consumers (Rliar ≤ 0.5). For higher
ratios of liars, public information misleads POYRAZ, but POYRAZ starts using







































































Figure 5.6: Performance over Time When 0.5 ≤ Rliar ≤ 0.8
When the ratio of liars is high (Rliar > 0.5), performances of POYRAZ and
Exp+TRAVOS are close, but POYRAZ still outperforms Exp+TRAVOS. This
performance difference can be explained by the fact that TRAVOS does not use
all of its personal observations related to an advisor while evaluating the trust-
worthiness of the advisor. However, POYRAZ uses a larger number of personal
observations while evaluating trustworthiness. As a result, it determines liars and
reaches its maximum service selection performance earlier than Exp+TRAVOS.
In summary, POYRAZ is a novel combination of experience-based service se-
lection and a component adapted on the basis of our personalized approach for
coping with shared deceptive experiences. We empirically compare this adapted
method with other deceptive information filtering methods from the literature, to
show that our personalized approach outperforms its alternatives. Our experiments
show that the adapted approach determines liars more accurately and improves the
performance of the experience-based service selection more significantly. These re-
sults are similar to the comparative results presented in Section 3.4 to indicate that
our personalized approach performs better than both BRS and TRAVOS in coping
with the problem of unfair ratings in the context of e-commerce. They confirm
the value of our personalized approach in the context of experience-based service
selection on the Semantic Web.
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5.3 A Credibility Model for Participatory Media
The central idea of our personalized approach in Chapter 3 is to combine an agent’s
private and public knowledge when it models the trustworthiness of another agent.
This personalized approach allows a buying agent to model the trustworthiness of
a selling agent by considering not only the buyer’s own experience with the seller
but also the advice provided by other buyers (advisors) that have had experience
with the seller. The trustworthiness of the advisors is also determined by effectively
combining the buyer’s private and public knowledge of the advisors. In this section,
we discuss how we can make use of and extend this idea in the design of a cred-
ibility model for participatory media (such as blogs) [69, 68].2 We also carry out
experimental validation using a dataset obtained from digg.com, a knowledge shar-
ing website where users indicate their satisfaction with messages that are provided
to them. The performance of our method is compared with that of Pagerank [6],
which is used to rank Internet web-pages in order of their importance and that of
the beta reputation system (BRS) [82].
5.3.1 The Credibility Model
Credibility is an important component to judge the usefulness of participatory
media content. This is because of the ease of publishing information on the Internet
without any editorial checks by a formal agency: Anybody can publish “incorrect”
information, or bad-mouth “correct” information. We propose a credibility model,
by making use of and extending the central idea in our personalized approach, that
is to combine both private and public knowledge for trust modeling. Our credibility
model determines the credibility of messages that are posted in participatory media,
of use in recommender systems (e.g. the one developed by Seth and Zhang [67])
designed to provide users with messages that are considered to be the most credible
to them.
We draw from theories developed in sociology, political science, and information
science. Different criteria are used to judge the credibility of messages in this model,
including for example, the influence of public opinion, influence of close friends of
people, and the extent to which different people may trust their own beliefs. We
then use these criteria to build and learn a Bayesian network on a personalized
basis for each user, to predict which messages the user may find to be credible. Our
2This model was designed as joint research with Aaditeshwar Seth.
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method makes extensive use of social network information to create the user model,
and combines the link structure of social networks of users with information about
authorship and ratings of messages by users. The result is a method for evaluating
the credibility of messages that is user-specific and sensitive to the social network
in which the user resides.
Similar to our personalized approach, the credibility model is developed to model
credibility as a multi-dimensional construct. It allows a user to model the experi-
enced credibility of a message based only on ratings given by the user in the past.
This reflects the user’s personal belief about the credibility of the message. It also
allows the user to model the reputed credibility of the message based on third-party
reports about the credibility of the message.
We also consider relevant studies from sociology and political science for the
design of the model. People are embedded in real-world social networks of relation-
ships as friends, acquaintances, family members, etc. The strength-of-weak-ties
hypothesis in sociology [24] states that such social networks consist of clusters of
people with strong ties among members of each cluster, and weak ties linking peo-
ple across clusters.3 Whereas strong ties are typically constituted of close friends,
weak ties are constituted of remote acquaintances. The hypothesis claims that
weak ties are useful for the diffusion of information and economic mobility, because
they connect diverse people with each other. On the other hand, people strongly
tied to each other in the same cluster may not be as diverse. This reflects the
fact that local community clusters of people are often homogeneous in opinion, and
these opinions may be different from those of people belonging to other clusters.
Furthermore, people have different degrees to which they respect the opinions of
those not in their immediate local community cluster. This reflects the fact that
the personal characteristics of people also influence the extent to which they would
be comfortable in deviating from the beliefs of their immediate local cluster. Based
on these observations, the reputed credibility has at least two sub-types: cluster
credibility and public credibility. The cluster credibility of a message that a user
has is modeled based on the ratings given by other users in the same cluster of the
user. It denotes the credibility associated by the cluster or local community of the
user to the message. The public credibility is modeled based on ratings by all users,
and reflects the general public opinion about the credibility of the message.
As argued by studies in information science [60], users also have different prefer-






Figure 5.7: Credibility Model
ences for the different types of credibilities discussed so far. We propose a Bayesian
network to combine these different types of credibilities into a single credibility
score, as shown in Figure 5.7. Our aim is to learn the distribution for Pr(C|S,E, P )
for each user based on ratings given by various users to older messages. Here, S, E,
and P are evidence variables for the cluster credibility, experienced credibility, and
public credibility of a message, respectively. C is a variable denoting the credibility
that the user associates with the message. The credibility model learns over time
the user’s preferences for these credibilities, and predicts the credibility of a new
message. The model is thus learned in a personalized manner for each user, and
is able to accommodate varying degrees of openness of users to respect opinions of
other users.
Figure 5.7 also shows two hidden variables as shaded ovals. The hidden vari-
ables help make the model more tractable to learn, and also capture an insight
we developed in prior work [67]. This work showed that a new message has two
characteristics with respect to a recipient: it carries some contextual information
for the recipient about the issue being discussed in the message, and some degree
of completeness of information about the issue. Context relates to the ease of un-
derstanding of the message, based on how well the message content explains the
relationship of the message to its recipient. Messages that are more contextual
for users will be simpler for them to understand. Completeness denotes the depth
and breadth of topics covered in the message. Messages that are more complete
will carry more diverse opinions or more mention of relationships with other issues.
For each message, the model first estimates the credibilities of the contextual and
complete information carried by the message, and then uses these two credibilities
to generate the final estimate. We reason that cluster credibility will only influ-
ence contextual credibility, while public credibility will only influence completeness
credibility. This is because general public opinion is by definition averaged over
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different contexts, and hence it will only add noise to any context specific credibil-
ity. Similarly, cluster credibility will double count the opinion of a specific cluster
when judging the degree of completeness or diversity in a message. Experienced
credibility will influence both contextual and completeness credibility since it is
based on the personal beliefs of the user.
5.3.2 Credibility Computation
The different types of credibilities can be computed based on social network in-
formation, ratings given by users to messages, and authorship information. The
notion of credibility of messages is extended to credibility of users as well. We first
list the axioms that are the basis for our formulation to quantify the various types
of credibilities, and then give the actual computation process.
We use the information captured in the following relationships:
• A-1 : A message is credible if it is rated highly by credible users.
• A-2 : A user is credible if messages written by her are rated highly by other
credible users.
• A-3 : A user is also credible if ratings given by her are consistent with the
ratings given by credible users.
• A-4 : A user is also credible if she is linked to by other credible users in the
social network.
There is clearly a recursive relationship between these axioms. We solve the recur-
sion using fixed-point Eigenvector computations [35]. Note that the credibility of
a user in rating messages as stated in A-3 is also similar to the idea of our per-
sonalized approach for modeling the trustworthiness of advisors in the context of
e-commerce presented in Section 3.1.1. It is modeled by combining both the private
and public knowledge about the user in providing ratings of messages.
Calculation of Evidence Variables
We start with the following information that will be a part of our training set.
A[k, n] is a matrix for k messages and n users, where aij ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether
message mi was written by uj. R[k, n] is a ratings matrix for k messages and n
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users, where rij ∈ {0, 1} indicates the rating given to message mi by user uj. N [n, n]
is a social network matrix where nij ∈ {0, 1} indicates the presence or absence of a
link from user ui to user uj.
Our goal is to find a method to compute the evidence variables for the Bayesian
model using the axioms given above. The evidence variables can be expressed as the
matrices E[n, k], S[n, k], and P [k], containing the credibility values for messages.
Here, pk is the public credibility for message mk authored by user uj. eij is the
experienced credibilities for message mk according to the self-beliefs of user ui.
Similarly, sij is the cluster credibility for message mk according to the beliefs of
the users in ui’s cluster Vi. Once these evidence variables are computed for older
messages, they are used to learn the Bayesian model for each user. Subsequently,
for a new message, the learned model for a user is used to predict the credibility of
the new message for the user.
We begin with computation of the evidence variable matrix for public credibility
P ; we will explain later how other credibilities can be computed in a similar fashion.
1. Let P ′[n] be a matrix containing the public credibilities of users, and con-
sider the credibility of a message as the mean of the ratings for the message,




rki · p′i/|rki > 0| (5.1)
Here, the denominator counts the number of occurrences of ratings greater
than 0. This is the same as writing P = Rr ·P ′, where Rr is the row-stochastic
form of R, i.e. the sum of elements of each row = 1.
2. The credibility of users is calculated as follows:
2a. Consider the credibility of a user as the mean of the credibilities of the mes-





This is the same as writing P ′ = ATc · P , where Ac is the column-stochastic
form of A; and ATc is the transpose of Ac.
2b. The above formulation indicates a fixed point computation:
P ′ = ATc ·Rr · P ′ (5.3)
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Thus, P ′ can be computed as the dominant Eigenvector of ATc · Rr. This
formulation models the first two axioms, but not yet the ratings-based credi-
bility (A-3 ) and social network structure of the users (A-4 ). This is done as
explained next.
2c. Perform a fixed-point computation to infer the credibilities G[n] acquired by
users from the social network (A-4 ):
G = (β ·NTr + (1− β) · Zc · 1T ) ·G (5.4)
Here, β ∈ (0, 1) denotes a weighting factor to combine the social network
matrix N with the matrix Z that carries information about ratings given to
messages by users. We generate Z by computing zi as the mean similarity in
credibility ratings of user ui with all other users. The ratings similarity be-
tween a pair of users is computed as the Jacquard’s coefficient [62] of common
ratings between the users. Thus, zi will be high for users who give credible
ratings, that is, their ratings agree with the ratings of other users (A-3 ). This
computation is similar to our personalized approach in calculating the public
reputation of advisors.
In this way, combining the social-network matrix with ratings-based credibil-
ity helps to model the two remaining axioms as well. Note that Zc[n] is a
column stochastic matrix and 1[n] is a unit column matrix; augmenting N
with Zc ·1T provides an additional benefit of converting N into an irreducible
matrix so that its Eigenvector can be computed.4
2d. The ratings and social network based scores are then combined together as:
P ′ = (α · ATc ·Rr + (1− α) ·Gc · 1T ) · P ′ (5.5)
Here again 1 is a unit column matrix, and α ∈ (0, 1) is a weighting factor.
The matrix P ′ can now be computed as the dominant Eigenvector using the
power method.
3. Once P ′ is obtained, P is calculated in a straightforward manner as P =
Rr · P ′.
4This step is similar to the Pagerank or HITS computations for the importance of Internet
web pages [6, 38]. The matrix N can be considered as the link matrix of web-pages, and the
matrix Z as the Pagerank personalization matrix. The output matrix G then essentially ranks
the web-pages in order of their importance, after taking personalization into account.
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The cluster credibilities S[n, k] are computed in the same manner as the public
credibilities, but after modifying the ratings matrix R to contain only the ratings of
members of the same cluster. Thus, the above process is repeated for each cluster,
modifying R in every case. For each users ui belonging to cluster Vi, sik is then
equal to the cluster credibility value for message mk with respect to ui.
The matrix Z in the computation on the social network matrix is also modified.
When computing the cluster credibilities for cluster Vi, element zj of Z is calculated
as the mean similarity of user uj with users in cluster Vi. Thus, zj will be high
for users who are regarded credible by members of cluster Vi because their ratings
agree with the ratings of the cluster members. This computation is also similar to
our personalized approach in calculating the public reputation of advisors.
The experienced credibilities E[n, k] are computed in the same manner as well,
but this time for each user by modifying the ratings matrix R to contain only the
ratings given by the user. The matrix Z is also modified each time by considering
zj as the similarity between users ui and uj, when calculating the experienced
credibilities for ui. This computation is similar to our personalized approach in
calculating the private reputation of advisors.
Model Learning
Once various types of credibilities for messages are calculated with respect to dif-
ferent users, this data is used to learn the Bayesian model for each user and topic
of interest using the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm [63]. Model para-
meters are learned to predict for user ui the probability Pri(cix|eix, six, px) that ui
will find a new message mx to be credible.
Inference
Now, for a new message mx, the evidence variables are calculated with respect to a
recipient user ui, and the learned model is used to produce a probabilistic prediction
of whether ui would find mx to be credible.
The cluster and public credibilities are calculated as the weighted mean of rat-
ings for the message given by other users and the credibilities of these users with
respect to ui. The experienced credibility is the same as the corresponding credi-
bilities of the message author with respect to ui.
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Given the evidence variables for the new message, and the learned Bayesian
model, the probability of ui finding the message to be credible is computed using
standard belief propagation methods such as Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC) [63].
5.3.3 Experimental Validation
We evaluate our method over a dataset of ratings by real users obtained from a
popular knowledge sharing website, digg.com [42]. The website allows users to
submit links to news articles or blogs, which are called stories in the terminology
used by the website. Other users can vote for these stories; this is known as digging
the stories. Stories that are dugg by a large number of users are promoted to the
front-page of the website. In addition, users are allowed to link to other users in
the social network. Thus, the dataset provides us with all the information we need.
Although the dataset is quite large with over 200 stories, we are able to use
only 85 stories which have a sufficiently large number of ratings by a common set of
users. This is because we require the same users to rate many stories so that we have
enough data to construct training and test datasets for these users. Eventually, we
assemble a dataset of 85 stories with ratings by 27 users. We do not include users
who rate more than 65 stories as all 1 or 0, because a good predictor for such users
would trivially be to always return 1 or 0, and besides, such user behavior may
amount to attacks on the system which we consider as future work.
We evaluate the performance of the model for each user by dividing the 85
stories into a training set of 67 stories and a test set of 17 stories (80% and 20%
of the dataset respectively). We then repeat the process 20 times with different
random selections of stories to get confidence bounds for the cross validation. For
each evaluation, we use the performance metric Matthew’s correlation coefficient
(MCC) described in Section 3.4.2. The MCC is a convenient measure because it
gives a single metric for the quality of binary classifications.
The parameter α is used in Equation 5.5 to combine the ratings and social
network matrices. The best performance of our method happens at α = 0.5, and
gives MCC = 0.156, conveying our message that all of authorship, ratings, and
social networks provide valuable credibility information. All the experiments are
done using ratings-based inference with β = 0.85 (Equation 5.4).
We compare our method with an Eigenvector computation on the social network
matrix (Equation 5.4), personalized for each user, which is identical to the Pagerank
algorithm used to rank Internet web pages [6]. This method performs poorly with
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an MCC = 0.007. This suggests that users are influenced not only by their own
experiences, but also by the judgement of other users in their cluster, and by public
opinion. Methods ignoring these factors may not perform well.
We also compare our method with the beta reputation system BRS. The cred-
ibility of a message is estimated by aggregating all user ratings for the message
based on a probability density function [82]. Ratings are filtered out by BRS if
they are not in the majority amongst other ratings. BRS does not perform well in
the context of participatory media, given an MCC = 0.064. This is because in BRS,
only the public opinion is considered. Our method models the credibility of a user
in rating messages based on not only the public credibility and cluster credibility
but also the experienced credibility of the user.
These results confirm that the idea of our personalized approach, that is to com-
bine an agent’s private and public knowledge when modeling the trustworthiness
of another agent, also works well in the context of participatory media.
5.4 The Importance of Trust Modeling
Our trust-based incentive mechanism presented in Chapter 4 is built on the trust
modeling method presented in Chapter 3 to form a social network of buyers. This
trust model allows each buyer to model the trustworthiness of other buyers. The
most trustworthy other buyers are chosen for each buyer as its neighbors from which
it can ask advice about sellers. Because of this social network, sellers in our mech-
anism can model the reputation of buyers and can reward more reputable buyers.
Buyers are then incentivized to be honest. As will be discussed in Section 5.6, the
use of this social network also provides an avenue for excluding colluding buyers
and detecting and avoiding dishonest, colluding sellers.
An important assumption in the design of an incentive mechanism is that all
agents are rational [31]. They all have the goal of maximizing their profit. However,
there might be some agents that are irrational. In this case, our trust modeling
approach becomes important. It can help agents model the trustworthiness of other
agents and make correct decisions even when some irrational agents act dishonestly.
Another issue with incentive mechanisms is the exit problem, as acknowledged
in [15]. If an agent plans to leave the market, it can cheat freely without reper-
cussions [36]. In this case, this agent may not have incentives to be honest and
incentive mechanisms may fail. However, if trust modeling is still used by buying
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agents, it will be possible to detect dishonest advisors even if they plan to exit, in
order to continue to make effective decisions about selling agents.
5.5 The Role of the Central Server
Our trust-based incentive mechanism described in Chapter 4 relies on a central
server. We assume that the central server is trustworthy. In this section, we discuss
the important role of the central server, and argue that this assumption is necessary
and practical.
In a marketplace operating with our mechanism, the central server runs auctions
to bring buyers and sellers together. It acts as a message relay station. In our
setting, sellers can register to the central server with the information about the
products they produce. The central server is similar to a registry in [52] or a
service broker mentioned in [46]. For each request it receives from a buyer, the
central server forwards the request to the relevant sellers in the market. This
avoids a lot of message overhead in the network. Sellers do not need to provide
every buyer with the information about their products.
The central server also stores ratings of sellers provided by buyers. Using these
ratings, it selects for each buyer a list of other buyers that are most trustworthy to
the buyer as its neighbors. The trustworthiness of these other buyers is modeled
by the central server for the buyer using our personalized approach. The central
server also models the global reputation of each buyer based on the social network
of buyers.
When the buyer models the trustworthiness of the sellers that register to join
the buyer’s auction, it may acquire from the central server ratings of the sellers
provided by its neighbors. If a seller is allowed to bid in order to sell its product to
the buyer, the central server also reports to the seller the reputation of buyers in
the marketplace. The seller can then use this information to formulate its bid by
giving more attractive offers to more reputable buyers.
After the transaction between the buyer and the selected winner of its auction
is done, the buyer will report the result of conducting business with the seller to
the central server, registering a rating for the seller. These ratings of the seller
can then be shared with those buyers that consider this buyer as their neighbor,
through the central server.
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As stated in Section 5.2.2, our personalized approach for modeling the trustwor-
thiness of buyers can be adapted to work in a distributed setting by using a P2P
search mechanism [12]. The details of the P2P search mechanism can be found in
Section 5.2.2. Each buyer can then use the adapted approach to model the trust-
worthiness of other buyers without relying on the central server. However, we argue
that it is still necessary to have the central server for the following reasons.
• The personalized approach assumes that a buyer provides a rating for a seller
only when a transaction between them occurs. This is the assumption also
made by many other reputation systems, e.g. BRS [29]. Otherwise, it would
be easy for a buyer to untruthfully rate a seller a large number of times
without any cost, which is referred to as “flooding” the system [14]. We then
have to develop a system to certify ratings provided by buyers.
• Another issue is the fact that it is costly for a buyer to obtain public knowledge
of other buyers without the central server when there are a large number
of buyers in the marketplace. The buyer needs to ask every buyer in the
market to collect all ratings for sellers. In this case, we may allow each buyer
to keep a large set of other buyers as candidates for its neighbors. Public
reputation of other buyers can be measured based on ratings provided by
these candidates. This however may reduce the accuracy of the modeling for
the public reputation.
• Third, if not relying on the central server, a buyer may untruthfully report
the result of modeling the trustworthiness of other buyers. This will result
in sellers’ inaccurate estimation of buyers’ reputation. In such a case, the
overall mechanism is challenged. The honest buyers may not get appropriate
rewards from sellers because their reputation is lowered by dishonest buyers.
Similarly, dishonest buyers may get rewards. By relying on the central server,
the trust that a buyer has of another buyer can be modeled by the central
server. Thus, there is no need to ask for buyers’ reporting of other buyers’
trustworthiness.
Our assumption of relying on a trustworthy central server is also practical.
Side payment mechanisms summarized in Section 2.2.1 require a center to control
monetary payments. In contrast, in our mechanism the central server does not
handle payments; rewards are directed from sellers to buyers. The central server
therefore does not have incentives to act untruthfully.
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5.6 Coping with Collusion
The problem of coping with strategic agents that may collude with each other has
been acknowledged as an important consideration by several researchers in the field
(e.g [31]). Various elements of our particular incentive mechanism may provide an
avenue for addressing collusion more effectively than other researchers.
Side payment mechanisms [15, 31, 49] surveyed in Section 2.2.1 offer side pay-
ment to buyers that provide ratings of sellers that are similar to those provided by
other buyers. These mechanisms have difficulty with the situation where buyers
collude in giving untruthful ratings. Honest buyers are penalized because their
truthful ratings are different from others’ ratings. In contrast, in our mechanism,
honest buyers will not be adversely affected by collusion in the marketplace; with
our personalized approach for modeling the trustworthiness of advisors, each buyer
can rely on private knowledge to detect dishonest buyers and will limit their neigh-
borhood of advisors to those that are determined to be trustworthy.
With further investigation, Jurca and Faltings [33] observe that side payment
mechanisms can cope with some collusion scenarios under some assumptions. For
example, in the scenario where all buying agents may collude but do not share
revenues, their mechanism with a certain small amount of truthful feedback about
sellers will be able to cope with such collusion. In the scenario where only some
of the buyers collude but using different strategies and also distribute revenues,
the side payment mechanism copes with collusion but only when the number of
colluding buyers is small enough and other buyers are reporting honestly. However,
in the scenario where all buyers may collude according to different strategies, no
side payment mechanism can cope. In addition, all these scenarios only concern
the case where buyers collude with each other. They do not consider the case
where a seller may collude with a group of buyers in promoting the seller itself or
in bad-mouthing another seller.
Credibility mechanisms [53, 32] introduced in Section 2.2.2 suffer when buyers
and sellers collude to increase each other’s credibility. Because our mechanism
allows the central server to maintain for buyers a list of trustworthy other buyers
as their neighbors, a buyer can make an informed decision about which sellers to
do business with. If a buyer were to accept the advice of another agent that is
colluding with a seller and then be disappointed with the purchase, the advisor
would be considered untrustworthy and should not impact any future decisions.
In addition, all buyers have incentives to be honest, in order to enjoy the rewards
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offered by the honest sellers of the marketplace, if they maintain their position in
many neighborhoods of the social network.
Consider a simple example of collusion. In this example, a buyer b needs to
decide whether to do business with a seller s. The buyer models the trustworthi-
ness of the seller. Suppose that the seller is in fact dishonest. A set of buyers
{b1, b2, b3, b4} collude with seller s in promoting the seller by each providing the
rating of 1. In this case, these buyers also collude with each other in providing the
same ratings and will be rewarded by the side payment mechanisms. The seller
will be rewarded by the credibility mechanisms because it will certainly provide a
rating of 1 for itself. Another set of buyers {b5, b6} honestly report the rating of
0 for the seller. Our mechanism makes use of the personalized approach for buyer
b to model the trustworthiness of other buyers. Only the trustworthy buyers are
considered by b as its neighbors from which it will ask advice about seller s. The
dishonest buyers {b1, b2, b3, b4} are subsequently excluded from the buyer’s neighbor
list. Therefore, their untruthful ratings will not mislead the buyer’s decision about
future sellers. If the dishonesty of b1, b2, b3 and b4 is similarly detected by additional
buyers, these untruthful advisors will continue to have low reputation and will not
get high rewards from sellers. Note that the ratings provided by the honest buyers
{b5, b6} in the buyer’s neighbor list will still allow the buyer to correctly model the
trustworthiness of the seller and avoid doing business with the seller. The dishonest
seller thus cannot gain better profit in our mechanism.
For future work, we plan to carry out experiments involving strategic agents that
may collude with each other to demonstrate the robustness of our model against
possible collusion attacks. A detailed discussion of this is presented in Section 6.2.2.
5.7 Studies in Economics and Sociology
It is important to note that our trust-based incentive mechanism presented in Chap-
ter 4 is supported by certain studies in economics and sociology.
Buyers in the mechanism use our personalized approach presented in Chapter 3
to model the trustworthiness of sellers. This approach takes into account the buyer’s
personal experience with the sellers as well as ratings of the sellers provided by other
buyers. There are also theoretical studies in economics and sociology that promote
allowing buyers to seek advice about sellers from others. Horner [26] points out
that in order to sustain high quality equilibrium, the honest sellers have to be
rewarded by a widening of the buyer base. To widen the buyer base, it is proposed
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that potential buyers should be able to recognize which sellers are reputable. This
in turn requires that buyers have reliable information about a seller’s reputation,
either through the direct evidence of a seller’s popularity or indirectly through the
advice of acquaintances. Rob and Fishman [61] describe a model where buyers are
allowed to ask advice about sellers from other buyers (advisors). In this setting,
they prove that there exists a reputation equilibrium, which indicates that sellers
have incentives to produce high quality products to attract more buyers over time.
Bolton et al. [4] compare the competitive markets with or without social reputation
networks, based on experiments carried out in a series of simulated online markets.
Results indicate that a reliable social reputation network can have more advantages
in promoting trust.
To choose a proper seller to do business with, buyers limit the number of se-
lected bidders (sellers) in their auctions based on the modeled trustworthiness of
the sellers. Researchers in economics and sociology have also provided theoretical
results to suggest appropriate approaches for buyers to select business partners, in
order to sustain sellers’ high quality equilibrium. A buyer should limit the number
of selected bidders in its auctions, which is supported by Kim’s analysis results
demonstrated in [37]. Kim states that public tendering could lead to quality reduc-
tion by bidders; in contrast, selective tendering depending on bidders’ trustworthi-
ness may avoid such difficulties. Calzolari and Spagnolo [8] also analyze repeated
procurement processes. They show that by limiting the number of competitors
and carefully choosing the trustworthy ones to join their auctions, buyers offer sell-
ers sufficient future gain so that sellers will prefer to provide acceptable levels of
quality of products in the current auction to build their reputation, in order to
gain more profit in the future. Bar-Isaac also uses an example in [3] to show that
low competition may sustain an equilibrium in which sellers produce high quality
products.
Our proposal of having sellers in the mechanism decrease their prices and in-
crease quality of products to attract more buyers is also supported by theoretical
work in economics. In [39], Kranton argues that under the condition that a firm
can permanently increase its market share by attracting new consumers with a
price cut, it will have an incentive to produce high-quality goods. That is, its offer
of high-quality goods will be credible, despite the lower current-period price. The
profits from selling to a larger set of consumers in the future is greater than the
one-shot gain from being dishonest and producing low quality goods.
127
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we conclude our work by highlighting its contributions, including
the personalized approach and the trust-based incentive mechanism. We also pro-
pose future work to expand our proposed models and to develop more extensive
evaluation to demonstrate the value of our work.
6.1 Contributions
In this section, we summarize the contributions of our work, including the value of
our personalized approach and the value of our trust-based incentive mechanism.
6.1.1 Value of the Personalized Approach
In Chapter 3, we propose a novel personalized approach for effectively modeling
trustworthiness of advisors, allowing a buyer 1) to model private reputation of an
advisor based on their ratings for commonly rated sellers 2) model public reputa-
tion of the advisor based on all ratings for the sellers ever rated by that agent 3)
flexibly weight the private and public reputation ratings into one combined rating.
Similarly, we adopt the personalized approach to model the trustworthiness of sell-
ing agents by combining the weighted private and public reputation values of the
sellers.
Our approach tracks ratings provided according to their time windows and limits
the ratings accepted, in order to cope with advisors flooding the system and to deal
with changes in agents’ behavior. The public reputation component allows the
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approach to work effectively even when buying agents do not have much experience
with selling agents. Our approach works effectively even when the majority of
advisors provide large numbers of unfair ratings, by adjusting to rely more heavily
on private reputations of advisors.
Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the personalized approach
in terms of adjusting advisors’ trustworthiness based on the percentages of unfair
ratings they provided. Our approach is shown to be scalable in terms of different
populations of involved sellers. We also demonstrate the value of our method for
modeling advisors in order to effectively model the trustworthiness of sellers. Our
personalized model can therefore be seen as a valuable approach to use when intro-
ducing social networks in order to model the trustworthiness of sellers in electronic
marketplaces.
We also carry out comparative experiments in a simulated dynamic electronic
marketplace environment where buying and selling agents are possibly deceptive
and they may freely leave and join the marketplace. Experimental results show that
our personalized approach in general performs better than the TRAVOS model and
the BRS system. Results also show that our approach performs much better than
TRAVOS especially when buyers do not have much experience with sellers. Our
approach performs well even when the majority of advisors are dishonest, sellers
may vary their behavior, and advisors may provide a large number of ratings to
flood the system.
In Chapter 5, we discuss that our personalized approach is also valuable for
different contexts other than electronic marketplaces. It can build an effective
social network of trust by critiquing the ratings provided by the advisors in the
context of modeling the trustworthiness of information providers on the Semantic
Web.
Our approach can also be adapted to be used in a distributed setting where ser-
vice consumers select an appropriate service provider based on shared experiences
provided by other consumers on the Semantic Web. It can be easily integrated
with an experience-based service selection approach that is consumer-oriented and
context-aware. We validate the adapted approach by comparing it with BRS and
TRAVOS in a simulated environment of experience-based service selection where
service consumers may be subjective, may request services in different contexts, and
may lie about their experiences with service providers to other consumers. Experi-
mental results confirm that our adapted approach determines lying consumers more
accurately and improves the performance of the experience-based service selection
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more significantly.
The central idea of the personalized approach is to combine buyers’ private
and public knowledge for trust modeling. This idea can also be made use of and be
extended in the design of a credibility model for participatory media. Experimental
validation using a real dataset obtained from digg.com shows that our credibility
model performs better than both Pagerank and the BRS system in the context of
determining credibility of messages on participatory media.
6.1.2 Value of the Trust-based Incentive Mechanism
Equipped with our personalized approach for modeling trustworthiness of advisors,
we then embed this reasoning into a novel trust-based incentive mechanism to en-
courage agents to be honest, as outlined in Chapter 4. In this mechanism, buyers
select the most trustworthy advisors as their neighbors from which they can ask
advice about sellers, forming a social network. In sharp contrast with other re-
searchers, we also have sellers model the reputation of buyers. Sellers will offer
better rewards to satisfy buyers that are well respected in the social network, in
order to build their own reputation. We provide precise formulae used by sell-
ers when reasoning about immediate and future profit to determine their bidding
behavior and the rewards to buyers, and emphasize the importance for buyers to
adopt a strategy to limit the number of sellers that are considered for each good to
be purchased. We theoretically prove that our mechanism promotes honesty from
buyers in reporting seller ratings, and honesty from sellers in delivering products
as promised. We also provide a series of experimental results in a simulated dy-
namic environment where agents may be arriving and departing. This provides a
stronger defense of the mechanism as one that is robust to important conditions
in the marketplace. Our experiments clearly show the gains in profit enjoyed by
both honest sellers and honest buyers when our mechanism is introduced and our
proposed strategies are followed.
The novel idea of designing an incentive mechanism based on trust modeling and
using this mechanism to further help trust modeling by diminishing the problem of
unfair ratings, will bridge researchers in the areas of trust modeling and mechanism
design. More specifically, trust modeling plays an important role in our incentive
mechanism. In the mechanism, buying agents model the trustworthiness of selling
agents, in order to avoid doing business with dishonest sellers. In this modeling
process, new buyers or buyers without much personal experience with sellers will
ask advice about the sellers from other buyers (called advisors). To cope with
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untruthful feedback about the sellers, buyers will also model the trustworthiness
of advisors and select the most trustworthy ones as their neighbors, using our
personalized approach. In our mechanism, sellers also model reputation of buyers
based on the social network of buyers to satisfy more reputable buyers, in order
for the sellers themselves to be known as trustworthy sellers by many buyers in
the marketplace. In our incentive mechanism, it is in the best interest of buyers to
provide truthful ratings of sellers. Truthful information about sellers can increase
the accuracy of modeling the trustworthiness of sellers. Sellers are also encouraged
to be honest, which can eliminate the disadvantages of new buyers.
Our mechanism’s use of neighborhoods also provides an avenue for excluding
colluding buyers and detecting and avoiding dishonest, colluding sellers. Side pay-
ment mechanisms of [15, 31, 49] have difficulty with the situation where buyers
collude in giving untruthful ratings. In the trust revelation mechanism of Dash et
al. [13], the assumption is that all of each agent’s preferences concern only its own
allocation. However, agents may collude with each other. In contrast, in our mech-
anism, honest buyers will not be adversely affected by collusion in the marketplace;
with our personalized approach for modeling the trustworthiness of advisors, each
buyer can rely on private knowledge to detect dishonest buyers and will limit their
neighborhood of advisors to those that are determined to be trustworthy. Credi-
bility mechanisms [53, 32] suffer when buyers and sellers collude to increase each
other’s credibility. Because our mechanism allows the central server to maintain for
buyers a list of trustworthy other buyers as their neighbors, a buyer can make an
informed decision about which sellers to do business with. If a buyer were to accept
the advice of another agent that is colluding with a seller and then be disappointed
with the purchase, the advisor would be considered untrustworthy and would not
impact any future decisions. In addition, all buyers have incentives to be honest, in
order to enjoy the rewards offered by the honest sellers of the marketplace, if they
maintain their position in many neighborhoods of the social network.
In our mechanism, a trustworthy seller is rewarded by a buyer from doing busi-
ness with many more other buyers in the marketplace that consider this buyer as
their neighbor. Therefore, unlike the trust revelation mechanism of [5], our mecha-
nism does not rely on the assumption that the quantity of the goods a buyer wants
to purchase has to be dependent on sellers’ trustworthiness. In contrast with side
payment and credibility mechanisms, our mechanism has the potential to be ex-
tended to accept ratings other than binary. A detailed discussion of this extension
can be found in Section 6.2.1. Different from the side payment mechanisms, our
mechanism also does not rely on the central server to handle monetary payments.
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Rewards are directed from sellers to buyers. It therefore easily achieves budget
balance.
6.1.3 Value in General
Our research aims to bridge the communities of trust modeling and incentive design,
within the artificial intelligence subfield of multiagent systems. While our focus has
primarily been on the application of electronic commerce, we have discussed the
potential usefulness of our methods for other application areas as well. With respect
to electronic commerce, our goal is to contribute towards the design of effective
electronic marketplaces populated by buying and selling agents. We aim to enable
these agents to earn the trust of their users, as a result of our proposed methods for
modeling the trustworthiness of their fellow agents and our proposed mechanism
for promoting honest agent behaviour. As such, our work should provide valuable
encouragement for the acceptance of e-commerce by human users and business
organizations.
6.2 Future Work
For the future, we plan to expand on our current research, both in extending the
personalized approach and the trust-based incentive mechanism we are building and
in developing more extensive validation to demonstrate the value of our particular
approaches.
6.2.1 Extending the Model
For future work, we will revisit certain design decisions required for the models
presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
Proper Size of Time Window
For the personalized approach, we have set aside the question of how best to deter-
mine the appropriate size of the time window to be used in the evaluation of the
trustworthiness of advisors. The time windows proposed in [14], for instance, are
determined based on the frequency of the ratings to a given seller, so that if the
market carries many ratings to this seller the time windows are quite small. This
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suggests that some methods for gauging the level of activity in the market could
be applied to the proposed size of time window.
Another important factor for determining the proper size of time window is to
what extent sellers may change their behavior. Our experiments in Section 3.4.4
analyze how our personalized approach performs in the scenario where sellers may
vary their behavior widely. Experimental results show that our personalized ap-
proach is still effective by comparing a buyer’s and an advisor’s ratings only if these
two ratings are within the same time window and the size of the time window is
small enough (e.g. one day).
For future work, we will explore an effective method to determine a proper size
of time window, by examining the relative benefits of different sizes of time windows
in effectively capturing changes of sellers’ behavior as well as the level of activity in
the market. This method will take both factors as parameters and will return the
size of the time window. By adjusting the two parameters based on buyers’ ratings
collected from the marketplace, the most appropriate size of the time window would
be chosen for the personalized approach to have the best performance of estimating
the trustworthiness of advisors.
Determining Consistency of Ratings
Our personalized approach estimates the public reputation of an advisor based on
whether the advisor’s ratings for a seller are consistent with other ratings of the
seller. In our current work presented in Section 3.1.1, we use a simple method to
determine consistency by averaging all the ratings of the seller and determining
whether that is close to the advisor’s ratings. A detailed description of this is in
Section 5.2.2 when we adapt our personalized to work together with the experience-
based service selection approach, that is the approach POYRAZ. In this approach,
a threshold is set to represent the maximum acceptable deviation from the majority.
A rating of the advisor is considered as a consistent rating if the difference between
the advisor’s rating and the average of all other ratings is less than this threshold.
For future work, we will investigate a more comprehensive approach for deter-
mining the consistency of an advisor’s rating. For example, an approach similar
to that of Dellarocas [15] may be deployed, where the consistency of the advisor’s
ratings may also be determined by the variance value of all ratings for the seller.
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Learning the Parameters
Our personalized approach allows a buyer to model trustworthiness of advisors with
the flexibility of assigning a different weight to the private and public reputation
of the advisors. This weight is currently determined based on the reliability of
the estimated private reputation (see Equations 3.6 and 3.5 in Section 3.1.1). It is
mainly dependent on how much private knowledge the buyer has about the advisors.
The personalized approach thus can work effectively even when the buyer does not
have much private knowledge about the advisors’ advice by relying more on the
public reputation of the advisors. There may also be the case where the majority
of advisors are lying. In this case, the personalized approach has to rely more on
the private reputation of the advisors. For the purpose of considering all these
cases, a learning approach may need to be developed to optimally learn the weight.
In Section 5.3, we discuss a credibility model to determine the credibility of
messages for participatory media. This model combines cluster credibility, experi-
enced credibility, and public credibility for messages into a single credibility score
by using a Bayesian network on a personalized basis for each user. The credibility
model learns over time the user’s preferences for these credibilities. The model is
thus learned in a personalized manner for each user, and is able to accommodate
varying degrees of openness of users to respect opinions of other users.
We may adopt a similar approach to adjust the weight of different parts of the
personalized approach for each user, by learning the two parameters ε and γ (see
Equations 3.5 and 3.6 in Section 3.1.1). The parameter ε is the maximal level of
error that will be accepted by the buyer and γ is the level of confidence the buyer
would like to attain. Once the optimal values for these two parameters are learned
based on the amount of the private knowledge the user has about advisors and the
buyer’s estimation whether the majority of advisors is lying, the weight can then
be effectively determined.
We may also learn to adjust other parameters for each buyer, such as the thresh-
olds θ and δ used to determine whether a seller is trustworthy or untrustworthy
(see Section 4.4.3). These parameters can be learned based on the results of the
buyer’s business with the seller. If the seller fails to deliver its promise, the buyer
may increase θ for the seller to be considered trustworthy by the buyer, to set a
higher standard for the seller. These parameters would then be set for the purpose
of maximizing the buyer’s profit in the long term, as suggested by [72].
A seller may also learn an optimal value for the parameter 4Pb, the increment
in probability of being allowed to join a buyer’s auctions in the future after the
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seller satisfies the buyer in a transaction. This is a part of the seller’s estimation
for expected future profit and the amount of rewards offered to the buyer (see
Equations 4.8 and 4.14 in Section 4.2.1). The seller will lose profit if it sets 4Pb too
high because it will offer rewards that it cannot recover in sales. An optimal value
for 4Pb may be learned by the seller by examining its success in being accepted
into auctions, in order to maximize the seller’s profit over time.
Introducing Additional Weighting
Another potential topic for future work is to distinguish ratings for the current
seller from ratings for other sellers when estimating trustworthiness of the advisor.
One possibility is to allow ratings for the current seller to influence the buyer’s
decisions more heavily, by assigning them greater weight.
As stated in Section 2.1.2, there is no approach belonging to the “private and
local” category because a buyer’s limited experience with the current seller is in-
sufficient to estimate trustworthiness of advisors. By assigning more weight to the
advisor’s ratings for the current seller when evaluating the private reputation of
the advisor, our approach would also have the property of the approaches in the
“private and local” category. Similarly, when modeling the public reputation of the
advisor, the advisor’s ratings for other sellers could also be set to carry less weight
when compared with all other advisors’ ratings for the common sellers.
Moving beyond Binary Ratings
Another avenue for future work is to make adjustments to the model presented in
Chapter 3, to broaden its applicability by moving beyond binary ratings for selling
agents to accept ratings in different ranges. Instead of using the numerical difference
of two ratings, comparison of the two ratings could take into account the semantics
of rating levels [10]. For example, although the numerical differences of the pairs are
same, the difference between 5 (very trustworthy) and 3 (neutral) is smaller than
that between 4 (trustworthy) and 2 (untrustworthy). In consequence, the similarity
between 5 and 3 say 0.2, should be set to be larger than the similarity between 4 and
2 say 0. When these extensions are made, the Dirichlet family of probability density
functions [21], which is the multivariate generalization of the beta family, could be
used to represent probability distributions of discrete similarity values. Our model
would evaluate private and public reputation values based on aggregation of those
discrete similarity values.
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We have begun to explore the use of the Dirichlet family of probability den-
sity functions for the application of trust management in an Intrusion Detection
Network (IDN) [20].1 Traditional intrusion detection systems (IDSes) work in iso-
lation and may be easily compromised by unknown or new threats. An IDN is a
collaborative intrusion detection system (IDS) network intended to overcome this
weakness by having each peer IDS benefit from the collective knowledge and ex-
perience shared by other peers. This enhances the overall accuracy of intrusion
assessment as well as the ability of detecting new intrusion types. However, in
such collaborative environments, a malicious (or malfunctioning) IDS can degrade
the performance of others by sending out false intrusion assessments. To protect
an IDN from malicious attacks, it is important to evaluate the trustworthiness of
participating IDSes. We adopt the Dirichlet family of probability density functions
in our trust management for estimating the likely future behavior of an IDS based
on its past history. This theoretical model allows us to track the uncertainty in
estimating the trustworthiness of the IDS, which improves the detection accuracy.
See Appendix C for details.
Choosing Advisors to Consult
Another area deserving further study for our personalized approach is how best to
determine which advisors to consult, when modeling the trustworthiness of sellers.
Challenging problems in this area include how to benefit from the greater infor-
mation source when the number of advisors is large, but to temper this by the
need to address the greater chance for unreliability when the pool of advisors is not
small. The proper number of advisors consulted should also reflect the population
of buying and selling agents in the marketplace and how actively buying agents
rate selling agents.
It is important to balance between the computation of maintaining the list of
advisors being evaluated by buyers and the chance of obtaining sufficient informa-
tion. A larger size of the advisor list will increase the computation of maintaining
and updating the trustworthiness of advisors, and may decrease the accuracy for
predicting selling agents’ trustworthiness from feedback provided by advisors. A
smaller size of the list may increase the accuracy, but will have higher chance the
advisors have insufficient experience [25]. An empirical analysis as in [25] may be
used to determine the proper number of advisors consulted. Two curves can be
drawn for two measures. One represents the increase of the accuracy for predicting
1This research was developed jointly with Carol Fung.
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selling agents’ trustworthiness when more advisors have been consulted. Accord-
ingly, another curve represents the increase of computation cost. A proper size of
the advisor list can be chosen to give the best balance between these two measures.
We would also look into the method used in [83] of allowing a buyer to ask its
neighbors about which other advisors to consult. In this way, each buyer does not
need to maintain a large neighbor list but is still able to gain sufficient information
from a large pool of advisors.
We should also determine the circumstances under which a number of advi-
sors may be consulted in order to make a very quick decision for time-sensitive
tasks. For example, the environment of the agents in a vehicular ad-hoc network
(VANET) is changing constantly and rapidly. A good trust model should introduce
certain dynamic trust metrics, capturing this dynamism by allowing an agent to
control trust management depending on the situation at hand [55, 16]. Agents in a
VANET environment in general can report data regarding different events e.g. car
crashes, collision warnings, weather conditions and information regarding construc-
tions etc. Determining the proper number of advisors to consult should therefore
be event/task specific. For example, some of these tasks may be time sensitive and
require quick reaction from the agent that receives them. In this case, this agent
can only consult a very limited number of other agents.
Handling Subjective Difference
To clearly present our trust-based incentive mechanism, we introduce a simplifying
assumption in our current work that ratings provided by buyers are objective. These
ratings represent whether sellers deliver their promised products. For future work,
it would be useful to examine the subjective difference of agents in their ratings.
To explain, if two agents have subjective difference with respect to products,
one agent’s ratings may seriously mislead another agent [43]. For example, a buyer
may give a low rating to a seller that delivers a book two days late. If the delivery
date is not significant for a second buyer, the first buyer’s low rating will not be
significant, either.
As discussed in Section 5.2, the method of Şensoy and Yolum [11] considers
subjectivity. However, this method requires agents to share experiences expressed
using semantic ontologies instead of numerical ratings. The Bayesian modeling
approach proposed by Regan et al. [56] may be a useful starting point for coping
with the subjective difference of agents in their ratings. Their approach allows
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a buyer to learn other buyers’ evaluation functions on different features of the
products delivered by sellers. This is done by analyzing ratings that are provided.
More specifically, a buyer’s evaluation function is a random variable in a Bayesian
network. As the buyer provides ratings for a seller and the seller’s behavior is
observed, the random variable (the buyer’s evaluation function) will be computed.
Our trust-based incentive mechanism would use this approach to adjust buyers’
ratings according to the learned evaluation functions of the buyers.
Using Our Work beyond E-Marketplaces
For future work, we are also interested in using our models for different applica-
tions in real-time environments and in scenarios of system security. One valuable
application is a vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET) where agents in vehicles can
communicate with each other regarding up to date information about road con-
ditions to enhance road safety. A second application is a collaborative intrusion
detection network (IDN) where the overall accuracy of intrusion assessment as well
as the ability of detecting new intrusion types can be increased because of the
collective knowledge and experience shared amongst member intrusion detection
systems. In these applications, trust modeling is an effective way to cope with
possibly malicious parties that try to degrade the performance of others and cause
huge damage to the systems by sending out false information.
Our personalized model allows agents to model the trustworthiness of other
agents in order for them to form a neighborhood of advisors from which they can
seek advice. This approach flexibly combines an agent’s personal experience with
other agents and the public knowledge about these other agents held by the system.
We would consider adapting this approach to work in a distributed system like
VANETs and collaborative IDNs, similar to the POYRAZ approach described in
Section 5.2.2. We may also allow each agent to keep a large set of other agents
as candidates for its neighbors. Public knowledge of other agents can be obtained
based on ratings provided by these candidates, to avoid communicating with every
agent in the system. It is also important to increase the scalability of this model
for it to be applicable for these large-scale networks.
It would be interesting to develop an incentive design for the distributed trust
model to encourage expert agents to contribute more to the network and to penalize
free-riders, drawing on insights gained from our work on designing the trust-based
incentive mechanism presented in Chapter 4. One issue in this distributed mech-
anism is that a buyer may rate a seller without actually doing business with the
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seller. One way to cope with this problem is to develop a system to certify ratings
provided by buyers.
If a distributed solution is found and the incentive design is effective, the trust
model may be valuable in deploying secure applications of VANETs and collabora-
tive IDNs by governments and business organizations.
6.2.2 Developing More Extensive Validation
For future work, we also plan to develop more extensive validation by involving
buying agents with different lying types and advanced lying strategies. We will
also continue to examine the robustness of our models against different types of
attacks and the scalability of our models for their practical applicability. A unified
simulation framework may also be developed to evaluate and compare different
trust and reputation models.
Buyer’s Lying Strategies
In our current evaluations in Section 3.4 and Section 4.4, a lying buyer will always
report ratings of sellers that are opposite to their truthful ratings. It would also be
worthwhile to consider other types of dishonest buyers from the literature, such as
the Exaggerated Positive and Exaggerated Negative types defined in [85] where a
lying buyer will always report positive or negative ratings of sellers, respectively. As
discussed in Appendix C, we can consider a lying type where lying buyers always
try to bring the most negative impact to other buyers. This lying type works when
ratings are in a multi-scale range. We may also want to investigate more advanced
dishonest buyers that may have mixed lying types. The performance of detecting
these types of dishonest buyers would then be evaluated and compared for our
personalized approach.
We have compared the performance of our personalized approach with that
of other competing approaches in detecting the possible dishonest buyers that are
fairly consistent in lying. For future work, it would be worthwhile to explore the case
where some dishonest buyers lie only for some sellers while being honest for other
sellers. Inspired by the evaluation in [82], a marketplace may involve some buyers
that have an adaptive lying strategy where buyers may learn from the marketplace
and build some strategies to adapt their lying types or lying frequency. A similar
idea can be found in the work of Sen and Banerjee [66], where strategic agents may
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exploit the marketplace. We are interested in demonstrating how our approach and
other existing approaches perform in this kind of marketplace environment.
Robustness to Attacks
Robustness to attacks is an important metric to evaluate a trust model [73]. This
can be indicated by how fast the trust model can detect these attacks and recover
from them. Different types of attacks may be considered.
One type of attack is sybil attacks that occur when a malicious agent in the
system creates a large number of pseudonyms (fake identities) [17]. This malicious
agent can use these fake identities to have large influence on other agents in the
market. One way to act against this type of attack is to design an authentication
mechanism for the market. For example, the eBay system requires users to have
a credit card to register to the system. Authentication makes registering fake
identities difficult. Another way used by our models is to assign low initial trust
values to newcomers, similar to [87]. It will take the newcomers a while to build up
their trust in order to make any impact.
Betrayal attacks [73] occur when a trusted advisor suddenly turns into a ma-
licious one and starts providing untruthful feedback of sellers. A trust model can
be degraded dramatically because of this type of attack. In one case, an advisor
may rate all sellers truthfully to intentionally build up its trust and then rate one
seller untruthfully. We have already discussed in Section 6.2.1 that our personalized
approach can be extended to distinguish ratings provided by an advisor for the cur-
rent seller from those for other sellers. In this way, the advisor’s “good” behavior
in rating other sellers will not affect a buyer’s decision about the current seller very
much. There may also be the case where an advisor may rate a seller truthfully
many times to build up its trust and then suddenly start providing untruthful rat-
ings for the same seller. In this case, we may employ a mechanism as used in the
model of Tran and Cohen [77], which is inspired by the social norm that it takes
a long-time interaction and consistent good behavior to build up high trust while
only a few bad actions may ruin it. Our personalized approach also introduces a
forgetting factor to discount older ratings provided by advisors (see Section 3.1.1).
This approach focuses more on the recent behavior of the advisor. In this way, it
may also be able to cope with this problem to some extent. For future work, we
will explore how best to set the forgetting factor. We will carry out experiments
to examine the effectiveness of detecting betrayal attacks when different values for
the forgetting factor are used.
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Collusion attacks happen when a group of malicious agents cooperate together
by providing truthful feedback in order to mislead other agents. At this stage, we
argue that our incentive mechanism may be able to cope with the situation where
buyers collude in giving untruthful ratings. In our mechanism, honest buyers will
not be adversely affected by collusion in the marketplace; with our personalized ap-
proach for modeling the trustworthiness of advisors, each buyer can rely on private
knowledge to detect dishonest buyers and will limit their neighborhood of advisors
to those which are determined to be trustworthy. Our incentive mechanism may
also be able to cope with the collusion between buyers and sellers. Because our
mechanism allows buying agents to maintain a list of trustworthy other buyers as
their neighbors, a buyer can make an informed decision about which sellers to do
business with. If a buyer were to accept the advice of another agent who is collud-
ing with a seller and then be disappointed with the purchase, the advisor would be
considered untrustworthy and would not impact any future decisions. In addition,
all buying agents have incentives to be honest, in order to enjoy the rewards offered
by the honest sellers of the marketplace, if they maintain their position in many
neighborhoods of the social network. If we are also able to demonstrate that we
model effectively even when collusion exists, this would be a significant contribu-
tion, since several researchers (i.e. Jurca and Faltings [31], and Papaioannou and
Stamoulis [53]) already acknowledge that they are unable to effectively address this
scenario.
For future work, we will simulate these attacks for our evaluations. For example,
to determine whether our model can cope with collusion, we will involve in our
experiments some strategic agents that may collude with each other. We can allow
some buying agents to collude with selling agents in providing unfairly high ratings
to increase the selling agents’ reputation. We can also allow some buying agents to
collude with other buying agents in giving unfairly low ratings to selling agents. We
will examine how our mechanism is robust in coping with these types of collusion.
Coping with unfair ratings from advisors in e-marketplaces by a modeling of
their trustworthiness has some similarity with the challenge of addressing shilling
attacks in recommender systems. The research of [41] suggests that the general
algorithms used by attackers (i.e. the kind of attacks) may be useful to model
and that the areas being attacked (e.g. low use items) may influence the possible
damage that can be inflicted. For future work, it would also be useful to simulate
these attacks and to compare the robustness of the approaches against the attacks.
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Scalability of Our Models
Scalability is a critical metric that determines the practical applicability of our
proposed models. In the experiments presented in Section 3.3, we have different
populations of sellers. We demonstrate that the trustworthiness of the advisor
modeled using our personalized approach remains nearly the same when the popu-
lation of sellers changes. This indicates that our personalized approach is scalable.
For future work, we will also analyze the scalability of our incentive mechanism in
terms of, for example, the population of agents in marketplaces growing increas-
ingly large or for a longer duration of operation, instead of 30 days, as in our current
experiments.
Considering More Varied Marketplaces
For future work, we plan to also consider marketplaces with products that have
different non-price features and ones where sellers in the marketplace may have
different costs for producing the same products. This should be especially valuable
to determine the value of accepting very trustworthy sellers that happen to simply
have high costs of production. These more general marketplace environments will
also allow us to further analyze the changes of buyer and seller strategies.
A Unified Simulation Framework
We also plan to develop a unified simulation framework to evaluate and compare
different trust models for multi-agent systems. We have already outlined a simula-
tion framework in Section 3.4 to compare our personalized model with other trust
models in a dynamic e-marketplace setting where buyers and sellers are possibly
dishonest and they may freely leave and join the marketplace. In particular, we
have analyzed different scenarios where, for example, the majority of buyers are
dishonest, they may not have much experience with sellers, and sellers may vary
their behavior widely.
The intended design of the framework is shown in Figure 6.1. The trust model
component is user-specific and would be implemented by users of this framework.
For the unified simulation framework, we would incorporate different deception
strategies of agents into the framework to determine the efficiency of the trust mod-
els as discussed earlier in Section 6.2.2, shown as a deception model in Figure 6.1.














Figure 6.1: A Unified Simulation Framework
evaluate the robustness of trust models. The simulation framework would offer
flexibility to vary the populations of agents to examine the scalability of different
models.
The simulation framework would consist of an input interface and an output
interface. The input interface provides a convenient way for users to set up simula-
tion parameters and to run customized experiments. The output interface sketches
visualized simulation results. The core engine would be the central part of the
simulation framework. Its main functionalities include: bootstrapping the simula-
tion process and display the input interface for users to configure the experiments;
creating a simulation with a group of agent instances based on the configurations
received from users; coordinating all the components of the simulation framework
to accomplish simulation tasks; collecting simulation results and sending data to
the output interface for plotting.
Our unified simulation framework has the following advantages over the ART
Testbed [19]. The ART Testbed is specifically designed for the e-commerce domain
and the only performance metric considered is profit. In contrast, our framework
will introduce performance metrics of robustness and scalability, which are two
important concerns in trust management. Our framework will incorporate sophis-
ticated deception models and attack models to fully test the performance of trust
models. It will also simulate specific scenarios to analyze which models will be more
effective in which situations.
Our development of the simulation testbed will be beneficial for other researchers
in the field of trust modeling to analyze and compare their trust models with the
purpose of improving their performance and by offering flexibility for them to adjust
parameters of simulations according to their needs.
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6.3 Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, we develop a personalized approach for effectively modeling trustwor-
thiness of advisors, to cope with the problem of unfair ratings provided by them.
Equipped with this approach, we propose a novel trust-based incentive mechanism
to promote honesty amongst buyers and sellers in e-marketplaces. Our work should
serve to create more confidence for real users to participate in the marketplace.
For future work, we plan to extend our models and develop more extensive
validation to demonstrate the value of our work. After these extensions are realized,
the hope is that our models will be more applicable to real-world environments. If
we are able to adapt our models to work in a distributed system like VANETs
and collaborative IDNs, our work will be shown to be robust and scalable in these
real-time environments and in scenarios of system security.
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Appendix A
A Simple Way of Calculating
Buyer’s Reputation
Equation 4.7 in Chapter 4 presents a complex way for calculating reputation of
buyers. This way uses a recursive calculation that may be expensive in computation
(see Appendix B for a detailed description of the algorithm). An alternative way is
to simply represent the reputation of a buyer based on the number of other buyers
considering this buyer as one of their neighbors. An example of this calculation is
illustrated as follows.
Table A.1: Neighbors of Buyers
Buyer b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
Neighbors
b2 b4 b4 b3 b3 b3
b5 b5 b5 b5 b4 b4
b6 b6 b6 b6 b6 b5
Suppose that there are 6 buyers, {b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6}. Assume that each buyer
is allowed to have only 3 neighbors in this example. The neighbors of each buyer
are listed in Table A.1. We calculate each buyer’s reputation represented by the
number of its neighborhoods as follows:
Rb1 = 0, Rb2 = 1, Rb3 = 3
Rb4 = 4, Rb5 = 5, Rb6 = 5
Buyers b5 and b6 are the most reputable and buyer b1 is the least reputable.
We also carry out experiments to show different reputation values of buyers
using different strategies. The experimental setting is the same as that presented
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in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4. The marketplace involves 90 buyers. These buyers
are grouped into three groups. They have different numbers of requests for buying
products from sellers. Every 10 of the buyers in each group has a different number
(10, 20 and 30) of requests. Some buyers will provide untruthful ratings. Each
group of buyers provides different percentages (0%, 20% and 40%) of untruthful
























Figure A.1: Reputation of Honest and Dishonest Buyers
We measure the reputation of buyers that provide different percentages of un-
truthful ratings. In our experiments, a buyer’s reputation is represented by the
number of other buyers considering this buyer as their neighbor. The results are
shown in Figure A.1. From this figure, we can see that the buyers providing the
smaller percentages of untruthful ratings will have the larger reputation values.























Buyer Rating All of Business
Buyer Rating 2/3 of Business
Buyer Rating 1/3 of Business
Figure A.2: Reputation of Buyers Providing Different Numbers of Ratings
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We also compare reputation values of buyers providing different number of rat-
ings. In this experiment, all buyers are honest. They have the same number of
requests. However, they rate different fractions (1/3, 2/3 and 3/3) of their business
with sellers. Results are shown in Figure A.2. Buyers that have provided more
ratings will have larger reputation values. This figure thus shows the same results
in Figure 4.10 of Chapter 4.
To reduce the cost of computation, we may choose the way of calculating the
reputation of a buyer as the number of other buyers considering this buyer as their
neighbor. The experimental results support that with this simple calculation, our




Java Source Code for Computing
Buyer Reputation Using
Equation 4.7 in Chapter 4
The Java source code below defines a method that takes a parameter of a set of
buyers and returns the reputation values of each buyer, implemented using Equa-
tion 4.7 in Chapter 4. The parameters of this method consists of the information
about each buyer’s neighbors and how much the buyer trusts each neighbor. Each
buyer has an ID, which is an integer number starting from 0. The returned array
of the method stores each buyer’s reputation value whose index in the array is the
buyer’s ID.
public static double[] buyerRep(Vector buyers) {
//initialize an array to store buyers’ reputation values
double[] reputation = new double[buyers.size()];
for(int i=0; i<reputation.length; i++){
reputation[i] = (double)(reputation.length);
}
//initialize a matrix to store trust values between buyer pairs
double[][] trust = new double[buyers.size()][buyers.size()];
for(int i=0; i<trust.length; i++){





//fill in the matrix with trust values between buyer pairs
//all trust values are normalized
for(int i=0; i<trust.length; i++){
Buyer buyer = (Buyer)(buyers.elementAt(i));
Hashtable neighbors = buyer.getNeighbor();
double sum = 0.0;
Enumeration nIDs = neighbors.keys();
while(nIDs.hasMoreElements()){
int nID = Integer.parseInt((String) (nIDs.nextElement()));
double tr_nb = Double.parseDouble((String)(neighbors.get(nID+"")));
sum = sum + tr_nb;
trust[i][nID] = tr_nb;
}




//compute the transformation of the trust value matrix
double[][] trust_t = new double[buyers.size()][buyers.size()];
for(int i=0; i<trust_t.length; i++){




//define minimum similarity between two buyer reputation arrays
double error = 0.001;
//define a new reputation array
double[] newRep = new double[reputation.length];
//compute reputation values till the newly computed reputation
//value set is very similar to the previous reputation value set
double similarity = 0.0;
do{
for(int i=0; i<newRep.length; i++){
for(int j=0; j<trust\_t.length; j++){




double rp = 0.0;
double np = 0.0;
double dotproduct = 0.0;
for(int i=0; i<reputation.length; i++){
rp = rp + reputation[i]*reputation[i];
np = np + newRep[i]*newRep[i];













Trust Modeling with Non-Binary
Ratings for Distributed Intrusion
Detection
To protect an IDN (Intrusion Detection Network) from malicious attacks, it is important
to evaluate the trustworthiness of participating IDSes (Intrusion Detection Systems). We
adopt the Dirichlet family of probability density functions in our trust management for
estimating the likely future behavior of an IDS based on its past history. This theoretical
model allows us to track the uncertainty in estimating the trustworthiness of the IDS,
which improves the detection accuracy.
Bayesian statistics provides a theoretical foundation for measuring the uncertainty in
a decision that is based on a collection of observations. We are interested in knowing the
distribution of satisfaction levels of the feedback about alert evaluations from each peer
IDS and, particularly, using this information to estimate the satisfaction level of future
consultations. A Dirichlet distribution [63] is based on initial beliefs about an unknown
event represented by an a prior distribution. The initial beliefs combined with collected
sample data can be represented by a posterior distribution. The posterior distribution
suits our trust management model well since trust is updated based on the history of
interactions.
Let X be the discrete random variable denoting the satisfaction level of the feedback
from a peer IDS. X takes values in the set X = {x1, x2, ..., xk} (xi ∈ [0, 1], xi+1 > xi)
of the supported levels of satisfaction. Let ~p = {p1, p2, ..., pk} (
∑k
i=1 pi = 1) be the
probability distribution vector of X, i.e P{X = xi} = pi. Also, let ~γ = {γ1, γ2, ..., γk}
denote the vector of cumulative observations and initial beliefs of X. Then we can model
~p using a posterior Dirichlet distribution as follows:
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The expected value of the probability of X to be xi given the history of observations




In order to give more weight to recent observations over old ones, we embed a forget-




λti × ~Si + c0λt0 ~S0 (C.4)
where n is the number of observations; ~S0 is the initial beliefs vector. If no additional
information is available, all outcomes have an equal probability making S0j = 1/k for
all j ∈ {1, .., k}. Parameter c0 > 0 is an a priori constant, which puts a weight on the
initial beliefs. Vector ~Si denotes the satisfaction level of the ith evidence, which is a tuple
containing k − 1 elements set to zero and only one element set to 1, corresponding to
the selected satisfaction level for that evidence. Parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] is the forgetting
factor. A small λ makes old observations quickly forgettable. Parameter ti denotes the
time elapsed (age) since the ith evidence ~Si was observed.
Let ∆ti = ti − ti+1. For the purpose of scalability, the ~γ(n) in Equation C.4 can be





c0 ~S0 n = 0
λ∆tn × ~γ(n−1) + ~Sn n > 0
(C.5)
After a peer IDS receives the feedback for an alert evaluation, it assigns a satisfaction
value to the feedback. This satisfaction value is assigned one of the satisfaction levels in
the set X = {x1, x2, ..., xk} that has the closest value. Each satisfaction level xi also has
a weight wi.
Let puvi denote the probability that peer v provides answers to the requests sent by




i = 1. We model ~p
uv
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using Equation C.1. Let Y uv be the random variable denoting the weighted average of





In this model, we adopt a linear pondering factor for the weights wi = xi. The
trustworthiness of peer v as noticed by peer u is then calculated as:











where γuvi is the cumulated evidence that v has replied to u with satisfaction level xi.
We evaluate this Dirichlet-based trust model based on a simulated collaborative IDS
network where peers are distributed in the network, they may have different expertise
levels in detecting alerts, and some peers may be deceptive. In this simulation framework,
deceptive peers may have four different deception models: complementary, exaggerate
positive, exaggerate negative, and maximal harm. The first three deception models are
described in [85], where an adversary may choose to send feedback about the risk level
of an alert that is respectively opposite to, higher, or lower than the true risk level. We
also propose a maximal harm model where an adversary always chooses to report false
feedback with the intention to bring the most negative impact to the request sender.
For instance, when a deceptive peer using the maximal harm strategy receives a ranking
request and detects that the risk level of the request is “medium”, it sends feedback “no



















Figure C.1: Trust Values for Different Expertise Levels
Experimental results are shown in Figures C.1 and C.2. Figure C.1 shows the average
trust values of the honest peers with different expertise levels. The peers that have a
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higher expertise level have the larger average trust values. This indicates that different
expertise levels of the peers are able to be effectively identified by our trust model. Fig-
ure C.2 shows the impact of deceptive peers using the five different deception strategies.
As can be seen from this figure, the deceptive peers using the maximal harm strategy have
the lowest trust values, while the deceptive peers using the complimentary strategy have
the second lowest trust values. Our Dirichlet-based trust model is thus evaluated to be






















Figure C.2: Trust Values for Different Deception Strategies
We may extend our personalized approach by adopting the Dirichlet family of proba-
bility density functions in a similar way. We would replace the set of satisfaction levels by
the set of possible similarity values between buyers’ ratings and advisors’ ratings, when
modeling the private reputation of advisors. When modeling the public reputation of
advisors, the set will be replaced by the set of all possible consistency values between
advisors’ ratings for sellers and other advisors’ ratings for the same sellers.
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